LIBRARY 

OF   THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 


THEOLOGY  AND 
HUMAN  PROBLEMS 


THEOLOGY  AND 
HUMAN    PROBLEMS 

A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY  OF  ABSO- 
LUTE IDEALISM  AND  PRAGMATISM 
AS  INTERPRETERS  OF  RELIGION 


THE 

NATHANIEL  WILLIAM  TAYLOR  LECTURES 

For  1909-10 

GIVEN  BEFORE  THE  DIVINITY  SCHOOL  OF  YALE  UNIVERSITY 


BY 

EUGENE   WILLIAM   LYMAN,  D.  D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  CHRISTIAN  THEOLOGY  IN  BANGOR  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 


UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YOFK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1910 


COPYRIGHT,  1910,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  September,  1910 


So 

MY   FATHER 
WHOSE   LOVED    MEMORY 

AND 

TO   MY  MOTHER 

WHOSE  GRACIOUS   PRESENCE 

HELP   ME   TO   UNITE   THE   SEEN   AND    THE 

UNSEEN   WORLDS 


OF   THE 

UNIVERSITY 


PREFACE 

'T^HIS  volume  consists  of  the  lectures  de- 
livered at  Yale  University  in  December, 
1909,  on  the  Nathaniel  William  Taylor  founda- 
tion. The  lectures  are  published  as  prepared 
for  that  occasion,  in  the  hope  that  an  attempt 
at  a  popular  statement  of  the  great  themes  dis- 
cussed may  have  a  value  of  its  own. 

There  are  in  general  two  methods  open  to 
the  worker  in  the  field  of  theology.  They  are 
the  method  of  the  cloister  and  the  method  of 
the  clinic.  These  two  methods  may  be  dis- 
tinguished by  their  predominant  motives.  The 
one  seeks  primarily  to  protect  religion,  the 
other  strives  mainly  to  develop  religion.  The 
former  method  aims  first  of  all  to  gain  support 
for  existing  religious  truth  from  philosophy, 
tradition,  or  the  church.  The  latter  method 
aims  to  deepen  the  significance  of  religious 
truth  and  to  enlarge  its  boundaries  by  liberat- 

•  • 

vn 


PREFACE 

ing  and  stimulating  the  religious  life.  The  two 
methods  are,  in  more  technical  language,  the 
a  priori  method  and  the  method  of  experience. 
The  one  deserves  to  be  called  cloistral  because 
it  seeks  to  gain  its  fundamental  truths  from 
sources  other  than  that  of  man's  actual  religious 
experience.  The  other  deserves  to  be  called 
clinical  because  in  the  last  analysis  it  relies  for 
its  scientific  truth  upon  the  study  of  the  religious 
life  and  needs  of  men. 

The  two  methods  are,  for  various  reasons, 
not  as  clearly  distinguished  as  they  should  be. 
On  the  one  hand  a  thinker  of  the  cloistral  type 
may  be  concerned  to  make  his  results,  after 
they  have  been  gained,  as  far  as  possible 
serviceable  to  life,  and  so  the  fact  may  be 
obscured  that  serviceableness  to  life  is  not  the 
principle  on  which  he  depends  for  the  discovery 
of  truth.  On  the  other  hand  the  thinker  of  the 
second  type  may  be  led  to  sink  himself  deeply 
into  the  religious  life  of  the  past — and  in  truth 
he  must  be  one  who  knows  how  to  enter  into 
his  closet  and  shut  the  door — and  so  men 

viii 


PREFACE 

may  deem  his  method  cloistral,  whereas  it  really 
is  clinical.  For  this  reason  it  has  seemed  to 
me  that  an  effort  to  bring  out  the  contrast  be- 
tween these  two  methods,  as  they  bear  upon  the 
interpretation  of  religion,  might  be  of  real  ser- 
vice. The  object  of  these  lectures,  therefore, 
is  to  determine  the  relative  merits  of  the  clois- 
tral and  clinical  methods,  and  then  to  apply  the 
one  adopted  to  certain  great  themes  of  religion. 
I  desire  here  to  acknowledge  my  permanent  in- 
debtedness, in  whatever  theological  work  I  may 
do,  to  my  honored  teachers  on  the  Faculty  of 
Yale  Divinity  School.  In  the  field  of  construc- 
tive theological  thinking  I  owe  to  the  richly 
suggestive  and  profoundly  spiritual  mind  of 
Professor  Frank  C.  Porter  more  than  I  well  can 
express.  For  helpfulness  and  counsel  in  regard 
to  the  preparation  of  this  volume  special  thanks 
are  due  to  my  colleague,  Professor  Warren  J. 
Moulton,  and  to  the  Rev.  Herbert  A.  Jump, 
of  New  Britain,  Connecticut. 

EUGENE  W.  LYMAN. 

BANGOR  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY, 
May  26,  1910. 

ix 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION i 

CHAPTER 

I.    HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT    ....  8 

II.    THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL       .  59 

III.  ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE      ....  108 

IV.  MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS     ...  164 

NOTES 221 

INDEX <  229 


UNIVERSITY 


THEOLOGY  AND   HUMAN 
PROBLEMS 

INTRODUCTION 

'TNHEOLOGIES  are  judged,  in  the  long  run, 
not  by  their  symmetry  or  elaborateness, 
but  by  their  contribution  to  the  solution  of 
human  problems.  On  the  shelves  of  every 
theological  library  there  are  works  of  divinity 
which  are  far  more  neatly  constructed  and 
minutely  wrought  out  than  anything  that  the 
theological  writers  of  our  day  are  putting  forth. 
But  to  most  of  us  they  are  as  objects  in  a  mu- 
seum. They  are,  indeed,  to  be  studied  by  all 
who  would  have  full  mastery  over  present 
thought,  but  they  cannot  be  largely  appro- 
priated and  applied  to  the  present.  They  rest 
from  their  labors,  and  the  works  of  others  do 
follow  them.  Their  symmetry  and  elaborate- 
ness do  not  condemn  them,  but  neither  do  they 
preserve  them.  They  have  ceased  to  speak  to 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

us  simply  and  directly;  their  language  is  archaic 
and  foreign,  and  we  turn  to  those  whose  speech 
has  the  accents  of  our  mother  tongue. 

Most  of  these  elaborate  theological  writings 
of  the  past  are  for  our  time  what  the  wooden 
frigates  of  our  navy  were  for  the  Civil  War. 
On  a  certain  day  in  Hampton  Roads  one 
monitor  proved  to  be  worth  twenty  frigates  for 
the  protection  of  the  cause  of  the  Union.  The 
more  intricate  the  scheme  of  spars  and  rigging 
on  those  stately  vessels,  the  more  fatally  did 
they  carry  their  crews  down  into  the  sea.  There 
was  a  new  situation  to  cope  with,  and  hence 
new  methods  of  defence  and  attack  were  re- 
quired. In  a  similar  way  new  situations  con- 
front us  in  the  world  of  thought,  and  the  church 
militant  must  have  its  Ericssons  and  its  Edisons 
as  well  as  its  officers  of  the  line  if  it  is  to  hold 
its  ancient  place  in  our  civilization. 

Let  me  not  speak,  however,  as  though  the 
issues  of  life  with  which  theology  is  concerned 
are  necessarily  all  new.  On  the  contrary, 
many  are  as  old  as  the  human  heart,  out  of 
which  they  proceed.  The  point  for  us  to  bear 
in  mind  is  simply  that,  whether  the  issues  be 

2 


INTRODUCTION 

new  or  old,  the  capacity  to  help  in  meeting  them 
is  that  by  which  theologies  are  judged.  The 
problem  burdening  the  spirits  of  men  to-day 
may  be  the  one  with  which  the  thinkers  of  Is- 
rael struggled  more  than  two  millenniums  ago, 
'Why  do  the  righteous  suffer?"  or  it  may  be 
the  modern  problem,  'How  can  a  man  be  just, 
when  he  is  a  member  of  an  unjust  industrial 
system?"  It  matters  not,  so  long  as  the  issue 
is  one  that  tries  men's  souls.  Whatever  that 
issue  may  be,  our  theology  will  be  judged  in  the 
light  of  it.  Theology  may  indeed  repudiate 
the  demand  that  it  furnish  instant  and  final 
solutions  for  all  such  problems,  but  it  cannot 
repudiate  the  demand  that  whatever  it  has  to 
say  should  bear  upon  those  problems,  and 
that  its  right  to  a  hearing  be  proportionate  to 
the  adequacy  of  the  solutions  it  offers. 

The  one  who  attempts  to  form  his  theology 
in  forgetfulness  of  the  turbid  stream  of  human 
life  is  thus  foredoomed  to  failure.  The  the- 
ologian cannot  live  unto  himself.  He  must 
see  the  visions  and  feel  the  burdens  of  his  age, 
he  must  vibrate  responsively  to  the  great 
passions  and  aspirations  of  his  kind,  he  must 

3 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

know  the  heart's  bitterness  and  its  yearning 
tenderness,  he  must  be  mindful  of  the  mys- 
teries that  shroud  the  soul  of  man,  and  must 
perceive  how  the  interweaving  and  entangling 
of  lives  with  one  another  make  up  the  glory 
and  the  tragedy  of  existence.  These  human 
realities  must  enter  into  his  experience,  if  his 
interpretation  of  the  eternal  life  is  to  come 
home  to  men  with  power.  He  needs  to  behold 
how 


Life,  like  a  dome  of  many  colored  glass, 
Stains  the  white  radiance  of  eternity," 


in  order  that  he  may  do  something  toward  help- 
ing each  individual— with  his  own  peculiarly 
colored  outlook,  realize  something  of  the  ful- 
ness of  the  light  celestial. 

The  fundamental  conviction  on  which  these 
lectures  are  based  is  that  theology  cannot  be 
isolated  from  human  problems  without  the 
most  fatal  results.  But  such  a  statement  in  its 
broad  and  general  form  arouses  the  dissent  of 
no  one.  On  the  contrary  it  is  likely  to  be  ac- 
cepted complacently  as  an  obvious  truth.  The 
idea  becomes  momentous  only  when  we  ask 

4 


INTRODUCTION 

what  kind  of  a  relation  exists  between  human 
problems  and  theology.  How  far  in  the  realm 
of  religious  truth  does  such  a  relation  extend  ? 
How  constant  and  pervasive  is  it  ?  Are  we, 
with  the  supernaturalist  of  the  older  type,  to 
conceive  of  religious  truth  as  let  down  from 
heaven  like  the  New  Jerusalem,  but  of  course 
let  down  for  the  salvation  and  perfecting  of 
men,  and  so  to  that  extent  practical  in  its  nat- 
ure ?  Or  are  we  to  conceive  of  religious  truth, 
with  those  who  base  their  theology  on  absolute 
idealism,  as  a  land  into  which  we  migrate,  a 
realm  whose  geography  is  fixed,  but  which  has 
a  practical  aspect  in  the  sense  that  we  are  to 
inhabit  and  till  it  ?  Or  again,  as  the  Ritschlian 
thinks,  is  religious  truth  like  a  vessel  bearing 
us  over  an  unplumbed  and  uncharted  sea 
toward  a  New  World,  of  which  our  pilot,  alone 
of  all  men,  has  taught  us  to  dream  ?  Or  once 
more,  shall  we  adopt  the  teaching  of  the  prag- 
matist,  according  to  which  all  truth,  that  of 
religion  included,  is  like  the  body  of  the  soul, 
a  thing  instinct  with  life  in  every  part,  the 
organ  by  which  a  soul  communicates  with  its 
fellows  and  with  the  Infinite,  growing  as  the 

5 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

soul  grows,  and  as  immortal  as  the  spirits, 
finite  or  Infinite,  by  which  its  tissue  is  woven  ? 
The  question  need  be  put  no  more  concretely 
than  this.  We  already  have  come  upon  one  of 
those 

'Battles  of  opinion 
That  divide  the  sons  of  men." 

The  task  of  the  present  lectures  is  to  try  to 
fashion  the  general  conviction  that  theology 
should  be  kept  in  close  relation  to  human  prob- 
lems into  greater  definiteness  by  discussing  it 
in  the  light  of  the  contrasts  presented  by  the 
different  points  of  view  just  mentioned.  The 
stand-point  of  the  older  supernaturalism  indeed 
has  been  criticised  so  thoroughly  in  our  time 
that  it  will  be  referred  to  only  incidentally  in 
the  following  lectures;  but  the  stand-points  of 
the  absolute  idealist,  the  Ritschlian,  and  the 
pragmatist  must  be  taken  up  for  as  serious 
discussion  as  the  compass  of  this  lectureship 
allows.  How  do  these  doctrines  bear  upon  the 
issues  of  life  ?  To  what  extent  do  they  lead  us 
into  direct  contact  with  the  great  human  prob- 
lems, and  afford  us  hope  of  gaining  in  some 

6 


INTRODUCTION 

measure  their  solutions  ?  With  this  question 
in  mind  let  us  proceed  to  the  theme  of  the  hour, 
which  is,  'Highways  of  Thought,"  and  the 
approach  they  may  afford  us  to  human  prob- 
lems. 


I 

HIGHWAYS   OF  THOUGHT 

TIT'HATEVER  may  be  the  special  goal  that 
a  student  is  seeking,  he  finds  that,  if  he 
wishes  to  make  real  progress  toward  it,  he  must 
follow  one  of  the  great  highways  of  thought. 
These  highways  as  one  now  finds  them  are  the 
creation  of  no  single  man.  A  few  great  pioneer 
thinkers  did  indeed  first  traverse  them  alone. 
All  honor  to  those  pioneers!  But  the  trails 
which  they  opened  up  have  since  been  trampled 
broad  by  the  passage  of  many  thinkers.  As 
for  the  average  philosopher  or  theologian,  he  is 
little  more  than  a  macadamizer  on  one  of  the 
great  highways — a  worthy  but  not  a  glorious 
task.  Now  so  inevitably  does  the  commerce  of 
thought  move  along  a  certain  few  main  high- 
ways that  present-day  theology  cannot  avoid 
making  use  of  them,  even  if  it  would.  In 

truth,  it  would   not  be   difficult  to  show  that 

8 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

theology  has  had  no  small  share  in  shaping  the 
course  of  some  of  these  highways.  Our  present 
question,  however,  is  not  what  theology  may 
have  done  toward  constructing  the  avenues  of 
thought,  but  rather,  what  is  their  capacity  for 
serving  the  ends  of  theology.  Hence  we  ask, 
which  of  these  highways  facilitates  most  the  task 
of  theology  as  the  servant  of  religion,  and  enables 
it  to  deal  most  effectively  with  human  problems  ? 
The  highways  of  thought  that  are  to  come 
under  our  survey  are  three:  The  highway  of 
absolute  idealism;  the  highway  of  the  critical 
philosophy,  or  Kantianism  (for  that  is  the  one 
along  which  the  Ritschlian  caravan  is  moving); 
and  the  highway  of  pragmatism. 


First,  then,  the  highway  of  absolute  idealism. 
What  is  its  starting-point,  what  is  the  charac- 
ter of  the  course  it  opens  to  us,  whither  does  it 
lead  our  thinking  ?  We  should  bear  in  mind, 
at  the  outset,  that  the  general  term  '  ideal- 
ism ''  has  many  associations  gathered  more  or 
less  loosely  about  it — associations  that  are  ethi- 

9 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

cal  and  spiritual  as  well  as  philosophical  in 
the  more  formal  sense — and  that  in  our  discus- 
sion of  absolute  idealism  we  have  to  do,  not 
with  these  larger  and  vaguer  associations,  but 
with  a  definite  logical  scheme  of  philosophy. 
Absolute  idealism  asks  us  to  begin  with  the 
question  as  to  what  it  is  to  "be" — what  do  we 
mean  when  we  say  that  a  thing  exists  ?  Just 
as  one  may  begin  the  study  of  geology  by  ex- 
amining his  own  door-step,  so  this  type  of  phi- 
losophy asks  us  to  turn  our  attention  to  those 
well-worn  conceptions  that  have  sustained  the 
going  out  and  the  coming  in  of  our  thought 
since  our  minds  were  first  freed  from  their 
swaddling-clothes.  What  must  be  the  nature 
of  anything  that  can  be  called  'real"  ? 

The  answer  which  absolute  idealism  gives  to 
this  question  is  that  to  exist  is  to  be  a  part 
of  some  consciousness.  Everything  that  exists 
is  known  to  some  consciousness,  and  its  being 
known  is  the  reason  for  its  existence.  Con- 
sciousness is  the  tissue  out  of  which  facts  are 
made.  Mind  is  the  only  reality,  and  every  ex- 
istent thing  is  part  and  parcel  of  some  mind. 

Facts  and  ideas  are  not  two  different  sorts  of 

10 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

reality  any  more  than  the  blue  sky  above  us  is 
different  from  the  air  we  breathe;  both  have 
this  in  common,  that  they  are  experiences  of 
some  mind. 

But  now  the  same  principle  must  apply  to 
the  existence  of  our  human  minds.  They, 
too,  are  facts,  so  they,  too,  must  be  a  part  of 
some  consciousness.  Moreover,  between  every 
thing  and  every  other  thing  exists  a  network  of 
relations.  These  relations  are  also  facts  and 
must  be  known.  And  so  we  are  swiftly  brought 
to  an  Absolute  Knower,  one  All-inclusive  Mind, 
of  whose  experience  everything  that  exists  is  a 
part.  Every  apparently  isolated  object  in  the 
world  is  like  the  bit  of  cloth  that  David  held  up 
before  the  eyes  of  Saul  at  En-gedi — a  fragment 
of  the  king's  robe.  All  things  are  a  part  of 
the  one  divine  experience.  We  ourselves  have 
our  existence  as  objects  of  God's  thought.  Out 
of  his  consciousness  is  everything  made  that  has 
been  made. 

But  the  same  reasoning  which  is  applied  to  all 
that  now  exists  is  also  extended  to  the  past  and 
the  future.  What  reality  have  past  events  ? 

Surely  they  have  some  reality.    The  world  that 

ii 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

Alexander  conquered  has  more  reality  for  us 
than  the  other  worlds  for  whose  existence  he 
sighed  that  he  might  conquer  them.  Now  on 
the  principles  of  absolute  idealism  we  must  say 
that  the  reality  of  that  past  world  consists  in 
the  fact  that  to  some  consciousness  it  is  present 
— that  is  to  say,  what  is  past  to  us  is  a  pres- 
ent reality  to  the  Absolute.  The  future,  too,  is 
to  be  dealt  with  in  the  same  way.  The  abso- 
lute idealist  would  say  that  last  July  the  Payne 
tariff  measure  was  more  of  a  reality  than  Presi- 
dent Taft's  possible  veto,  as  the  statute-books 
now  show.  Put  yourself  for  a  moment  back 
to  the  time  of  last  summer's  session  of  Con- 
gress. As  an  absolute  idealist  you  should  say: 
'To  human  vision  this  tariff  bill  is  only  a  pos- 
sible law,  still  undetermined  in  some  of  its 
features.  But  to  the  view  of  the  Absolute  it 
is  a  present  reality,  with  all  its  details  defined." 
Thus  the  all-inclusive  consciousness  of  the 
Absolute  embraces  not  only  all  reality  that 
from  our  finite  point  of  view  can  be  said  to  co- 
exist in  the  present,  but  also  all  that  belongs 
to  what  we  call  past  and  future.  In  other 

words,  the  Absolute  is  timeless.     That  is  to  say, 

12 


HIGHWAYS   OF  THOUGHT 

while  his  consciousness  includes  our  experiences 
of  time,  for  him  as  a  whole  there  is  no  time, 
and  as  a  consequence  whatever  has  been  or  is 
to  be  is  a  present  fact  to  him. 

In  order  that  this  conception  may  not  seem 
too  baffling  to  us  it  should  be  considered  in  the 
light  of  the  use  Professor  Royce  makes  of  the 
idea  of  'the  span  of  consciousness."  lsjs  The 
present  moment,  as  we  actually  feel  it,  really 
lasts  a  certain  brief  portion  of  time.  What 
we  call  'now"  may  be  a  fraction  of  a  second 
long,  or  it  may  be  two  minutes  long,  but  it  is 
usually  a  matter  of  seconds  and  never  is  it  a 
literal  instant  of  time.  That  is,  each  conscious 
moment  *  spans "  a  certain  brief  amount  of 
time,  and  the  things  that  happen  in  that  section 
are  felt  all  together.  But  now  this  span  of  our 
consciousness  may  be  regarded  as  a  perfectly 
arbitrary  matter.  We  may  say  that  man's 
mental  apparatus  is  simply  set  to  run  in  a  par- 
ticular way,  whereas  it  might  have  been  set  to 
run  in  a  quite  different  way.  The  long  hand 
on  a  stop-watch  sweeps  the  dial  every  second 

*A11  references  to  literature  are  to  be  found  in  the  notes 
at  the  end  of  the  book. 

13 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

instead  of  slowly  traversing  it  once  an  hour,  as 
with  an  ordinary  watch.  So  a  consciousness 
might  have  a  time-span  of  one  millionth  part 
of  a  second,  and  thus  be  able  to  perceive  com- 
plex events  where  we  perceive  nothing  at  all. 
In  the  same  way  we  can  think  of  consciousnesses 
having  a  vastly  longer  time-span  than  ours. 
Now  the  Absolute  must  have  an  infinite  time- 
span,  and  hence  to  him  all  things,  which  to  us 
are  either  present,  past,  or  future,  are  combined 
in  one  vast  conscious  moment. 

One  other  characteristic  of  absolute  idealism 
should  be  specially  noted.  Its  principal  doc- 
trines are  all  a  matter  of  rigid  logical  necessity. 
Each  step  in  their  unfolding  is  one  that  we 
are  forced  to  take,  if  only  we  will  think  con- 
sistently. As  Professor  Royce  declares,  to  de- 
scribe the  nature  of  being  in  any  other  way 
results  in  a  contradiction  of  terms.  This  ap- 
plies equally  to  the  doctrine  that  all  things 
exist  as  parts  of  some  consciousness,  to  the 
doctrine  that  all  finite  consciousnesses  are  parts 
of  the  Absolute,  and  to  that  which  declares  that 
not  only  what  now  exists,  but  the  past  and 
future  as  well,  are  alike  completely  present  to 

14 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

the  Absolute  Consciousness.  The  absolute  ideal- 
ist's whole  argument  is  made  to  move  forward 
by  a  rack-and-pinion  process,  and  is  represented 
as  self-locking  against  any  attempt  to  reverse  its 
onward  movement. 

Such,  then,  in  its  most  general  features,  is 
the  highway  of  absolute  idealism.2  Now  let 
us  turn  to  an  examination  of  the  outcome  of 
this  course  of  thought  in  the  light  of  our  general 
theme.  How  does  absolute  idealism  bear  upon 
human  problems  ? 

To  begin  with,  we  should  note  that  this  high- 
way of  absolute  idealism  is  built  in  part  out  of 
the  ruins  of  materialism.  Its  coursel  eads  di- 
rectly over  the  site  where  the  materialistic  cit- 
adel was  reared.  It  is  true  that  the  first  honors 
for  the  overthrow  of  materialism  go  to  the 
philosophy  of  Kant.  But  absolute  idealism 
does  the  work  more  thoroughly,  because  it  not 
only  undermines  materialism  by  negative  crit- 
icism, but  goes  on  to  construct  a  positive  spir- 
itual metaphysics.  And  after  all,  in  practical 
effect  materialism  is  completely  vanquished 
only  when  some  form  of  spiritual  metaphysics 
has  been  put  in  its  place. 

15 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

But  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  absolute 
idealism  maintains  its  authority  with  the  aver- 
age lay  student  of  philosophy  altogether  too 
largely  by  virtue  of  the  overthrow  of  materi- 
alism, in  which  it  has  had  a  conspicuous  share. 
Just  as  the  Republican  party  has  in  the  past 
sometimes  maintained  its  ascendency,  in  spite 
of  grave  delinquencies,  on  the  strength  of  the 
Civil  War,  so  certain  problems  that  absolute 
idealism  involves  remain  in  the  background, 
particularly  for  the  student  of  theology,  because 
of  its  success  in  routing  materialism.  We 
should  proceed,  therefore,  to  consider  the  more 
positive  contributions  of  absolute  idealism,  if 
we  would  rightly  appraise  this  point  of  view. 

The  main  contribution  that  idealism  makes 
to  theology,  and  one  which  bears  positively  on 
the  solution  of  human  problems,  is  the  idea  of 
the  immanence  of  God.  The  place  of  this 
conception  in  the  idealistic  scheme  we  have 
seen  already  in  the  doctrine  that  all  things, 
including  our  finite  conscious  lives,  have  their 
being  only  in  and  through  the  being  of  God. 
As  for  the  value  of  this  doctrine  for  life,  it  is 

widely  appreciated  in  our  day.     God  immanent 

16 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

in  his  universe  means  that  the  world  in  which 
we  live,  however  baffling  to  our  understand- 
ing, is  still  our  home.  The  stars  are  not  merely 
lakes  of  fiery  metal  in  the  chill  expanse  of  space; 
this  earth  is  something  more  than  the  reeking 
battle-ground  of  animal  species;  man  is  not 
simply  a  gregarious  animal  endowed  with  su- 
perlative cunning;  society  must  not  be  regarded 
as  merely  an  Asiatic  fair  where  the  guileful 
blandish  the  unwary  out  of  their  means  of  sub- 
sistence. No,  plausible  as  such  views  of  our 
world  may  be  made  to  appear,  reason  dictates 
a  higher  creed.  This  mighty  universe,  with  its 
system  upon  system  of  worlds,  pulsates  with 
an  infinite  life;  subtle  waves  of  intelligence  vi- 
brate to  its  farthest  coast;  infinitely  numerous 
attractions  and  repulsions,  organic  tendencies, 
instincts,  conscious  impulses,  and  moral  striv- 
ings are  being  woven  into  the  realization  of 
one  vast  purpose,  in  which  all  that  has  spiritual 
meaning  will  find  itself  embraced.  The  veil  of 
mystery  hangs  close  about  us,  but  it  is  shot 
through  with  light.  Life  has  its  grinding  toil, 
its  bitter  defeats,  and  its  appalling  tragedies, 
but  the  immanent  God  who  toils  and  suffers 

17 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

with  us  has  unmeasured  resources  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  his  purposes;  and  he  wel- 
comes each  toiling  and  struggling  soul  into  the 
august  fellowship  of  his  age-long  labors  and 
achievements. 

It  seems  impossible  to  deny  the  practical  and 
moral  power  imparted  by  this  faith  in  the  im- 
manence of  God  which  I  have  just  tried  to  de- 
scribe, and  the  further  meaning  of  which  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  develop  in  the  later  lect- 
ures of  this  course.  But  that  to  which  I  ask 
your  attention  now  is  the  relation  between  the 
idea  of  the  divine  immanence  and  the  timeless 
character  attributed  to  God  by  absolute  ideal- 
ism. My  question  is  whether  the  notion  that 
God  is  timeless  does  not  tend  to  neutralize  the 
religious  and  practical  value  of  faith  in  his  im- 
manence. 

So  long  as  we  apply  the  idea  of  the  divine 
immanence  only  to  physical  nature,  this  diffi- 
culty remains  in  the  background.  For  the 
carrying  through  of  this  idea  in  the  physical 
realm  turns  mainly  on  showing  that  space 
has  only  subordinate  reality,  and  that  conse- 
quently the  world  of  material  things  in  space 

18 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

may  be  regarded  ultimately  as  one  form  in 
which  the  life  of  God  finds  expression.  Such 
an  argument  has  a  solid  basis  in  experience, 
because  in  our  own  inner  life  we  have  knowl- 
edge of  reality  that  is  not  subject  to  the  forms 
of  space. 

The  difficulty  comes  into  the  foreground 
when  we  apply  the  idea  of  the  divine  imma- 
nence to  history,  which  indeed  is  the  realm 
where  it  should  have  the  greatest  practical  value. 
The  absolute  idealist  affirms  that  God  is  time- 
less. But  of  course  time  is  the  form  which 
characterizes  history  through  and  through.  In 
truth,  time  pertains  to  all  our  psychic  expe- 
rience, both  outer  and  inner.  In  spite  of  the 
position  taken  by  absolute  idealism,  it  is  a 
question  whether  we  can  conceive  spirit  at  all 
concretely  apart  from  the  idea  of  time.  But 
leaving  that  aside  for  the  present,  it  is  of  course 
impossible  to  think  of  history  as  anything  but 
a  series  of  events  in  time.  Now  if  God  were 
really  timeless,  could  he  be  immanent  in  his- 
tory ?  It  seems  plain  that  he  could  not,  and 
the  idealistic  doctrine  appears  definitely  to  ex- 
clude such  a  thought.  According  to  Pro- 

19 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

fessor  Royce  finite  consciousnesses  do  all  that 
is  done  in  time.3  God  does  not  do  anything 
in  time,  except  as  we  think  of  his  action  as 
identically  the  same  as  some  finite  action. 
God,  then,  is  not  an  actor  in  history  whose 
deeds  count  in  addition  to  our  deeds.4  So  far 
as  events  in  history  are  concerned,  he  acts  only 
as  Congress  acts — that  is,  when  its  members 
vote. 

This  doctrine  of  God  as  a  timeless  Absolute 
results  in  the  '  remoteness "  and  "foreignness" 
of  that  conception,  of  which  Professor  James 
complains.5  It  leads  to  the  distinction  between 
the  'Temporal  Order '''  and  the  "Eternal 
Order,"  which  runs  through  the  pages  of  Pro- 
fessor Royce's  great  work,6  and  which,  as  the 
exposition  proceeds,  grows  into  a  chasm  that 
yawns  as  widely  as  a  dualistic  chasm  well  can 
in  a  deliberately  monistic  treatise.  Every- 
thing that  happens  belongs  to  the  Temporal 
Order.  The  Eternal  Order  simply  is.  Any 
actor  in  the  Temporal  Order  may  at  any  mo- 
ment be  'viewed'  from  the  stand-point  of  the 
Eternal  Order,  but  as  so  viewed  he  is  identically 
the  same  as  when  'viewed  eternally "  at  any 

20 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

other  moment,  say  fifty  years  later.  As  living, 
active  personalities  we  belong  to  the  Tem- 
poral Order,  whereas  God  belongs  to  another 
order  of  being. 

As  one  contemplates  the  idea  of  the  timeless 
Absolute  in  its  strict  meaning — and  especially 
as  one  regards  it  from  the  stand-point  of  the 
ethical  life  with  its  constant  activity  in  the 
production  of  spiritual  goods — it  loses  all  power 
to  call  forth  our  worship,  and  appears  like  a 
huge  spherical  aquarium,  encompassing  within 
itself  motion  and  life,  but  as  a  whole  rigid, 
glassy,  and  motionless.  Surely  the  timeless  Ab- 
solute is  not  the  supreme  solver  of  human  prob- 
lems, nor  the  God  to  whose  worship  we  should 
summon  the  aspiring  and  struggling  sons  of  men. 
The  Jehovah  of  the  Old  Testament  is  a  God 
of  battles,  and  One  that  worketh  righteousness 
upon  the  earth.  The  Heavenly  Father  of  our 
New  Testament  faith  is  one  who  is  seeking  to 
reconcile  all  things  unto  himself,  and  whose 
Spirit  agonizes  with  our  spirits.  For  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness  the  God  of  activity,  of  infinite 
purposes  and  of  redeeming  power  will  always 

have   profounder   practical    meaning   than   the 

21 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

timeless  Absolute  of  idealistic  speculation,  even 
though  the  latter  be  conceived  as  the  Envelope 
of  all  finite  existence. 

Thus  we  see  that  absolute  idealism  contains 
elements  which  impair  the  practical  value  of  its 
richest  insight.  While  it  undertakes  to  establish 
the  immanence  of  God,  it  does  so  in  such  a  way  as 
to  rob  the  result  of  its  worth.  Now  the  ultimate 
source  of  the  difficulty  is  the  method  employed. 
Absolute  idealism  assumes  that  the  deductive 
method  must  predominate  in  the  field  of 
metaphysics.  Hence  it  seeks  to  work  out  a 
spiritual  view  of  the  universe  by  logical  demon- 
stration. Professor  Royce,  referring  to  his 
own  position  writes:  "The  only  ground  for 
this  definition  of  Being  lies  in  the  fact  that 
every  other  conception  of  reality  proves,  upon 
analysis,  to  be  self-contradictory,  precisely  in 
so  far  as  it  does  not  in  essence  agree  with  this 
one;  while  every  effort  directly  to  deny  the 
truth  of  this  conception  proves,  upon  analysis, 
to  involve  the  covert  affirmation  of  this  very 
conception  itself.  Upon  these  assertions  of  the 
absolute  logical  necessity  of  our  conception  of 

Being,  our  whole  case  in  this  argument  rests."7 

22 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

The  method  which  leads  us  to  the  fundamental 
truths  of  the  universe  is  therefore  wholly  a 
matter  of  the  intellect. 

Now  the  certainty  claimed  for  the  results 
of  this  method  has  blinded  men  to  its  one  sided- 
ness.  After  all,  if  we  are  to  gain  a  genuinely 
spiritual  interpretation  of  the  universe,  we  must 
draw  upon  the  entire  spiritual  experience  of 
man.  One  cannot  construct  a  symphony  by 
arithmetic  nor  paint  a  landscape  by  geometry, 
however  much  these  sciences  may  have  to  do 
with  music  and  painting.  The  soul  of  the  artist 
with  all  its  powers  must  be  engaged  in  the 
work,  or  the  spiritual  meaning  without  which 
any  work  of  art  is  dead  will  be  wanting.  So 
in  gaining  the  deepest  truths  of  the  universe  one 
cannot  rely  on  the  intellect  alone,  but  must 
have  recourse  to  moral  and  religious  experience 
as  well,  and  in  fact  must  allow  this  highest  type 
of  experience  to  play  the  decisive  role.  In  the 
actual  practice  of  the  ideal  life,  and  in  the  vital 
exercise  of  religious  faith,  the  deepest  insights 
are  gained,  and  it  is  only  through  these  highest 
activities  that  we  come  to  a  full  assurance  of 
the  spirituality  of  the  universe  in  which  we  live. 

23 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

Absolute  idealism,  it  is  true,  always  has  recog- 
nized that  moral  faith  could  serve  in  lieu  of 
philosophy,  but  not  that  it  was  one  of  the  prime 
resources  of  philosophy.  It  has  conceived  faith 
to  be  serviceable  for  the  erection,  as  it  were,  of 
squatters'  cabins,  which  should  be  replaced  as 
soon  as  possible  by  the  more  capacious  struct- 
ures that  the  pure  intellect  rears.  But  these 
constructions  of  the  pure  intellect  prove  in  the 
end  to  be  too  much  like  certain  European 
cathedrals  whose  sites  have  been  determined 
solely  by  some  legend  of  the  church — they  are 
too  remote  from  the  avenues  of  daily  life  to  be 
able  to  render  large  service  to  the  spiritual 
needs  of  mankind.  We  therefore  must  prose- 
cute our  inquiry  further,  in  the  hope  of  finding  a 
method  that  will  make  possible  a  larger  use  of 
our  moral  and  religious  experience  in  forming 
our  conceptions  of  the  world  and  of  life.  To 
this  end  we  proceed  to  a  brief  survey  of  our 
second  highway  of  thought. 


24 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

II 

The  critical  philosophy  of  Kant,  although 
the  creation  of  a  single  thinker,  has  also  be- 
come one  of  the  broad  highways  of  thought. 
The  modern  idealist  follows  it  for  a  certain 
portion  of  its  course,  and  both  theologians  and 
positivists  are  to  be  found  therein.  Since,  how- 
ever, it  is  on  the  whole  the  chosen  avenue  of 
a  definite  school  of  theological  thinking,  the 
Ritschlian  School,  our  cursory  account  of  it  will 
have  reference  solely  to  certain  main  positions 
at  which  these  theologians  arrive.  And  this  is 
why  we  revert  to  the  critical  philosophy  after 
our  discussion  of  absolute  idealism.  Since  the 
work  of  Kant  preceded  and  initiated  the  type 
of  idealism  that  we  have  just  discussed,  it  would 
seem  natural  to  follow  the  same  order  in  our 
present  survey.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the 
Ritschlian  theologians,  as  well  as  many  natural 
scientists,  have  turned  'back  to  Kant"  in  re- 
action from  absolute  idealism,  and  hence  in 
considering  the  service  that  the  highways  of 
thought  render  to  theology  our  present  order 
is  the  more  natural. 

25 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

Kant  furnishes  the  entering  wedge  for  that 
larger  recognition  of  religious  experience  for 
which  we  are  seeking.  This  he  does  because 
he  makes  faith  one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of 
his  philosophy.  By  faith  Kant  does  not  mean 
a  blind  acquiescence  to  authority,  nor  a  merely 
intellectual  acceptance  of  doctrine;  he  means  by 
it  rather  a  moral  attitude  of  the  soul,  an  active 
fidelity  to  the  good,  that  kind  of  faith  which  the 
prophet  Habakkuk  meant  when  he  declared 
that  the  righteous  shall  live  by  his  faithfulness. 
In  faith  so  understood  Kant  finds  one  of  the 
essential  functions  of  the  human  spirit,  which 
philosophy  cannot  transcend,  and  hence  should 
justify  and  utilize.  Let  us  recall  how  this  is 
done  in  his  philosophy. 

The  presupposition  on  which  Kant  accords 
to  faith  a  fundamental  place  is  his  doctrine  of 
the  limits  of  human  knowledge.8  He  analyzes 
the  constitution  of  the  mind  as  the  statesman 
analyzes  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  he  feels  forced  to  become  a  strict-con- 
structionist.  The  understanding,  as  he  shows, 
is  equipped  for  its  work  with  certain  funda- 
mental principles,  notably  the  laws  of  cau- 

26 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

sation  and  substance,  but  what  is  their  scope  ? 
Formerly  these  laws  were  employed  to  settle 
questions  in  the  metaphysical  realm,  but  Kant 
denies  that  this  is  justifiable.  The  true  func- 
tion of  these  laws  is  to  serve  as  the  means 
by  which  we  reduce  to  order  the  experiences 
of  our  senses  and  the  facts  of  the  inner  life, 
and  more  than  this  we  cannot  say.  We  know 
that  we  have  a  right  to  use  these  funda- 
mental principles  of  the  understanding  to  this 
extent,  for  otherwise  our  world  would  not  be 
the  world  of  law  which  it  really  is.  It  would 
be  just  a  mass  of  miscellaneous  and  incoherent 
experiences — an  April  fool's  world,  in  which 
the  sugar  was  salt,  and  the  cake  cotton,  and 
the  pocket-books  vanished  from  the  sidewalk 
as  we  tried  to  pick  them  up.  Hence  it  is  legiti- 
mate to  use  the  laws  of  causation  and  sub- 
stance as  the  warp  into  which  the  woof  of  ex- 
perience furnished  by  the  senses  is  woven,  but 
we  have  no  ground  for  extending  them  into 
the  field  of  metaphysics.  Knowledge,  in  the  ac- 
curate sense  of  the  term — that  is,  theoretical 
or  scientific  knowledge — is  limited  to  phenom- 
ena. We  know  things  as  they  appear  to  us, 

but  not  as  they  are  in  themselves.    Man  may  be 

27 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

free,  but  so  far  as  our  knowledge  can  go  he  is 
causally  determined  in  every  act.  The  soul 
may  be  immortal,  and  there  may  be  a  great 
First  Cause  or  unitary  World-Ground  or  an 
Absolute  All-inclusive  Consciousness,  but  these 
points  never  can  be  matters  of  knowledge  in 
the  true  sense  of  the  term.  The  laws  of  thought 
as  applied  to  experience  give  us  none  of  these 
things,  and  when  we  cut  loose  from  experi- 
ence and  pass  to  metaphysical  speculation, 
we  simply  slip  the  belt  from  the  driving-wheel 
of  thought — the  machinery  by  which  the  real 
work  of  knowing  is  done  stands  motionless,  and 
while  our  thinking  may  go  on  with  great  free- 
dom, it  accomplishes  nothing  except  to  endanger 
its  own  coherence. 

The  critical  philosophy  thus  appears  to  give 
us  a  very  narrow  world.  It  closes  to  our  in- 
tellect the  old  realm  of  metaphysics.  It  requires 
the  philosopher  to  have  a  paid-up  capital  of 
experience  for  all  his  transactions,  and  it  con- 
fines him  chiefly  to  working  out  more  fully  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  The  physical  sciences 
and  psychology  cover  the  realm  where  real 
knowledge  is  to  be  had. 

But  now  comes  in  the  other  great  charac- 

28 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

teristic  of  the  critical  philosophy.  Where 
knowledge  is  excluded  faith  is  given  a  passport. 
Kant  himself  declared  that  he  must  limit 
knowledge  in  order  to  make  room  for  faith.9 
After  the  boundaries  of  the  theoretical  reason 
have  been  determined,  the  sphere  of  the  practi- 
cal reason  is  disclosed. 

The  practical  reason  deals  with  man's 
moral  life,  and  with  the  relation  between  that 
life  and  the  world  in  which  it  is  lived.10  Its 
fundamental  teaching  is  that  the  sense  of  duty 
is  the  kingliest  quality  in  man,  and  has  ultimate 
authority  for  him.  Any  deliberate  conviction, 
so  long  as  it  bears  the  vignette  of  the  sovereign 
consciousness  "I  ought,"  is  absolutely  binding 
on  the  soul  of  man.  But  actual  allegiance  to 
the  principle  of  moral  authority  within  us  calls 
for  the  exercise  of  faith.  It  requires  us  to  shape 
our  lives  in  accordance  with  the  convictions 
that  the  will  is  free,  that  the  soul  is  immor- 
tal, and  that  God  exists  and  rules  this  world. 
These  ideas  are  postulates  of  our  moral  con- 
sciousness, and  are  valid,  because  without  them 
we  cannot  rationally  live  the  moral  life.  Thus 

through  our  moral  natures  we  lay  hold  of  truths 

29 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

that  our  intellectual  natures  alone  never  can 
attain,  and  that  relate  to  the  metaphysical 
realm,  from  which  the  intellect  is  excluded.11 
The  practical  reason,  therefore,  affords  us  a 
new  kind  of  knowledge — a  knowledge  gained 
through  faith. 

Kant,  however,  very  carefully  bounds  this 
realm  of  faith.  God,  freedom,  and  immortality 
are  objects  of  knowledge  only  in  a  restricted 
sense.  They  are  matters  of  practical  knowledge, 
but  Kant  still  insists  that  in  the  full  and  accurate 
sense  of  the  word  knowledge  does  not  extend 
beyond  phenomena.  In  the  strictest  use  of  our 
terms  all  that  we  have  arrived  at  is  that  we 
should  act  "as  if"  we  were  free,  "as  if"  immor- 
tality awaited  us,  "as  if9  there  were  a  God.12 
So  to  act  is  our  duty,  and  hence  for  practical 
purposes  these  ideas  represent  reality,  but  more 
than  this  we  cannot  say.  The  mainland  of 
experience  belongs  to  scientific  knowledge, 
which,  however,  is  able  to  derive  from  it  only 
a  world  of  sense  perceptions  and  mechanical 
laws.  For  faith  are  reserved  a  few  islands  off  the 
coast,  where  it  may  keep  its  lights  burning  in 
the  hope  of  sustaining  some  commerce  with 

3° 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

the  great  deep  beyond.  We  may  feel  inclined 
to  protest  against  a  philosophy  which  thus  con- 
demns faith  to  be  a  lonely  watcher  between  the 
known  and  the  unknown,  but  at  the  same  time 
we  should  be  glad  that  the  religious  attitude 
has  been  able  to  gain  any  rights  as  an  indis- 
pensable source  of  knowledge  under  the  patents 
of  philosophy,  and  should  consider  whether  the 
cause  of  truth  does  not  require  the  extension  of 
those  rights. 

We  now  must  turn  aside  from  the  teachings 
of  Kant  himself,  in  order  to  inquire  into  the 
way  in  which  the  Ritschlian  theologians  build 
upon  those  teachings,  and  especially  into  the 
relation  which  they  establish  between  the  criti- 
cal philosophy  and  historical  religion. 

Strictly  speaking,  the  Ritschlians  find  in  the 
critical  philosophy  no  solution  of  human  prob- 
lems, but  rather  the  development  of  those  prob- 
lems into  their  acutest  form.  Man  as  we  know 
him  is  an  object  of  nature,  a  member  of  an  in- 
finite cosmic  process,  which  is  governed  by  rigid 
and  infallible  mechanical  laws.  He  is  abso- 
lutely determined  in  his  every  act  by  the  proc- 
ess as  a  whole,  and  the  effects  which  his  reac- 

31 


UNIVERSITY 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROPLEMS 

tions  produce  upon  the  whole  are  of  the  most 
infinitesimal  kind.  Moreover,  the  feebleness  of 
his  life  is  paralleled  by  its  transiency,  and  from 
the  stand-point  of  this  infinite  cosmic  process 
the  spores  of  a  mushroom  are  not  of  less  conse- 
quence than  the  children  of  men.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  from  the  stand-point  of  value  man 
is,  of  all  the  objects  of  nature,  supreme.  He 
alone  possesses  personality  and  the  capacity  for 
moral  development.  He  alone  aspires  to  rise 
above  nature,  to  free  himself  from  the  bondage 
of  mechanical  law,  and  to  achieve  ideals  of 
eternal  worth.  Man  refuses  to  submit  to  the 
tyranny  of  fact,  dreams  of  God,  freedom,  and 
immortality,  struggles  to  grasp  in  experience  the 
realities  of  which  he  dreams,  and  labors  to 
make  human  society  an  embodiment  of  the  ideal 
world. 

Now  to  the  thought  of  the  Ritschlians  there  is 
for  this  sharp  antinomy  between  man  as  science 
describes  him  and  man  as  ethics  conceives  him 
no  theoretical  solution.  A  practical  solution  is 
the  only  possible  one,  and  that  is  to  be  found  in 
historic  Christianity  alone.  He  who  has  felt 
the  saving  power  of  Christ  has  been  really  set 

32 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

free  from  the  fetters  of  the  natural  life.  He 
has  had  actual  experience  of  the  God  whom 
theoretical  reason  cannot  even  conceive,  and 
whom  practical  reason  cannot  discover.  He 
has  become  a  partaker  in  the  immortal  life 
which  is  the  inheritance  of  the  children  of  God. 
Apart  from  Christ  man  has  no  true  goal  for 
his  life  and  vacillates  aimlessly  or  battles  blindly 
amid  the  flux  of  things.  But  when  he  has  come 
under  the  magnetic  influence  of  Christ's  person- 
ality, then  he  becomes  responsive  to  mighty 
and  pervasive  forces  to  which  before  he  was 
unsusceptible,  and  his  life  is  forever  directed 
toward  the  true  pole  of  his  being.  In  Christ 
the  veil  of  our  phenomenal  existence  is  thinned 
down  to  absolute  transparency,  so  that  the  in- 
finite God,  who  is  to  us  elsewhere  but 

Broken  gleams,  and  a  stifled  splendor,  and  gloom, 

shines  through,  revealing  in  undimmed  efful- 
gence the  glory  of  his  being.  In  redemption 
through  Christ,  and  in  personal  fellowship  with 
him,  we  gain  what  all  the  philosophies  of  the 
world  have  sought  in  vain.13 

The  Ritschlian  does  not  fail  to  point  out  that 

33 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

we  are  still  moving  in  the  sphere  of  practical 
knowledge  here,  and  should  make  no  claim  of 
having  attained  a  result  that  the  theoretical 
reason  will  be  compelled  to  recognize.  The 
truths  of  religion  are  "value-judgments,"  gained 
under  the  guidance  of  the  moral  consciousness.14 
It  is  the  absolute  worth  of  Christ,  measured 
according  to  our  highest  standards  of  value, 
which  justifies  our  giving  him  the  supreme  place 
in  our  lives  and  in  our  thinking.  Nevertheless, 
that  to  which  we  have  been  led  under  the  guid- 
ance of  our  moral  consciousness  is  no  mere 
series  of  postulates,  projected  out  into  the  dark- 
ness, like  the  rays  of  a  searchlight,  by  the  energy 
of  our  own  consciousness.  It  is  a  tremendous 
and  overshadowing  fact,  which  no  criticism  can 
wear  away — the  moral  personality  of  Christ. 
On  this  fact  we  can  build,  through  it  our  weak- 
ness is  changed  into  strength,  from  it  we  have 
positive  evidence  of  the  nature  of  the  Infinite. 
Faith  is  thus  no  longer  the  heroic,  but  grim  and 
acrid  determination  of  the  will  to  act  'as  if 
the  great  aspirations  of  our  moral  nature  were 
true.  It  is  rather  an  experience  of  personal 
fellowship  with  one  in  whom  the  life  of  God 

34 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

stands  revealed — a  fellowship  conditioned  upon 
our  active  seeking  and  fidelity,  but  yielding 
the  support  of  an  indubitable  and  soul-satisfy- 
ing response.  And  while  a  recognition  of  the 
truths  of  faith  cannot  be  forced  from  the  theo- 
retical reason,  neither  on  the  other  hand  can  a 
veto  be  interposed  from  that  quarter,  when 
once  it  has  been  acknowledged  that  the  sphere 
of  the  theoretical  reason  is  limited  to  the  under- 
standing of  phenomena  according  to  the  laws 
of  mechanical  causation. 

We  now  have  followed  the  highway  of  thought 
pursued  by  Kant  and  the  Ritschlians  far  enough 
to  permit  us  to  stop  and  ask  how  we  are  situated 
with  reference  to  our  ultimate  object  of  pro- 
gressing toward  the  solution  of  human  problems. 

The  fact  of  fundamental  importance  is  that 
the  critical  philosophy  brings  us  to  a  great  point 
of  vantage  for  dealing  with  the  problems  of 
life  when,  with  however  great  reservations,  it 
recognizes  faith  as  a  primary  principle  of  knowl- 
edge. It  is  true  that  in  admitting  faith  to  be 
needful  for  solving  such  problems  as  have  to  do 
with  man's  relation  to  the  universe  as  a  whole 
we  must  surrender  the  claim,  which  absolute 

35 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

idealism  makes,  that  the  oneness  and  spirituality 
of  the  universe  can  be  demonstrated  with  logi- 
cal necessity.  Thus  we  seem  to  lose  ground. 
But  in  compensation  for  this  we  gain  the  recog- 
nition that  through  religious  experience  rela- 
tions to  reality  and  ranges  of  truth  are  opened 
to  us  that  can  be  gotten  in  no  other  way.  And 
this  strengthening  of  the  claims  of  religion  itself 
ultimately  leaves  spiritual  values  more  firmly 
established  than  abstract  demonstrations  possi- 
bly can. 

In  this  respect  the  transition  from  intellectual- 
istic  to  practical  philosophy  is  like  the  transi- 
tion from  the  monarchical  to  the  democratic 
state.  At  first  thought  government  seems  to 
be  rendered  more  unstable,  when  the  absolute 
decrees  of  the  few  are  replaced  by  the  suffrages 
of  the  many,  but  in  the  long  run  it  appears  that 
the  greater  stability  goes  with  the  more  plastic 
organization.  So  the  kingdom  of  truth,  domi- 
nated by  the  speculative  intellect,  may  become  a 
republic  of  truth,  where  each  man's  faith  counts 
in  the  settling  of  issues,  with  the  happy  result 
that  the  great  interests  at  stake  are  rendered 
not  less  but  more  secure  by  the  change. 

36 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

The  transition  of  which  we  speak,  however, 
is  made  by  the  critical  philosophy  only  in  half- 
way fashion.  The  theoretical  reason,  by  which 
scientific  knowledge  is  attained,  has  a  realm  to 
itself,  in  which  faith  finds  no  place,  and  the 
practical  reason  likewise  claims  a  realm  to  itself, 
where  faith  is  active,  but  which  scientific  knowl- 
edge must  not  invade.  Thus  the  two  depart- 
ments of  reason  are  supposed  to  maintain  a 
gigantic  reciprocal  quarantine  against  each 
other,  on  the  theory  that  each  is  healthy  and 
immune  only  when  the  other  is  held  firmly 
aloof.  This  is  the  fatal  defect  of  this  type  of 
philosophy  from  the  stand-point  of  the  seeker 
for  the  solutions  of  human  problems.  Every 
solution  that  may  be  gained  is  neutralized  in  its 
value  by  this  schism  in  the  mind's  own  nature. 
When  the  practical  nature  speaks  the  theoretical 
nature  listens  in  grim  silence  but  makes  no  re- 
joinder; when  the  theoretical  nature  utters 
its  conclusions  the  practical  nature  stands  with 
far-away  gaze,  seeming  not  to  hear  at  all. 
Reason  is  thus  portrayed  as  a  kind  of  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  empire  without  even  a  Franz 
Josef  to  preserve  outward  unity.  Such  a 

37 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

view  as  this  tends  to  paralyze  the  search  for 
truth  altogether,  or  else  to  make  men  settle 
down  to  the  pursuit  of  one  of  the  two  types  of 
truth  to  the  practical  exclusion  of  the  other. 
The  Kantian  theory  has  been  strong  because 
it  has  been  so  faithful  to  the  separate  interests 
of  the  mind,  each  in  its  turn,  but  it  has  made 
it  inevitable  that  we  should  seek  through  other 
theories  to  secure  a  greater  adjustment  and  uni- 
fying of  these  interests. 

As  for  the  positions  at  which  the  Ritschlians 
arrive  by  way  of  the  critical  philosophy,  they 
will  come  up  for  especial  discussion  in  the 
next  lecture.  We  therefore  will  pause  here 
only  to  point  out  two  things.  First,  it  was 
inevitable  that  a  new  treatment  of  positive 
Christianity  on  the  general  principles  of  Kant's 
philosophy  should  replace  Kant's  own  meagre 
treatment,  in  view  of  the  great  development  of 
the  science  of  history  since  Kant's  day.  The 
enrichment  of  the  idea  of  faith,  and  the  appeal 
to  moral  and  religious  experience  as  the  veri- 
fiers of  our  practical  postulates,  are  natural  re- 
sults of  the  new  place  of  history  in  our  world  of 
thought.  Secondly,  while  the  Ritschlians  have 

38 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

strengthened  the  realm  of  practical  knowledge 
by  their  appeal  to  history,  they  still  retain  the 
dualism  between  practical  and  theoretical  knowl- 
edge, and  this  is  a  most  serious  embarrassment 
to  them,  for  it  follows  them  into  the  field  of  his- 
tory. According  to  their  doctrine  history  is 
strictly  a  theoretical  science.  The  historical 
treatment  of  the  faiths  of  the  past  is  supposed  to 
have  nothing  to  do  with  their  claims  upon  us, 
and  to  be  concerned  only  with  describing 
those  faiths  in  their  causal  connection.  On  the 
other  hand,  all  practical  and  religious  judgments 
are  perpendicular  to  the  plane  of  historical 
thinking.  They  perforate  it,  so  to  speak,  but 
they  have  no  organic  connection  with  it.  The 
result  is  that  they  leave  the  Christian's  appeal 
to  the  personality  of  Christ  unsupported  by 
the  general  history  of  religion.  It  is  left  to 
stand  as  a  sheer  datum,  re-enforced  only  by  the 
claim  that  our  theoretical  reason  cannot  deny 
it.  But  can  our  religious  thinking  rest  here  ? 
I  am  convinced  that  it  cannot,  but  that  our 
estimate  of  Christ  and  of  Christianity  must  be 
tested  and  supported  by  relating  it  to  the  history 
of  religion  in  general,  and  that  it  must  be  de- 

39 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

fended  upon  the  principle  that  religion  is  a 
vital  and  permanent  function  of  the  human 
spirit,  organically  related  to  all  its  other  great 
functions,  and  therefore  jointly  with  them  a 
source  of  truth. 

Let  us  recall  the  most  general  results  of  our 
discussion  thus  far.  The  great  contribution  of 
absolute  idealism  toward  the  solution  of  human 
problems  has  been  the  conception  of  the  imma- 
nence of  God,  but  the  value  of  this  conception 
is  neutralized  by  the  doctrine  that  God  must  be 
conceived  as  a  timeless  Absolute;  and  the  reason 
why  absolute  idealism  creates  such  a  dilemma 
is  to  be  found  in  the  purely  intellectualistic 
method  that  it  employs  in  gaining  its  ultimate 
truths.  The  contribution  to  human  problems 
in  the  teachings  of  Kant  and  the  Ritschlians 
which  we  have  been  led  to  emphasize  are,  on 
the  one  hand  the  recognition  of  the  moral  con- 
sciousness and  of  faith  as  indispensable  sources 
of  knowledge,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  appeal 
to  the  life  of  the  Christian  and  the  facts  of  Chris- 
tian history  as  having  the  authority  of  expe- 
rience. But  here,  again,  we  have  found  a  fatal 

neutralizing  factor  in  the  sharp  separation  be- 

40 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

tween  scientific  knowledge  and  that  gained  in 
the  religious  realm.  With  these  main  charac- 
teristics of  the  two  types  of  thought  already 
discussed  in  mind,  let  us  turn  to  consider  the 
third  highway  of  thought. 


Ill 

It  must  be  recognized  at  the  outset  that  the 
highway  of  pragmatism  is  in  process  of  con- 
struction, and  those  of  you  who  may  have  en- 
deavored to  traverse  it,  and  who  protest  that  it 
is  still  in  a  somewhat  corduroy  state,  cannot  be 
reproached  for  your  jolted  feelings.  On  this 
account  it  may  seem  hazardous  to  bring  it  into 
comparison  with  the  more  established  highways; 
nevertheless,  if  in  the  end  it  may  possibly  lead 
us  to  straighter  thinking,  we  should  not  leave  it 
unexplored.  Here,  however,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  other  types  of  philosophy,  we  must  confine 
ourselves  to  the  few  main  features  most  impor- 
tant from  the  stand-point  of  our  general  theme.15 

The  pragmatist  holds  that  will  is  more  fun- 
damental than  intellect  in  our  human  nature. 
He  regards  man  as  first  a  being  of  action  and 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

then  a  being  of  thought.  He  challenges  the 
theory  of  the  mind  still  dominant  in  philosophi- 
cal and  theological  circles,  because  it  is  based 
too  exclusively  upon  the  mind  of  the  theorist 
himself.  It  is  not  unnatural  that  the  theorist, 
engaged,  as  he  is,  almost  solely  in  intellectual 
work,  should  regard  the  intellect  as  an  end  in  it- 
self. But  the  pragmatist  insists  that,  pardon- 
able as  such  an  error  may  be,  it  is  only  another 
form  of  provincialism.  If  we  look  abroad  at 
the  actual  workings  of  man's  conscious  life, 
and  if  we  reflect  upon  its  history,  we  cannot 
fail  to  see  that  the  will  is  the  more  elemental 
and  persistent  part  of  our  nature,  and  that  it  is 
the  basis  for  the  intellect.  Man  is  primarily  a 
being  of  instincts,  appetites,  passions,  aspira- 
tions, strivings,  deeds,  and  it  is  only  with  ref- 
erence to  this  maelstrom  of  psychic  activity  that 
the  intellect  can  be  understood.  Hence  it 
must  be  regarded  as  secondary  to  the  will,  and 
derived  from  it.  A  genial  but  acute  critic  of 
human  nature  is  reported  as  saying,  in  discuss- 
ing the  fitness  of  a  certain  man  for  a  position 
that  was  to  be  filled:  'He  is  all  right  in  a  way, 

but  he  hasn't  the  modern  conveniences  for  think- 

42 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

ing/3  Now  the  pragmatist  claims  that,  from 
the  stand-point  of  the  entire  history  of  con- 
sciousness, thinking  as  such  is  a  relatively 
modern  convenience.  That  is  to  say,  it  pre- 
supposes an  active  life  of  considerable  com- 
plexity, and  is  the  outgrowth  of  such  a  life. 

In  accordance  with  this  emphasis  on  the 
primacy  of  the  will  the  pragmatist  holds  that 
all  our  knowledge  is  essentially  purposive  in 
character.16  The  reason  for  its  existence  is  that 
it  helps  us  to  adjust  our  lives  to  their  environ- 
ment and  to  develop  more  fully  our  latent 
capacities.  Life,  to  be  sure,  expresses  itself 
spontaneously,  and  much  of  its  adjustment  to 
environment  is  effected  by  instinct.  But  then 
we  get  some  rebuff;  our  action  suddenly  be- 
comes futile,  or  something  comes  in  to  balk  it. 
The  palatable  sweets  make  us  sick,  the  rain- 
bows we  chase  elude  us,  our  own  familiar  friend 
lifts  up  his  heel  against  us.  These  experiences 
set  us  thinking.  The  thinking  means  that  we 
hesitate  or  halt  in  our  action,  let  several  alter- 
natives arise  in  our  imagination,  and  then  give 
free  course  to  one  of  them.  Each  of  the  ideas 
that  arise  in  the  mind  at  such  a  time  is  a  cue 

43 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

to  possible  action,  and  it  is  in  their  competition 
with  each  other  for  the  right  of  way  that  the 
thinking  consists.  It  is  out  of  such  a  process 
of  reflecting  and  experimenting  with  reference 
to  some  desired  end  that  all  our  knowledge 
comes,  and  hence  its  purposive  character  never 
should  be  lost  sight  of. 

No  matter  how  abstract  an  idea  may  be,  the 
pragmatist  tells  us  that  this  purposive  quality 
still  clings  to  it.  An  abstract  idea  is  like  a  label 
on  a  drawer,  which  shows  us  at  a  glance  what 
is  in  store  for  us  if  we  penetrate  further.  It  is 
a  symbol,  which  stands  for  a  large  mass  of 
concrete  experience,  as  a  baggage-check  stands 
for  baggage.  When  we  have  gotten  the  proper 
symbol,  we  can  turn  over  the  more  bulky  articles 
for  which  it  stands  to  the  mechanical  and  habit- 
ual parts  of  our  natures,  assured  that  they  will 
be  delivered  to  us  again  as  we  need  them.  Some 
of  these  symbols  serve  a  purpose  only  for  a  short 
time,  and  then  pass  out  of  use.  Others  are  in 
constant  demand,  and  without  them  we  could 
not  transact  a  single  item  of  the  business  of  life. 
In  the  latter  case  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  their 
only  worth  is  in  what  they  represent,  just  as  we 

44 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

sometimes  forget  that  money  merely  symbolizes 
actual  goods.  But  the  fact  remains  that  no 
abstract  idea  or  system  of  ideas  is  an  end  in 
itself,  but  only  a  means  to  guide  us  to  certain 
concrete  experiences  and  practical  activities. 

On  the  basis  of  the  positions  just  stated  the 
pragmatist  proposes  his  test  of  truth.  He  tells 
us  that  the  truth  of  an  idea  is  to  be  determined 
by  its  fruits  for  life.17  To  what  practical  re- 
sults does  an  idea  lead  ?  When  we  have  found 
that  out,  we  have  the  means  for  testing  its  truth. 
The  truthfulness  of  a  chart  appears  in  the 
accuracy  with  which  it  enables  the  navigator 
to  discriminate  between  the  course  that  leads 
to  shipwreck  and  the  one  that  leads  to  the  de- 
sired port.  The  truthfulness  of  a  diagnosis 
consists  in  the  power  it  gives  us  to  treat  the 
disease,  or  to  prevent  it  the  next  time,  or  to 
anticipate  the  results  of  a  surgical  examination. 
The  truth  of  a  political  policy  consists  in  the 
reforms  it  makes  possible  and  the  development 
of  freedom  and  power  to  which  it  leads.  Does 
an  idea  enable  us  to  anticipate  what  the  facts 
are,  or  to  get  into  harmonious  relations  with 
them,  or  to  control  them  ?  Does  it  satisfy  some 

45 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

need  of  our  natures,  or  release  new  energies 
within  us  ?  Does  it  contribute  to  social  unity 
and  progress  ?  In  short,  does  it  work  ?  Such 
are  the  criteria  by  which  the  truth  of  an  idea  is 
to  be  measured. 

The  last  mentioned  way  of  expressing  the 
pragmatic  test  of  truth  has  brought  down  upon 
it  much  criticism.  It  is  objected  that  the  truth 
of  ideas  cannot  be  tested  by  the  way  in  which 
they  work,  because  ideas  that  are  exactly  op- 
posed to  each  other  will  be  found  to  be  workable 
by  different  men  according  to  their  several 
points  of  view.  The  pleasure-seeker  finds  that 
a  certain  idea  works  well  for  the  simple  reason 
that  his  views  of  life  are  frivolous,  while  the 
philanthropist  reaches  an  entirely  opposite  con- 
clusion. So,  according  to  such  a  test  the  vicious 
and  the  upright,  the  egoist  and  the  patriot,  the 
pessimist  and  the  man  of  faith  would  each  be 
able  to  make  out  an  equally  good  case  for  him- 
self. In  justice  to  the  pragmatist,  however,  it 
must  be  explained  that  he  never  has  supposed 
the  question  of  truth  to  turn  upon  momentary 
satisfactions,  or  upon  those  that  belong  merely 
to  one  side  of  our  nature  or  only  to  a  single  in- 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

dividual.  The  pragmatist  recognizes  that 
there  is  an  existing  order  of  things  in  the  midst 
of  which  ideas  must  work,  and  that  the  in- 
terests of  a  man  which  claim  satisfaction  are 
numerous  and  of  varying  importance,  and  he 
requires  an  idea  to  work  from  the  stand-point 
of  society  as  well  as  from  that  of  the  individual. 
As  well  might  one  say  that  in  a  democracy  every 
one  is  a  law  unto  himself  as  to  say  that  accord- 
ing to  pragmatism  individual  caprice  or  arbi- 
trary desires  are  the  standards  of  truth.  The 
pragmatist  tests  ideas  according  to  their  power 
to  promote  fulness  of  life,  and  only  those  ideas 
which  do  this  "on  the  whole"  and  "in  the  long 
run'  have  permanent  validity. 

Hence  the  pragmatist  approaches  the  whole 
question  of  knowledge  from  the  stand-point  of 
evolution.  He  holds  that  the  entire  body  of 
our  knowledge  is  the  result  of  an  evolutionary 
process,  and  that  this  process  is  still  going  on. 
Even  our  most  fundamental  axioms  are  regarded 
from  the  same  point  of  view,  with  the  result  that, 
like  many  a  titled  family,  they  are  found  to 
have  had  the  humblest  origin.18  But  this  dis- 
covery, according  to  the  pragmatist,  has  the 

47 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

effect  only  of  brushing  aside  a  certain  artificial 
authority  claimed  for  these  axioms,  and  does  not 
impair  their  real  value.  To  this  particular  as- 
pect of  the  pragmatist's  doctrine,  however,  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  recur  in  the  third  lecture 
of  this  course,  and  so  we  need  not  linger  upon 
it  now. 

After  this  brief  sketch  of  pragmatism  let  us 
proceed  to  an  estimate  of  its  worth,  at  the 
same  time  filling  in  certain  other  features  of  it 
as  we  go  on.  We  see  that  the  pragmatist  makes 
experience  the  final  court  of  appeal,  and  con- 
ceives reason  to  be  auxiliary  to  experience  as  a 
whole,  no  matter  what  the  objects  we  are  seek- 
ing to  know  may  be.  But  what  we  should  note 
is  that  he  conceives  experience  in  the  broadest 
possible  way.  It  is  by  no  means  merely  a 
matter  of  the  five  senses,  but  is  something  in 
which  all  sides  of  our  natures  are  involved, 
and  in  which  all  our  interests  and  faculties  are 
interwoven.  Not  only  do  the  laws  of  the  under- 
standing play  their  part,  but  also  our  moral  and 
religious  attitudes  as  well.  Moreover,  these  mor- 
al and  religious  attitudes  are  not  simply  matters 

of  subjective  experience,  but  are  genuine  factors 

48 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

in  the  process  of  obtaining  objective  knowledge. 
Loyalty  to  a  moral  conviction  helps  to  make 
that  conviction  true.  Active  faith  in  the  pres- 
ence of  an  unseen  Spiritual  Power  places  the 
soul  in  a  position  to  realize  the  existence  of  such 
a  Power  and  to  gain  insights  into  its  nature. 
In  short,  the  way  we  react  on  the  universe  is 
of  decisive  importance  in  determining  whether 
or  not  we  discover  its  deeper  meaning.19 

Thus  pragmatism  gives  full  scope  to  the 
insight,  which  was  recognized  partially  by 
Kant  and  has  been  developed  by  the  Ritschlians, 
that  faith  is  an  indispensable  pathway  to  knowl- 
edge, and  that,  consequently,  religious  ex- 
perience is  an  irreducible  source  of  philosophy. 
The  awe  with  which  we  are  rilled  by  the  beauty 
and  vastness  of  the  world,  the  sense  of  life's 
mystery,  the  solemnity  of  moral  conviction, 
the  prayers  that  are  irrepressible,  the  steady 
sense  of  fellowship  with  a  Great  Companion, 
the  personal  energies  released  or  controlled  by 
such  experiences — these  are  facts  of  which  the 
pragmatist  is  bound  to  take  cognizance,  and 
which  may  become  the  source  of  principles  that 
are  fundamental  for  his  interpretation  of  the 

49 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

universe.  Not  that  religious  experience  can  be 
taken  uncritically.  Its  great  variations  in 
value  must  be  freely  recognized,  and  nothing 
must  be  used  dogmatically.  Of  even  our 
highest  experiences  we  should  speak  as  Para- 
celsus spoke  of  himself: 

'Just  so  much  of  doubt 
As  bade  me  plant  a  surer  foot  upon 
The  sun-road,  kept  my  eye  unruined  'mid 
The  fierce  and  flashing  splendor,  set  my  heart 
Trembling  so  much  as  warned  me  I  stood  there 
On  sufferance, — not  to  idly  gaze,  but  cast 
Light  on  a  darkling  race." 

Such  an  attitude  is  but  the  humility  arising  in 
every  religious  soul  which  confesses  of  the 
object  of  its  faith:  'his  ways  are  higher  than 
our  ways,  and  his  thoughts  than  our  thoughts/3 
But  with  all  due  recognition  of  the  inferior  and 
unworthy  types  of  religious  experience,  and  with 
full  acknowledgment  of  the  intellectual  humil- 
ity which  normally  goes  with  the  religious  con- 
sciousness, it  still  remains  true  on  the  principles 
of  pragmatism  that  a  function  so  vital  to  hu- 
manity as  religion  has  a  right  to  play  a  most 
important  part  in  determining  our  conceotions 

50 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

of  the  universe  and  its  relation  to  man.  This 
recognition  of  religion  as  an  integral  factor  in 
the  discovery  of  truth  counts  heavily  in  favor  of 
pragmatism. 

A  second  significant  fact  about  pragmatism 
is  that  it  removes  the  difficulty  which  prevented 
Kant  from  giving  full  value  to  the  knowledge 
gained  through  .faith.  That  difficulty,  as  we 
have  seen,  was  the  dualism  according  to  which 
the  realm  of  faith  and  that  of  theoretical 
knowledge  were  sharply  separated  from  each 
other.  Pragmatism  does  away  with  this  dualism 
by  showing  that  faith  enters  to  some  degree 
into  all  our  knowledge.  It  maintains  that  the 
fundamental  principles  of  science,  such  as  the 
uniformity  of  nature,  are  matters  of  faith,  for 
though  verified  every  day,  they  never  can  be 
completely  verified  nor  given  an  absolute  ab- 
stract proof.20  We  assume  or  believe  in  the 
truth  of  these  principles,  because  without 
them  we  can  make  nothing  at  all  out  of  our 
world,  and  for  that  very  reason  we  see  that  they 
are  postulates  of  the  mind;  in  other  words,  they 
always  retain  a  certain  element  of  faith.  Again 
any  new  doctrine  about  nature,  like  the  theory 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

of  evolution  in  its  modern  form,  arises  first  as 
an  hypothesis  which  becomes  the  working  faith 
of  certain  men.  Their  faith  leads  to  a  long 
process  of  observation  and  experiment,  which 
may  result  in  the  hypothesis  becoming  a  gen- 
erally accepted  theory;  but  even  then  it  remains 
to  some  extent  a  matter  of  faith.  The  same 
quality  of  faith  comes  in  play  when  a  well- 
established  law  appears  to  be  contradicted  by 
certain  new  facts.  The  mind  is  not  content 
simply  to  make  a  debit  entry  against  the  law, 
but,  persisting  in  the  belief  that  the  law  is  uni- 
versal, strives  to  bring  the  opposing  facts  into 
line  with  it.  Many  of  the  brilliant  successes  of 
science  are  due  to  just  such  an  exercise  of 
faith. 

This  recognition  of  the  element  of  faith 
which  enters  into  all  knowledge  makes  it  pos- 
sible to  do  away  with  the  dualism  between 
science  and  religion,  and  therefore  constitutes  a 
strong  argument  for  pragmatism.  In  contrast 
to  apologetics,  which  has  tried  to  adjust  merely 
the  results  of  science  and  faith,  and  to  the  criti- 
cal philosophy,  which  has  kept  them  rigidly 
apart,  and  to  absolute  idealism,  which  makes 

52 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

faith  a  crude  substitute  for  philosophy  so  far 
as  knowledge  is  concerned,  pragmatism  shows 
that  they  are  organically  interrelated,  and  thus 
preserves  the  mind's  vital  unity. 

A  third  characteristic  of  pragmatism  should 
be  emphasized  for  the  sake  of  comparison  with 
one  of  the  points  brought  out  in  discussing  ab- 
solute idealism.  Pragmatism  accepts  without 
reserve  the  reality  of  time.  Time  is  real  for 
every  consciousness,  that  of  God  as  well  as  that 
of  man.  Hence  one  of  the  great  difficulties 
presented  by  absolute  idealism — that  it  could 
not  successfully  represent  God  as  immanent  in 
history — is  removed  by  pragmatism.  To  think- 
ers of  the  pragmatic  school  the  chief  grounds 
for  the  belief  in  God  always  will  be  the  evi- 
dences of  his  active  participation  in  the  world 
of  human  experience,  and  their  conception  of 
God  will  remain  inseparable  from  such  mani- 
festations. The  pragmatist  asks  in  regard  to 
the  idea  of  God,  as  in  regard  to  all  other  ideas, 
what  does  it  practically  mean  ?  And  the  an- 
swers that  count  for  the  most  are  furnished  by 
the  experience  of  moral  salvation  through  trust 
in  God,  and  the  progress  of  mankind  which 

53 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

such  a  trust  has  brought  about.  Immanence 
in  history  is  thus  inseparable  from  a  pragmatic 
conception  of  God.21 

One  other  point  is  of  especial  importance. 
The  method  by  which  pragmatism  tests  and 
interprets  truth  is  essentially  historical.  It 
not  only  studies  how  ideas  function  in  our 
minds,  but  it  traces  out  their  workings  in  his- 
tory.22 The  way  in  which  an  idea  appeals  to 
you  and  me  is  by  no  means  an  adequate  test 
of  its  worth.  We  must  study  in  history  the  spir- 
itual trend  which  it  represents,  and  the  values 
which  it  has  produced  or  destroyed,  for  only 
then  shall  we  be  able  to  see  what  it  really  sig- 
nifies for  us  and  to  take  the  attitude  toward  it 
which  will  lead  to  the  best  results  in  the  future. 
History  is  the  laboratory  in  which  spiritual  ex- 
periments are  made  and  the  meaning  of  great 
ideas  is  worked  out.  It  is  history  rather  than 
logic  that  shows  the  indestructible  worth  of 
the  family,  the  importance  of  basing  govern- 
ment on  nationality,  the  relation  of  art  to  eco- 
nomic life  and  of  philosophy  to  free  institutions. 
All  our  actual  problems,  to  be  sure,  concern  the 
future,  not  the  past.  But  the  principles  on 

54 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

which  the  future  should  be  dealt  with  are  larger 
than  the  intellects  of  any  one  generation  can 
invent.  We  must  find  them  emerging  from  the 
past,  and  must  use  them  in  the  light  of  the 
values  which  they  there  have  revealed. 

The  consequence  of  this  historical  character 
of  the  pragmatist's  method  with  which  we  are 
most  concerned  here  is  that  it  requires  him 
to  treat  the  history  of  religion  as  one  of  the 
great  sources  of  the  ultimate  practical  truths 
about  the  universe.23  This  attitude  is  one 
greatly  needed  in  our  time.  For  more  than  one 
generation  the  history  of  our  own  faith,  and  of 
religions  in  general,  has  been  investigated  with 
the  utmost  skill  and  with  great  success.  But 
neither  the  special  students  of  this  history,  nor 
the  other  thinkers  who  took  account  of  their 
results,  have  realized  the  full  significance  of 
this  work.  It  has  been  regarded  too  largely 
as  bearing  to  practical  religion  a  negative  rela- 
tion— perhaps  even  being  destructive  of  faith, 
as  the  extreme  conservative  has  thought,  per- 
haps merely  removing  misunderstandings  and 
liberating  faith,  as  the  progressives  have  main- 
tained. It  has  not  been  recognized  for  what 

55 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

it  really  is — one  of  the  great  means  of  testing 
and  establishing  spiritual  truth. 

But  when  one  thinks  of  the  actual  history 
of  religion,  can  one  regard  it  as  indeed  a  source 
of  truth  ?  Such  an  innumerable  host  of  wild, 
aimless  prayers;  so  many  ages  of  fruitless  cere- 
monial; such  an  endless  succession  of  sacri- 
fices on  uncounted  altars;  so  vast  a  mass  of 
superstition,  mythology,  useless  custom,  mean- 
ingless sacred  writings,  vain  dogmas!  Yes, 
there  is  much  that  is  strange  and  depressing 
in  this  history,  but  is  it  any  the  less  the  devious 
pathway  by  which  the  race  has  been  moving 
up  to  God  ?  Have  not  the  prayers  of  the  past 
engendered  in  man  a  purer  hunger  for  God's 
presence  ?  the  ceremonials  given  him  a  finer 
reverence  and  a  more  worshipful  heart  ?  and  the 
sacrifices  strengthened  his  sense  of  obligation 
to  an  unseen  world  ?  And  may  not  we,  like 
our  Master,  sift  from  the  superstitions,  mythol- 
ogies, and  dogmas  the  few  great  truths  on 
which  hang  the  whole  law  and  all  of  life  for 
man  ?  Nor  is  this  all,  as  we  well  know.  Above 
the  general  level  of  the  world's  religious  life 
rise  the  great  prophetic  personalities,  like  Al- 

56 


HIGHWAYS  OF  THOUGHT 

pine  peaks  towering  into  the  light  of  sunrise 
above  valleys  still  shrouded  in  twilight  and 
mist.  And  pre-eminent  among  them  all  stand 
the  Hebrew  prophets  and  psalmists,  the  divine 
Son  of  Man  and  his  apostles,  in  whose  utterances 
and  lives  we  find  depicted  the  life  eternal.  In 
this  history  there  is  a  demonstration  of  the 
great  truths  of  the  spirit  such  as  no  logic  can 
furnish,  and  such  as  can  be  dispensed  with  by 
no  age  of  the  world,  not  even  the  last  of  those 
bright  centuries  that  our  present  time  can  fore- 
tell. 

We  have  seen  reasons  for  believing  that  this 
third  highway  of  thought  retains  the  advantages 
offered  by  the  other  two  and  at  the  same  time 
avoids  certain  grave  difficulties  which  they  in- 
volved. It  makes  religious  experience  an  ir- 
reducible source  of  truth,  which  absolute 
idealism  fails  to  do.  At  the  same  time  it  does 
away  with  the  dualism  between  faith  and 
knowledge,  by  which  the  Ritschlians  are  still 
hampered,  despite  their  emphasis  upon  faith  as 
a  source  of  truth.  Further  it  makes  it  possible 
for  us  to  conceive  of  God  as  one  who  is  gen- 
uinely immanent  in  history,  which  absolute 

57 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

idealism,  though  standing  sponsor  for  the 
conception  of  immanence,  cannot  really  accom- 
plish. Finally  it  does  justice  to  the  historical 
character  of  religion,  and  brings  out  the  im- 
mense practical  importance  of  the  study  of 
religious  history.  There  are  indeed  certain 
positions  taken  by  leading  pragmatists  that  will 
require  our  critical  scrutiny  in  a  later  lecture, 
but  so  far  as  a  method  and  a  theory  of  truth 
are  concerned,  it  would  seem  that  we  have 
ample  reason  for  choosing  pragmatism  as  the 
highway  along  which  our  thought  should  move 
in  the  discussions  that  are  to  follow. 


II 

THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

^  I  AHE  solution  of  every  man's  problem  in  life 
is  ultimately  an  individual  matter.  In 
the  last  resort  it  is  some  experience  that  takes 
place  within  a  man's  own  soul,  some  saving 
reinforcement  of  his  inner  life,  some  silent  but 
momentous  uprising  of  inward  spiritual  en- 
ergy which  breaks  the  tension  within  him  and 
opens  again  the  pathway  of  action  and  growth. 
And  if  for  any  one  life's  problem  never  gets 
solved,  but  remains  rumbling  and  heaving  be- 
neath the  surface  or  subsides  altogether,  it  is 
because  he  has  not  been  able  to  open  his  soul 
to  the  liberating  insight  or  reinforcing  impulse 
at  the  timely  moment. 

It  therefore  is  impossible  for  theology  to  fur- 
nish ready-made  answers  to  the  enigmas  of  life. 
At  best  it  can  only  put  men  on  the  road  to  dis- 
covery. It  may  introduce  them  to  the  great 

59 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

laboratories  of  the  spirit,  make  them  familiar 
with  the  resources  there,  place  in  their  hands 
the  apparatus  devised  by  the  original  souls  of 
the  past,  and  help  them  to  undertake  their  own 
experiments  with  as  much  wisdom  and  skill  as 
possible.  But  this  should  be  the  limit  of  its 
endeavors.  In  times  past  theology  has  as- 
sumed to  do  more  than  this.  It  has  conceived 
that  its  task  was  to  compile  an  answer-book 
covering  all  the  sums  that  man  is  set  to  do. 
And  since  in  these  days  it  no  longer  undertakes 
to  furnish  such  a  book  of  answers,  it  is  much 
discredited  in  certain  quarters.  But  after  all 
it  seems  plain  that  to  guide  the  actual  spiritual 
researches  of  men,  to  no  matter  how  small  an 
extent,  is  the  nobler  though  more  modest  task, 
and  it  is  solely  with  such  a  purpose  as  this  in 
mind  that  I  have  ventured  to  take  up  the  theme 
of  these  lectures.  Accordingly,  after  having 
discussed  the  most  important  methods  of  ap- 
proach to  human  problems,  as  we  did  in  the 
last  lecture,  our  object  now  must  be  to  fix  in 
view  one  of  the  most  fundamental  of  those  prob- 
lems, and  then  to  ask  what  aid  theology  is 

able  to  render  toward  its  solution. 

60 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

The  questions  as  to  what  are  the  true  ends 
of  life  ?  what  are  the  real  and  dominant  forces 
of  the  world  ?  what  are  the  abiding  realities  in 
the  flux  of  things  ? — these  are  among  the  most 
persistent  questions  that  the  human  spirit  asks. 
Every  illusion  outlived,  every  passion  forspent, 
every  futile  endeavor  or  rude  betrayal  that  we 
experience,  forces  from  us  such  questions. 
They  are  unescapable,  and  in  all  save  those 
who  stifle  them  they  engender  a  longing  for  the 
things  that  do  not  pass  away.  The  more  in- 
tensely moral  the  nature  of  a  man  the  more 
insistently  do  such  questions  and  longings  arise. 
Are  they  not  the  most  earnest  souls  we  know 
who,  in  the  midst  of  quiet  conversation  on  the 
deeper  meanings  of  life,  sometimes  break  out 
with  startling  intensity,  'Oh,  if  I  could  only 
know!  I  believe  I  can  will  and  do  gladly,  but 
how  I  long  to  know  surely  what  to  do!'  Per- 
haps there  are  few  deeper  glimpses  into  the 
moral  yearnings  of  man's  heart  than  those 
which  such  questions  afford.  Yes,  we  may 
thankfully  say  that  the  souls  are  not  few  in 
this  world  that  will  live  gallantly  and  die  cheer- 
fully for  a  cause.  But  must  they  not  know 

61 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

that  they  have  a  cause  ?  Truly  here  is  a  human 
problem.  When  it  is  felt  in  its  length  and 
breadth  it  resolves  itself  into  man's  longing  for 
the  Eternal,  the  soul's  hunger  for  God. 

What  has  theology  to  say  to  a  problem  like 
this  ?  Nothing  glib  and  conventional,  let  us 
hope.  He  who  could  approach  so  supreme  a 
question  with  anything  like  jaunty  assurance 
would  be  one  to 

Peep  and  botanize  upon  his  mother's  grave. 

The  first  obligation  of  the  thinker  in  the  field 
of  religion  is  that  he  should  inwardly  apprehend 
the  problems  of  life  in  their  universality,  for 
only  so  will  he  be  able  to  discern  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  solving  truths  when  he  comes  upon 
them.  But  the  very  fact  that  our  problem  is  a 
universal  one  means  that  the  great  of  all  ages 
have  wrestled  with  it,  and  that  we  may  become 
heirs  of  their  victories.  The  chastisement  of 
our  peace  has  been  upon  the  suffering  servants 
of  the  Lord,  and  with  their  stripes  we  are  healed. 
The  undertaking  of  this  hour  is  therefore  to 
consider  certain  typical  forms  of  answer  to  the 

question:  Wherein  may  man  have  an  experience 

62 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

of  the  Eternal  ?  We  will  consider  three  types 
as  the  ones  making  the  most  important  claim 
upon  our  attention  to-day.  According  to  these 
types  the  experience  of  the  Eternal  may  be 
found  in  mystical  states  of  consciousness,  or  in 
historical  revelation,  or  in  the  development  of 
moral  personality.  We  will  take  up  these 
answers  in  the  order  given,  and  accordingly  will 
estimate  first  the  claim  that  mystical  experience 
constitutes  the  supreme  type  of  relation  to  God. 


The  mystic  is  the  radical  in  religion.  He 
seeks  to  gain  the  experience  of  the  Eternal  in 
a  form  utterly  pure  and  undefiled.  His  ideal 
is  to  apprehend  God  immediately  and  without 
the  admixture  of  any  other  experience.  His 
vision  of  the  Infinite  must  be  without  horizon, 
without  contrasting  forms  of  light  and  shade, 
the  simple  undiversified  beholding  of  pure  and 
ineffable  glory.  Such  an  experience  cannot 
come  through  the  activity  of  the  will,  for  the 
human  will,  with  its  strivings,  its  failures,  and 
its  only  partial  successes,  is  the  most  finite  part 

63 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

of  man's  nature.  Neither  can  such  an  experience 
be  gained  by  the  intellect.  The  intellect  can  only 
know  about  reality,  but  cannot  place  us  in  con- 
tact with  it.  Hence  our  intellectual  natures  can 
simply  adumbrate  the  Infinite,  but  cannot 
enable  us  to  lay  hold  of  it  in  actual  experience. 
For  these  reasons  the  mystic  turns  to  the  life 
of  feeling  for  the  experience  that  he  seeks.  Here 
the  vaster  possibilities  of  the  soul  are  believed  to 
dwell.  Our  life  of  feeling  is  not  a  matter  of 
metes  and  bounds,  as  are  the  activities  of  in- 
tellect and  will.  It  is  the  door  of  the  soul 
through  which  the  life  of  the  Infinite  can  enter, 
it  is  the  organ  of  divine  knowledge.  For  the  full- 
grown  mystic,  however,  the  feelings  in  which 
the  divine  knowledge  is  really  attained  are 
something  more  than  those  that  suffuse  our  daily 
life  of  thought  and  action.  They  displace  this 
every-day  life,  or  rather  they  fulfil  and  submerge 
it,  bringing  insights  that  to  the  intellect  are  in- 
expressible, and  a  fulness  of  life  that  the  will 
can  never  gain.  They  lift  one  out  of  this  shad- 
ow-world of  time  and  sense  into  the  very  pres- 
ence of  pure  and  infinite  Being.  When  the 
mystic  experience  reaches  its  height  it  becomes 

64 


• 

THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

a  state  of  ecstasy,  in  which  the  soul  swoons  to 
outer  realities,  but  becomes  immeasurably  alive 
in  the  realm  of  the  Spirit.  And  though  even 
the  adept  in  mystical  religion  can  remain  in  the 
state  of  rhapsody  but  for  a  brief  space  of  time, 
yet  he  lives  the  rest  of  his  life  in  the  light  of  what 
such  states  have  brought  him.  They  repre- 
sent the  essence  of  religious  experience  to  him, 
and  thought  and  volition  come  to  be  regarded 
primarily  as  means  for  their  reproduction.  So 
in  general  we  may  say  that  the  mystic  finds  the 
experience  of  the  Eternal  in  exalted  states  of  feel- 
ing, which  are  marked  by  the  immediateness 
and  sufficiency  of  the  relation  to  God  that  they 
are  felt  to  involve,  and  by  the  unutterableness 
of  the  insights  that  they  are  believed  to  bring. 

If  such  are  the  characteristics  of  mysticism 
as  an  experience,  we  next  may  ask  to  what  con- 
ception of  God  it  leads  us  ?  Here  is  one  of  the 
baffling  traits  of  mysticism.  As  its  sense  of  God 
grows  rich  its  conception  of  God  becomes  poor. 
No  attribute  that  we  can  ascribe  to  him  really 
applies,  because  he  is  above  all  attributes.  The 
way  to  a  knowledge  of  him  is  the  way  of  nega- 
tion. Personality,  spirit,  goodness,  love — these 

6s 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

must  all  be  denied  of  him  because  he  is  beyond 
them  all.  We  are  to  pay  homage  to  our  king 
by  throwing  our  most  priceless  treasures  into  the 
sea,  as  mere  baubles  unworthy  of  him.  If 
thought  would  praise  God,  let  it  become  dumb. 
Let  its  noblest  achievements  be  written  upon 
the  choicest  parchments  and  then  burned  as 
incense  to  the  Most  High.  The  powerlessness 
of  thought  to  make  any  contribution  whatever  to 
man's  experience  of  the  Eternal,  when  that  ex- 
perience reaches  its  higher  levels,  is  one  of  the 
tenets  of  mysticism. 

If  we  turn  to  the  ideal  of  life  which  mysticism 
fosters,  we  find  it  in  harmony  with  the  traits 
already  noted.  The  concentration  of  religion  in 
intense  states  of  feeling  results  in  an  attitude 
of  detachment  from  the  world  and  from  social 
relations.  This  is  nowhere  more  noticeable 
than  in  Thomas  a  Kempis,  whose  mysticism  is 
of  a  practical  rather  than  of  a  speculative  type. 
Thus  for  example  he  writes,  "  For  what  is  it  to 
thee,  whether  a  man  be  such  or  such,  or  whether 
this  man  do  or  speak  this  or  that  ?  Thou  shalt 
not  need  to  answer  for  others,  but  shalt  give 

account  for  thyself.     Why  therefore  dost  thou 

66  - 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

entangle  thyself?  ...  Do  thou  keep  thyself  in 
perfect  peace,  and  let  go  the  unquiet,  to  be  as 
unquiet  as  he  will."1  The  true  goods  are  within 
the  soul,  and  all  outward  matters,  even  includ- 
ing the  concerns  of  other  people,  are  a  distrac- 
tion and  a  hindrance.  The  affairs  of  the  world, 
and  the  noisy  strivings  and  clamor  of  men,  are 
jarring  discords  to  the  ear  intent  on  catching  the 
entrancing  harmonies  of  the  soul.  The  mystic 
bears  the  stress  of  the  world  patiently  and  meets 
with  faithfulness  the  inevitable  claims  of  men, 
but  he  does  not  give  to  these  outward  and  social 
concerns  a  positive  religious  meaning.  They 
play  no  direct  part  in  his  experience  of  the 
Eternal.  Just  as  the  choicest  works  of  art  know 
only  the  touch  of  the  master's  hand,  so  the 
mystic  considers  that  the  soul  which  is  to  ex- 
press the  thought  of  the  Infinite  must  suffer  as 
little  as  possible  the  defacing  touch  of  the  world. 
What  then  is  the  mystic's  thought  of  the  soul 
itself?  The  soul,  being  essentially  one  with 
God,  is  thought  of  by  the  mystic  as  no  less  in- 
capable of  definition  than  he.  Indeed  it  is  in 
reality  nothing  distinct  from  God.  As  for  our 
individual  selfhood,  inasmuch  as  it  denotes  a 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

certain  measure  of  separation  from  God  it  is 
intrinsically  evil,  as  all  that  separates  us  from 
God  must  be.  This  is  an  ever-recurring  thought 
in  that  well-known  manual  of  mystical  piety, 
the  Theologia  Germanica,  as  for  example  in 
the  following  passage:  'A  man  should  so 
stand  free,  being  quit  of  himself,  that  is,  of  his  I, 
and  Me,  and  Self,  and  Mine,  and  the  like,  that 
in  all  things,  he  should  no  more  seek  or  regard 
himself,  than  if  he  did  not  exist,  and  should 
take  as  little  account  of  himself  as  if  he  were 
not.  .  .  .  Likewise  he  should  count  all  the 
creatures  for  nothing.  What  is  there  then,  which 
is,  and  which  we  may  count  for  somewhat  ? 
I  answer,  nothing  but  that  which  we  may  call 
God."2  In  such  a  passage,  it  is  true,  the  terms 
have  an  ethical  as  well  as  a  metaphysical  mean- 
ing, but  the  metaphysical  meaning  is  the  funda- 
mental one,  and  according  to  it  finiteness,  and 
all  that  goes  to  make  up  individuality,  is  evil. 

But  on  the  other  hand  this  evil  of  finiteness 
and  individuality  is  only  an  illusion.  We  are 
really  of  one  substance  with  God,  and  only  the 
persistence  of  the  illusion  of  selfhood  prevents 

us  from  complete  oneness  with  him.    As  long  as 

68 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

the  illusion  continues  we  maintain  our  separate- 
ness  like  cakes  of  ice  in  the  open  ocean.  Our 
substance  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  vast  reality 
on  whose  bosom  we  are  upborne,  but  an  inward 
hardness  and  coldness  preserves  us  in  the  iso- 
lation of  selfhood.  But  let  this  inward  rigidity 
liquefy,  and  instantly  our  likeness  to  the  Infinite 
is  revealed  through  the  merging  of  our  being 
in  his  free  flowing  life.  The  true  nature  of  the 
soul  therefore  is  realized  only  in  those  mystical 
transports  in  which  the  boundaries  of  our 
finite  individuality  fade  away,  and  the  illusion 
of  self  is  dissolved  by  the  reality  of  God. 

We  need  not  follow  the  teachings  of  mysticism 
further.  In  fact  its  positive  teachings  are 
necessarily  few,  and  the  writings  of  mystics 
consist  largely  of  a  richly  varied  reiteration  of 
such  modes  of  thought  as  we  already  have 
sketched.  But  we  should  not  fail  to  note  that 
the  influence  of  mysticism  is  much  wider  than 
the  prevalence  of  the  foregoing  teachings.  Ob- 
jection might  be  plausibly  made  to  the  place 
we  are  giving  mysticism  in  our  discussion  on 
the  ground  that  the  pronounced  mystic  is  rarely 
to  be  met  with.  But  if  the  mystic  himself  is 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

rare,  belief  in  mystical  religion  is  widespread. 
Many  people  believe  in  mysticism  who  are  not 
themselves  mystics  in  any  marked  sense.3  Their 
lives  are  more  or  less  tinged  with  mystical  feel- 
ing, and  they  have  come  to  think  that  the  real 
way  to  a  deeper  experience  of  God  is  through 
an  enhancement  of  these  feelings.  They  dwell 
upon  such  as  they  have,  and  find  the  true  ful- 
filment of  what  is  feebly  expressed  in  them 
in  the  glowing  utterances  of  the  adept.  If 
perchance  they  are  largely  shut  out  by  tempera- 
ment from  definite  mystical  experience  the  result 
is  often  unfortunate.  They  develop  a  dissatis- 
fied frame  of  mind,  full  of  unhappy  yearnings 
and  futile  aspirations,  and  their  lives  become 
dank  and  unwholesome,  like  that  of  plants  in 
a  cellar,  by  reason  of  the  dimness  of  the  light 
in  which  they  dwell.  Nevertheless  they  do  not 
cease  to  acknowledge  the  mystical  type  of  re- 
ligious experience  as  the  authoritative  one. 

It  is  noteworthy,  too,  that  the  non-religious 
often  join  in  this  recognition  of  mysticism  as  the 
authentic  form  of  religion.  In  this  very  view, 
indeed,  frequently  lies  one  of  the  chief  reasons 

for    men's    aloofment   from   the   religious    life. 

70 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

They  assume  that  religion  is  essentially  mysti- 
cism, but  they  find  in  themselves  no  capacity  for 
mystical  experience,  and  they  do  not  feel  dis- 
posed simply  to  borrow  their  religion  from  those 
who  do  have  such  capacity.  Thus  since  the 
way  to  personal  religion  seems  closed  to  them, 
they  prefer  to  have  no  part  nor  lot  in  at  it  all. 

This  singular  combination  of  authoritative- 
ness  and  ineffectiveness,  which  mysticism  pre- 
sents when  it  confronts  general  human  needs, 
raises  a  serious  question  as  to  the  validity  of 
its  claim  to  be  the  true  experience  of  the  Eternal. 
It  leads  one  to  suspect  that  there  is  a  liberal 
mixture  of  truth  and  error  in  such  a  claim. 
There  may  be  many  entrances  into  the  temple 
of  the  divine  life,  and  the  postern  door  of  mysti- 
cism, while  accessible  to  the  cloistered  few, 
may  be  ill-adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  multi- 
tudes who  throng  the  thoroughfares  of  life. 
Let  us  therefore  proceed  to  an  estimate  of  the 
teachings  of  mysticism,  in  order  that  we  may 
discover,  if  we  can,  the  sources  of  its  strength 
and  weakness. 

One  of  the  undoubted  values  of  mysticism 
is  its  strong  emphasis  on  the  personal  nature 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

of  religion.  In  times  when  ecclesiasticism  is 
rampant,  and  forms  and  ceremonies  threaten 
to  monopolize  the  religious  life  of  men,  it  not 
infrequently  is  the  mystic  who  keeps  alive 
the  religion  of  personal  experience.  In  the 
monk's  cell,  in  the  chair  of  philosophy,  at  the 
shoemaker's  bench,  or  gathered  together  in 
communities  as  ' Friends  of  God'  or  *  Breth- 
ren of  the  Common  Life,"  the  mystics  have 
done  their  work  of  preserving  religion  as  direct 
relation  between  man  and  God.  The  mystic 
will  know  nothing  of  vicarious  religion.  To 
his  mind  a  religion  must  vitally  affect  a  man's 
personal  life,  or  else  it  is  unworthy  of  the  name. 
Whereas  under  the  care  of  sacerdotalism  religion 
becomes  little  more  than  a  classical  language, 
understood  by  the  few,  formally  honored  by  the 
many,  but  the  living  speech  of  no  one,  the 
mystic  preserves  it  as  the  vernacular  of  the  soul, 
the  natural  vehicle  for  the  expression  of  its 
highest  life. 

Mysticism  has  rendered  equally  great  service 
in  resisting  the  forces  that  tend  to  secularize  re- 
ligion or  to  reduce  it  to  mere  dogmatism.  The 

mystic   is   the   uncompromising   though   gentle 

72 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

foe  of  all  formalism.  Religion  must  be  inward 
and  spiritual,  or  it  is  nothing.  Forms  of  doc- 
trine are  but  the  anatomy  of  religion,  moral 
deeds  are  but  spiritual  gymnastics,  so  far  as  the 
doer  is  concerned,  unless  both  the  doctrines  and 
the  deeds  are  vivified  by  the  devotion  of  the 
heart.  The  mystic's  voice  is  raised  in  warning 
against  an  ever-present  tendency  in  our  churches 
to  repeat  the  follies  of  our  material  civilization. 
Just  as  we  denude  nature  to  enrich  ourselves, 
when  all  our  wealth  comes  ultimately  from 
nature,  just  as  we  multiply  factories  beside 
streams  that  are  running  dry,  so  the  mystic 
shows  us  that  we  are  prone  to  rob  faith  of 
its  meaning  while  we  elaborate  its  forms,  and 
while  constantly  enlarging  the  institutions  of 
religion,  to  drain  away  its  power.  Mysticism 
recalls  us  to  the  simple,  primitive  forces  of  re- 
ligion, the  inward  life  with  God,  purity  and  sin- 
gleness of  heart,  the  concentration  of  spiritual 
energy  on  the  things  that  abide.  Perhaps  to 
mysticism  more  than  to  any  other  type  of  faith 
is  due  the  insistence  that  the  true  goal  of  religion 
is  simply  and  solely  the  experience  of  the  Eter- 
nal. This  is  in  itself  an  important  service,  how- 

73 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

ever  much  the  mystic's  conception  of  the  nature 
of  such  experience  may  need  to  be  corrected  or 
enlarged. 

But  if  the  emphasis  on  personal  and  inward 
religion  is  the  strength  of  mysticism,  and  the 
source  of  its  authoritativeness,  what  are  those 
elements  of  weakness  which  prevent  it  from 
meeting  more  widely  the  needs  of  men  ?  The 
weakness  of  mysticism  appears  when  we  note 
that  in  its  zeal  that  religion  should  be  inward 
and  individual  it  sacrifices  its  active  and  social 
aspects.  The  mystic  somehow  allows  himself 
to  believe  that  personal  religion  can  be  detached 
from  social  activity,  and  while  of  course  social 
relations  cannot  be  suspended,  they  are  never- 
theless not  constituents  of  the  religious  life,  and 
may  be  regarded  as  a  positive  hindrance  to  it. 
He  allows  the  contrast  between  the  inward  and 
the  active  life  to  become  so  sharp  that  religion 
cannot  overcome  it,  so  as  to  include  both  within 
itself.  He  feels  most  keenly  man's  need  for 
spiritual  unity  and  peace,  and  he  rightly  per- 
ceives that  religion  is  the  true  means  for  gain- 
ing them,  but  he  fails  to  see  that  the  peace  which 
comes  through  the  suppression  of  life  is  not 

74 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

a  victorious  one.  The  mystic's  solution  of 
life's  problem  is  too  much  like  that  of  the  world- 
ling. The  latter  escapes  unrest  by  smothering 
the  aspirations  of  the  inner  life,  the  former  by 
silencing  the  appeal  of  the  outer  world.  But  a 
religion  that  cannot  glorify  our  common  life, 
and  that  surrenders  the  task  of  conserving,  uni- 
fying, and  enhancing  its  concrete  values,  is  lack- 
ing in  those  qualities  which  command  the  posi- 
tive allegiance  of  men.  According  to  the  prag- 
matic test  of  truth  it  falls  short  at  the  most  vital 
point. 

Now  while  these  passive  and  non-social  char- 
acteristics are  by  no  means  to  be  found  in  all 
whose  religion  has  a  mystical  vein,  yet  they  are 
the  normal  outcome  of  the  teachings  of  mysti- 
cism as  a  definite  type,  so  that  it  naturally  tends 
to  foster  them.  The  assumption  that  it  is  es- 
pecially through  feeling  that  we  enter  into  re- 
lation with  the  Divine,  and  the  consequent  exalt- 
ing of  feeling  over  against  knowledge  and  will, 
the  emptying  of  the  conception  of  God  of  all 
definite  meaning,  accompanied  by  the  assertion 
that  he  is  immediately  apprehended  in  the 
mystical  state,  the  obliteration  of  selfhood,  the 

75 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

view  that  finiteness  is  the  essence  of  evil,  but 
on  the  other  hand  the  assertion  that  this  evil 
is  an  illusion — these  are  teachings  ill-adapted 
to  foster  the  production  of  moral  and  social 
values.  The  morality  which  mysticism  culti- 
vates is  more  negative  than  positive,  and  it  has 
to  do  far  more  with  individual  than  with  social 
salvation.  The  mystic  dreams  of  a  realm  'be- 
yond the  good  and  the  bad,"  and  in  his  trans- 
ports he  enters  into  this  realm,  but  in  so  doing 
he  is  as  one  who  ascends  a  mountain  so  far  that 
he  goes  down  on  the  other  side.  Anything 
beyond  the  realm  of  moral  distinctions  is  below 
that  realm  in  its  practical  effect  on  the  lives 
of  men.  In  the  last  analysis  there  is  too  little 
moral  earnestness  in  mysticism  to  allow  it  to 
justify  its  claim  to  be  the  essential  and  suffi- 
cient way  to  the  knowledge  of  God.4 


II 

Great  as  is  the  value  of  mysticism,  its  weak- 
nesses are  so  fundamental  as  to  compel  us  to 
seek  for  a  broader  basis  for  the  religious  life; 
and  so  we  come  to  the  second  of  our  three 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

answers  to  the  question,  Wherein  does  man 
have  experience  of  the  Eternal  ?  From  the 
point  of  view  of  this  second  answer  such  an 
experience  is  gained  through  historical  revela- 
tion. This  answer  brings  us  much  nearer  than 
the  other  to  the  essence  of  Christian  experience. 
A  religion  that  is  to  shape  the  conduct  of  men 
and  mould  society  must  have  its  foundations 
deep  in  the  soil  of  history.  God  does  not  come 
to  men  merely  in  vague  and  formless  feelings, 
but  has  made  himself  known  explicitly  in  histori- 
cal events  and  personalities;  and  only  through 
such  tangible  disclosures  of  God  do  we  get  a 
solid  basis  for  strong  and  hopeful  living.  Glo- 
rious indeed  may  be  the  mystic's  moments  of 
vision,  but  the  days  between  are  often  dreary 
and  empty  of  meaning,  and  his  hours  of  de- 
spair are  terrifying.  The  author  of '  'Theologia 
Germanica"  describes  experiences  of  spiritual 
desolation,  which  are  as  acute  as  the  loftiest 
ecstasies,  so  that  the  former  are  termed  "hell': 
as  the  latter  are  called  "heaven";  and  then  he 
adds,  "So  long  as  a  man  is  on  earth,  it  is  possi- 
ble for  him  to  pass  ofttimes  from  the  one  to  the 
other;  nay  even  in  the  space  of  a  day  and 

77 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

night."5  The  Christian  life  of  fidelity  and 
ardor  and  manful  struggle  in  the  cause  of  the 
Spirit  is  not  to  be  sustained  by  relying  mainly 
on  such  a  fluctuating  revelation  as  this.  It  has 
a  far  better  basis  in  the  clear  and  adequate  dis- 
closure of  God  that  history  affords.  Christian- 
ity is  distinguished  among  faiths  as  the  pre-emi- 
nently historical  religion,  and  this  will  remain 
true  of  it  so  long  as  it  preserves  its  essential 
nature.  In  the  mighty  past  were  fashioned  for 
us  great  continents  of  faith,  and  voyage  as 
men  may  in  search  of  those  islands  of  the  blest 
about  which  they  dream,  the  continents  will  still 
remain  the  home  of  their  largest  and  richest  life. 
But  our  conception  of  what  historical  revela- 
tion is  has  undergone  great  changes  in  recent 
years,  and  while  these  changes  have  brought 
with  them  much  gain  they  also  have  left  not  a 
little  confusion.  A  few  generations  ago  his- 
torical revelation  meant  that  a  certain  limited 
portion  of  human  history  had  been  set  apart  by 
God  as  a  means  of  revealing  his  will.  This 
period  gained  its  peculiar  character  because  the 
ordinary  processes  of  history  were  in  important 
respects  suspended.  It  possessed  extra-terri- 

78 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

torial  rights  in  the  general  realm  of  human 
affairs.  The  events  which  happened  in  it  were 
not  subject  to  the  same  laws  as  prevailed  over 
the  rest  of  the  empire  of  history,  but  were  deter- 
mined by  the  direct  intervention  of  a  higher 
power.  It  was  in  this  manner  that  men  tried  to 
explain  why  the  history  and  literature  of  Israel 
and  of  the  beginnings  of  Christianity  had  a 
significance  for  them  such  as  belonged  to  noth- 
ing else  in  human  history. 

But  there  were  two  great  difficulties  with  this 
conception — one  scientific  and  the  other  re- 
ligious. The  first  of  these  difficulties  was  that 
such  a  revelation  was  not  really  historical  at  all. 
It  was  an  episode  in  history  but  not  an  integral 
part  of  it.  The  episode  indeed  was  regarded  as 
the  truly  important  thing,  as  compared  with 
which  the  rest  sank  into  insignificance,  but  it  was 
not  part  and  parcel  of  the  total  fabric  of  his- 
tory. But  science  could  no  more  be  prevented 
from  the  historical  study  of  the  events  of  reve- 
lation than  of  any  other  portion  of  the  story  of 
human  life,  and  if  it  were  to  study  these  events, 
it  must  use  the  same  methods  used  elsewhere. 
So  the  Chinese  Wall  around  the  Celestial  king- 

79 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

dom  proved  ineffective  against  the  invasions  of 
modern  historical  science,  and  the  Christian 
scholar  as  well  as  the  secular  historian  now 
treats  the  Old  and  New  Testament  narratives 
in  a  genuinely  historical  way. 

The  other  difficulty  is  that  such  a  conception 
of  the  divine  revelation  did  not  accord  to  the 
men  of  the  present  any  real  experience  of  God 
at  all.  The  authority  of  the  past  revelation  was 
so  absolute  that  all  thoughts  of  God's  living 
presence  among  men  were  completely  over- 
shadowed. Or  at  best  it  was  only  in  the  throes 
of  conversion,  or  in  certain  sporadic  experiences 
of  special  illumination,  that  God  was  thought  of 
as  coming  into  direct  relation  with  the  human 
soul.  The  ordinary  daily  experience  of  men 
was  written  in  cipher,  the  only  key  to  which 
was  the  revelation  of  long  ago.  The  genera- 
tions that  were  dominated  by  this  view,  with  all 
their  unworldliness,  yet  allowed  the  world  to 
loom  so  large  before  their  vision  as  to  eclipse 
the  direct  outshining  of  the  divine  presence  and 
love. 

Rejecting  then  this  conception  of  an  histori- 
cal   revelation,   we    are    confronted    with    the 

80 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

question,  Is  a  genuine  revelation  of  God  in  his- 
tory thinkable,  when  once  we  have  accepted  the 
scientific  conception  of  history  ?  Has  not  his- 
torical science  rendered  the  idea  of  revelation 
an  anachronism  ?  If  all  things  are  alike  the 
product  of  development,  it  would  seem  that 
we  could  speak  of  no  portion  of  history  as  a 
revelation.  Is  not  the  idea  of  an  historical 
revelation  a  contradiction  in  terms  ?  We  appear 
to  be  shut  up  to  a  dilemma:  either  we  may  be- 
lieve in  a  revelation  at  the  price  of  supposing  a 
violent  break  in  history,  or  we  may  hold  to  the 
continuity  of  history  and  sacrifice  the  idea  of 
an  historical  revelation — in  which  case  we 
might  be  led  to  revert  to  mysticism  as  the  only 
possible  type  of  an  experience  of  God. 

We  must  look  to  the  theologians  of  the  Ritsch- 
lian  school  for  help  at  this  point.  Among 
modern  theologians  they  are  the  ones  who 
have  had  the  courage  to  grasp  this  dilemma  by 
both  horns.  They  are  bent  on  doing  full  jus- 
tice to  the  claims  of  history,  and  yet  they  also 
maintain  with  unabated  vigor  that  Christianity 
is  a  religion  of  revelation.  They  stand  in  reac- 
tion against  a  merely  rationalistic  treatment  of 

81 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

history  and  against  finding  in  mysticism  the 
typical  form  of  man's  life  with  God,  as  de- 
fenders of  the  belief  in  historical  revelation.6 

What  the  Ritschlian  first  brings  home  to  us 
is  that  all  knowledge  in  the  religious  realm  is 
conditioned  on  faith.  This  is  a  truth  which 
we  already  have  found  reason  for  adopting, 
and  which  is  most  essential  for  the  solving  of 
our  problem.  The  attitude  of  the  soul  is  all- 
important,  when  spiritual  realities  are  to  be 
perceived.  Religion  requires  openness  of  soul, 
the  free  yielding  of  the  will,  an  attentive  absorp- 
tion in  the  things  that  appeal  to  us  as  the  high- 
est, in  order  that  the  true  purposes  of  God 
may  be  perceived  and  his  full  power  felt.  In- 
deed the  importance  of  having  the  right  inward 
attitude,  if  the  truth  is  to  be  seen,  is  not  confined 
to  religion  alone.  The  lover  of  color  and  form 
finds  beauty  in  the  wide  marshlands  and  the 
mist-draped  mountains,  when  others  see  only 
empty  wastes  and  dull  weather.  The  subtle 
ear  of  the  musician  hears  sweet  chords  and  rich 
overtones  in  the  human  voice,  which  are  lost 
on  the  heavier  sensibilities  of  the  untrained. 

The   kind   heart   discovers   a   noble   tenderness 

82 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

and  sense  of  honor  in  rough  commonplace 
men,  and  a  delicacy  of  feeling  in  women  who 
may  have  no  beauty  or  grace  of  person.  So 
the  mind  of  faith  perceives  the  august  beauty, 
the  vast,  soul-compelling  harmony,  the  infini- 
tude of  tenderness,  grace,  and  power  that 
pervade  the  world  through  the  presence  of  the 
Eternal. 

But  religious  faith  in  its  normal  form  is  not 
a  matter  of  mere  mystical  feeling.  This  the 
Ritschlians  earnestly  insist  upon,  and  rightly. 
However  mystical  feeling  may  accompany  it  or 
result  from  it  in  people  of  a  certain  tempera- 
ment, faith  itself  is  something  more  definite  and 
practical.  Nor  is  it  a  merely  arbitrary  function, 
without  any  real  basis  in  rationality.  Faith — 
at  least  in  the  Christian  sense  of  the  term — has 
its  roots  in  our  moral  nature.  It  is  the  active 
adoption  by  the  soul  of  what  the  moral  reason 
requires.  In  other  words  faith  is  fundamentally 
faithfulness,  the  principle  of  loyalty  in  man's 
nature,  an  active  willingness  to  obey  the  best 
that  one  knows.  The  Ritschlian  finds  the  phil- 
osophic interpretation  of  this  characteristic  of 
Christianity,  as  we  saw  in  the  last  lecture,  in 

83 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

Kant's  doctrine  of  the  practical  reason.  But 
the  pragmatic  point  of  view,  to  which  our  dis- 
cussion led  us,  differs  on  this  point  chiefly  in 
giving  a  wider  scope  to  faith.  Faith  on  its 
higher  levels  remains  essentially  the  same  in 
quality  from  either  point  of  view.  The  re- 
quirements of  our  moral  natures  set  us  our 
deepest  problems,  and  thereby  become  our 
highest  test  of  truth;  and  as  a  consequence  of 
this  faith  becomes  the  true  pathway  of  spiritual 
discovery,  the  necessary  condition  for  a  knowl- 
edge of  God.  It  is  the  moral  nature  that  gives 
especial  urgency  to  the  problem  with  which 
we  are  seeking  to  deal  in  our  present  discussion. 
As  morally  earnest  men  we  need  to  believe  that 
the  values  we  achieve  will  be  conserved  by  the 
processes  of  the  world,  and  we  yearn  for  a 
living  relation  to  the  Power  that  controls  these 
processes — for  an  experience  of  the  Eternal.7 

And  now  to  turn  to  the  question  of  a  revela- 
tion of  God  in  history.  The  mind  of  faith 
finds  in  the  historic  personality  of  Jesus  Christ 
the  adequate  revelation  of  God.  This  is  the 
centre  of  the  Ritschlian  position,  and  here  in- 
deed we  secure  the  needed  corrective  for  mys- 

84 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

ticism — a  clear  and  definite  basis  for  a  religious 
life  in  which  the  possibilities  of  the  soul  may 
be  developed  to  the  full,  and  power  may  be 
gained  for  complete  devotion  to  the  service  of 
men.  It  is  through  Christ  that  we  are  set 
free  from  sin  and  given  victory  over  the  world. 
He  introduces  us  into  the  more  abundant  life, 
even  the  life  eternal.  Christ  is  the  great  solver 
of  human  problems.  Through  him  we  come 
to  know  God  as  nowhere  else  in  the  world. 
Every  earnest  soul  that  has  once  faced  the  great 
moral  issues  of  life  will  find  in  him  the  supreme 
evidence  that  there  is  in  the  universe  a  divine 
power  able  to  deal  with  those  issues.  Every 
soul  that  is  weak  and  dejected  or  oppressed  with 
guilt  will  find  in  Christ  the  fullest  assurance  of 
the  Heavenly  Father's  nearness  and  forgiving 
love. 

These  are  the  great  convictions  of  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness,  and  their  basis  is  an  historic 
fact.  He  who  looks  to  Jesus  as  the  full  and 
sufficient  revelation  of  God  has  a  sure  founda- 
tion for  his  faith.  The  fluctuations  of  his  own 
feelings  do  not  paralyze  his  religious  life,  be- 
cause it  is  not  primarily  through  his  own  sub- 

85 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

jective  feelings  that  the  knowledge  of  God 
comes.  The  revelation  in  Christ  is  an  un- 
changeable fact,  and  it  abides  as  an  unfailing 
source  of  insight  and  strength  for  all  who  feel 
their  need  of  God.  Thus  as  a  matter  of  experi- 
ence history  and  revelation  intersect  in  the 
person  of  Jesus  Christ.8 

But  the  revelation  in  Christ  is  historical  in  a 
deeper  sense  than  this,  as  the  Ritschlians  clear- 
ly bring  out.  Christ's  disclosure  of  the  divine 
life  was  wrought  out  in  and  through  a  partici- 
pation in  human  history.  This  is  especially 
evident  when  we  consider  Christ's  life  in  com- 
parison with  the  ideals  of  mysticism.  Jesus 
stood  in  the  midst  of  human  affairs,  believing 
that  this  was  God's  world  and  that  to  live 
with  God  was  to  do  a  work  in  the  world.  He 
did  not  feel  that  the  world  must  be  regarded  as 
a  mere  illusion  in  order  that  one  might  be  united 
with  God;  he  believed  rather  that  the  kingdom 
of  God  should  come  on  earth.  To  his  thought 
God  was  not  accessible  solely  in  weird  ecstasies 
of  feeling.  His  experience  brought  him  some- 
thing far  richer  than  that — an  ever  present 

sense  of  fellowship  with  God   in  his  daily  life. 

86 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

There  was  all  the  difference  between  Jesus' 
fellowship  with  God  and  that  of  the  mystic, 
which  exists  between  the  patriotism  of  a  senti- 
mentalist and  that  of  a  statesman.  The  former 
exhausts  itself  in  mere  feeling,  the  latter  never. 
The  statesman's  patriotism  comes  out  in  positive 
active  service  to  the  life  of  his  country  or  he  is  no 
true  statesman.  So  with  Jesus  fellowship  with 
God  meant  the  service  of  men.  It  was  precisely 
in  and  through  his  work  in  the  world  that  he 
maintained  his  filial  relationship  to  God.  All 
spiritual  relationship,  according  to  his  teaching, 
is  a  matter  of  doing  God's  will.  'For  whoso- 
ever shall  do  the  will  of  God,  the  same  is  my 
brother,  and  sister,  and  mother/3  Hence  the 
Ritschlians  rightly  lay  great  emphasis  on  Jesus' 
fidelity  to  his  vocation  as  one  of  the  main  ele- 
ments of  his  revelation  of  God  and  his  saving 
power  with  men.9 

It  is  true  that  the  ends  which  Jesus  sought  to 
accomplish  by  his  life  and  death  were  purely 
inward  and  spiritual.  His  work  was  to  awaken 
men's  faith,  to  release  them  from  the  despond- 
ency of  guilt  and  the  bondage  of  sin,  and  to 
bring  them  into  the  filial  life  with  God.  Never- 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

theless  his  own  spiritual  life  found  its  true  being 
and  expression  in  this  spiritual  service  that  he 
rendered  to  others,  and  hence  the  life  to  which 
he  sought  to  bring  other  men  was  a  life  with 
God  realized  in  service. 

The  revelation  through  Christ  is  thus  one 
that  appears  in  the  very  heart  of  human  history, 
and  yet  one  that  lifts  our  vision  above  the  chance 
and  change  of  merely  human  events  to  princi- 
ples which  are  eternal.  It  brings  healing  and 
forgiveness  to  bruised  and  heartsick  and  guilty 
souls,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  distractions,  strug- 
gles, and  frustrated  hopes  of  life  it  revives  us 
with  a  consciousness  of  freedom  and  power. 
In  the  redeeming  might  of  Jesus'  personality 
the  soul  of  his  disciple  finds  full  satisfaction, 
and  gains  a  deep  assurance  of  the  Heavenly 
Father's  personal  fellowship  and  love. 

Such  then  is  the  answer  of  the  theology  of  the 
Ritschlians.  They  point  out  first  that  accord- 
ing to  the  actual  nature  of  religion  as  seen  in 
the  fully  developed  form  of  Christianity,  re- 
ligious knowledge  is  conditioned  on  moral  faith, 
and  secondly,  that  for  the  mind  of  faith  there  is  a 
full  and  adequate  revelation  of  God  in  Jesus 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

Christ.  Historically,  indeed,  this  revelation 
precedes  our  faith,  and  is  the  power  which 
awakens  it,  but  as  an  inward  experience  of  the 
soul  the  revelation  begins  at  the  moment  when 
faith  is  awakened.  The  value  of  this  answer 
there  is  no  reason  to  call  in  question;  on  the  con- 
trary, there  is  every  reason  to  emphasize  its 
truthfulness.  The  place  given  to  faith  and  to 
the  authority  of  actual  experience  is  of  vital  im- 
portance, in  order  that  religion  may  be  recog- 
nized as  an  essential  and  integral  part  of  the 
functions  of  the  human  spirit,  and  the  histori- 
cal character  of  the  revelation  in  Christ  is  our 
safeguard  against  the  vague,  ineffective  and 
negative  character  of  mysticism. 

But  now  the  question  arises,  Is  this  all  that 
theology  should  do  toward  solving  our  great 
problem  ?  We  have  seen  good  reason  why 
theology  should  not  assume  to  gain  its  funda- 
mental truths  by  purely  intellectual  processes, 
apart  from  religious  experience.  On  the  con- 
trary, religious  experience  must  be  the  funda- 
mental basis  of  all  the  conclusions  of  theology. 
Nor  can  we  call  in  question  the  sufficiency  of 
the  faith  in  Christ,  unaided  by  direct  theological 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

reflection,  for  countless  hosts  of  his  followers. 
Most  certainly  religion  can  sustain  itself  widely, 
and  doubtless  for  considerable  periods,  without 
a  conscious  theology.  Nevertheless  the  func- 
tion of  theology,  when  it  is  needed,  is  to  work 
out  reflective  interpretations  of  religion,  which 
shall  strengthen  and  guide  the  life  of  faith, 
and  if  possible  enlarge  the  boundaries  of  truth. 
The  Ritschlian  theology  only  partly  fulfils  this 
function.  It  registers  the  great  values  of  our 
religion,  and  it  does  police  duty  to  prevent  these 
values  from  being  encroached  upon  by  other 
interests.  It  has  done  great  service  in  bringing 
out  the  essence  of  Christianity,  and  in  freeing 
it  from  subjection  to  metaphysics.  But  in 
ruling  out  all  metaphysics,  and  in  insisting 
that  Christianity  should  have  no  other  support 
than  its  own  self-witnessing,  it  has  curtailed  the 
power  of  theology  to  serve  religion.  The  suffi- 
ciency of  unreflective  faith  for  many  a  life,  and 
the  fact  that  faith  is  an  essential  condition  of 
gaining  truth  in  all  religious  lives,  should  not 
blind  us  to  the  fact  that  faith  has  its  hours  of 
exhaustion,  in  which  the  intellect  can  bring  it 

support,  that  it  needs  the  discipline  of  the  in- 

90 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

tellectual  nature,  and  that  under  the  guidance 
of  the  intellect  it  may  go  forward  to  new  dis- 
coveries. Moreover,  there  are  many  minds 
in  which  faith  can  be  evoked  only  by  a  rational 
appeal  to  the  intellect.10 

No  Ritschlian,  to  be  sure,  would  dissent  from 
these  statements  in  their  general  form.  In  fact, 
he  would  make  them  the  principles  of  his  work 
as  far  as  his  theories  would  let  him.  It  is  his 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  which  hampers 
him.  Having  accepted  the  separation  between 
the  theoretical  and  the  practical  reason,  as  a 
kind  of  Monroe  doctrine,  necessary  for  the  de- 
velopment of  faith,  he  is  then  too  conscientious 
to  make  incursions  into  the  eastern  hemisphere 
of  thought.  Having  warned  the  theoretical 
reason  off  from  the  domain  of  the  practical 
reason,  he  cannot  consistently  appropriate 
anything  of  value  from  the  realm  of  the  former. 
Hence  his  hostile  attitude  toward  metaphysics 
in  theology,  which  prevents  him  from  giving 
faith  the  support  of  a  speculative  interpretation. 

But  pragmatism  is  not  under  these  limitations. 
It  neither  insists  that  the  theoretical  reason  can 
deal  only  with  phenomena,  nor  maintains  that 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

the  rational  nature  is  divided  into  two  separate 
realms,  the  theoretical  and  the  practical.  It  can 
admit  practical  interests  into  its  metaphysical 
decisions,  and  it  can  be  as  speculative  as  it 
pleases  in  the  practical  realm,  so  long  as  its 
final  test  is  found  in  the  facts,  and  in  the  prac- 
tical workings  of  the  truth.  Thus  it  appears 
to  make  possible  a  fuller  interpretation  of  re- 
ligious experience  than  can  be  gotten  under  the 
limitations  of  the  critical  philosophy.  A  prag- 
matic defence  of  a  religious  truth  would  have 
four  features.  It  would  show  that  it  was  postu- 
lated by  man's  moral  nature;  it  would  freely 
recognize  the  authority  of  the  inward  experience 
in  which  that  postulate  is  felt  to  be  satisfied; 
it  would  set  the  truth  to  be  defended  in  the 
framework  of  religious  experience  in  general 
through  the  comparative  study  of  religion;11  and 
finally  it  would  fit  it,  as  far  as  possible,  into 
the  rest  of  our  experience  by  some  form  of  em- 
pirical metaphysics.12  Now  the  Ritschlian  de- 
fence of  the  historical  revelation  of  God  in 
Jesus  covers  the  first  two  parts  of  the  prag- 
matic line  of  argument,  but  for  the  reasons 

given  it  has  practically  to  ignore  the  last  two 

92 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

parts.  In  order,  therefore,  to  get  the  full  sig- 
nificance of  the  experience  of  God  through  his- 
torical revelation,  we  must  undertake,  if  only  in 
a  fragmentary  and  suggestive  way,  to  supple- 
ment the  Ritschlian  argument.  But  in  so  do- 
ing we  are  led  on  to  the  third  answer  to  our 
general  problem  mentioned  at  the  outset,  which 
finds  an  experience  of  the  Eternal  in  the  de- 
velopment of  moral  personality. 


Ill 

The  materials  for  the  first  stage  in  the  pro- 
cess of  constructing  the  frame-work  of  religious 
experience,  which  at  the  same  time  shall  enable 
us  to  see  the  revelation  given  in  Christ  in  its  true 
significance,  lie  close  at  hand.  They  are  given 
in  the  Pauline  conception  of  the  Spirit.  This 
conception  is  of  course  ignored  by  no  theology, 
and  yet  theology  in  general  has  not  given  it  a 
central  place,  and  that  of  the  Ritschlians  is  no 
exception.  But  it  was  in  this  conception  that 
Paul  found  the  interpretation  of  the  new  life 
with  God  which  Christ  had  made  possible  for 
him. 

93 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

The  Christian  conception  of  the  Spirit  is  the 
product  of  the  transformation  effected  in  Paul 
by  the  life  and  death  of  Jesus  Christ.  The 
conception  thus  received  its  characteristic  ex- 
pression as  the  result  of  what  a  personality  of 
infinite  depth,  poise  and  inspiring  power  ac- 
complished in  another  personality  that  was  in 
the  grip  of  moral  despair.  This  fact  is  of  the 
utmost  significance  to  us  in  trying  to  understand 
the  idea.  The  moral  deed  of  the  one  assuaging 
the  moral  pain  of  the  other;  a  life  that  was  per- 
fectly whole  ministering  to  a  life  that  was  sick; 
a  will  with  resources  that  could  know  no  de- 
pletion rescuing  a  will  that  was  fiercely  wasting 
its  energy  in  a  fruitless  struggle — this  was  the 
personal  experience  of  Paul  through  which  his 
understanding  of  the  Spirit  was  reached. 

But  this  experience  of  the  apostle  Paul  was 
not  that  of  being  overwhelmed  by  a  tidal  in- 
undation, such  as  the  mystic  knows,  only  to  have 
the  flood  draw  back  again  into  the  great  deep, 
leaving  a  wan  and  exhausted  soul  behind.  In- 
stead, it  remained  as  a  permanent  principle  of 
life.  It  revealed  to  Paul  a  righteousness  of  God 
from  faith  unto  faith,  and  enabled  him  to  under- 

94 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

stand  that  saying  which  is  written,  'the  right- 
eous shall  live  by  faith."  Thus  there  came  to  this 
Jewish  rabbi  a  sustaining,  illumining  and  con- 
trolling power  such  as  all  his  knowledge  of  the 
law  had  not  enabled  him  to  discover.  He  was 
lifted  so  far  above  his  old  life  that  he  could  ex- 
claim, 'It  is  no  longer  I  that  live,  but  Christ 
liveth  in  me:  and  that  life  which  I  now  live  in 
the  flesh  I  live  in  faith,  the  faith  which  is  in  the 
Son  of  God,  who  loved  me,  and  gave  himself 
up  for  me." 

Now  in  this  new  life  into  which  Paul  had 
come  two  elements  were  perfectly  blended — the 
fullest  and  richest  moral  activity  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  indwelling  presence  of  God. 
And  in  just  this  union  lay  his  experience  of  the 
Spirit.  Herein  consists  the  profound  significance 
of  the  Pauline  conception  of  what  the  Spirit 
is.  The  conception  stands  for  the  full  union 
of  what  mankind  is  sa  prone  to  conceive  of  only 
in  greater  or  less  isolation.  We  have  seen  how 
the  mystic  thinks  that  God  is  most  fully  in  him 
when  there  is  the  least  of  individual  thought 
and  action,  and  on  the  other  hand  we  know 
well  the  ever-present  tendency  to  self-sufficiency 

95 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

that  goes  with  human  achievement.  But  here 
we  are  brought  to  the  insight  that  man  attains 
the  most  intimate  relation  to  the  divine  in 
moral  activity,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  the 
higher  righteousness  comes  only  through  the 
life  of  faith.  The  deep  meaning  of  the  Chris- 
tian doctrine  of  the  Spirit  is  that  the  fullest  and 
inmost  experience  of  the  Eternal  comes  in  the 
development  of  moral  personality.  There  is  a 
vision  of  God  that  is  given  in  the  opening 
flower,  in  the  grace  and  freedom  of  the  bird, 
in  the  ceaselessly  heaving  sea,  in  the  pageant 
of  day  and  night,  and  of  springtime  and  har- 
vest. There  is  a  sense  of  God  that  comes  in  the 
hush  of  meditation,  in  the  breathless  moments 
when  we  hear  "the  deep  pulsations  of  the  world," 
and  feel  that  our  souls  for  an  instant  are  in 
tune  with  the  mighty  rhythm.  But  there  is  a 
life  with  God  that  comes  only  to  those  who 
can  read  the  human  heart,  with  its  divine  possi- 
bilities and  its  dire  needs,  and  who  with  a  pa- 
tience, an  unswerving  fidelity  and  a  tenderness 
of  love  to  be  learnt  only  from  the  Master,  and 
through  whatever  agony  and  bloody  sweat,  can 
be  servants  and  saviors  of  men. 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

But  here  we  are  met  with  an  objection.  Very 
lofty  morality  often  exists  in  men  who  have  no 
consciousness  of  a  relation  to  God,  and  this  fact 
is  held  to  show  that  such  a  synthesis  of  reli- 
gion and  morality  as  we  have  found  in  Paul's 
doctrine  of  the  Spirit  is  accidental,  and  gives  us 
no  essential  truth.  The  common  but  unlovely 
custom  when  dealing  with  this  objection  is  to 
depreciate  the  moral  worth  of  such  men  as 
would  be  cited  most  naturally  in  its  support. 
But  nothing  could  be  more  futile,  and  the 
true  method  is  exactly  opposite  to  this.  It  is 
our  privilege  as  Christians  to  believe  that  all 
who  live  the  Christ-like  life  profoundly  and 
intensely  have  actually  a  vital  relation  to  the 
Spirit  of  God,  even  though  they  are  not  conscious 
of  such  a  relation.  Surely  the  relations  of  even 
the  most  religious  men  to  God  are  much  larger 
than  they  are  aware  of.  The  morality  of  the 
skeptic,  then,  so  far  as  it  is  a  real  contribution  to 
the  cause  of  righteousness  and  not  a  mere  float- 
ing on  the  surface  of  the  average  social  ethics, 
may  be  welcomed  as  the  work  of  the  Spirit. 

But  more  than  this — many  of  those  whose 
morality  is  not  sustained  by  the  conscious 

97 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

presence  of  God  long  most  earnestly  for  such 
a  sustaining  power.  Listen,  for  example,  to 
these  words  of  Romanes,  written  at  the  time 
that  the  new  theories  of  evolution  had  under- 
mined his  former  religious  faith:  *  Forasmuch 
as  I  am  far  from  being  able  to  agree  with  those 
who  affirm  that  the  twilight  doctrine  of  the 
'new  faith'  is  a  desirable  substitute  for  the 
waning  splendor  of  'the  old,'  I  am  not  ashamed 
to  confess  that  with  this  virtual  negation  of 
God  the  universe  to  me  has  lost  its  soul  of  loveli- 
ness; and  although  from  henceforth  the  precept 
to  'work  while  it  is  day'  will  doubtless  but 
gain  an  intensified  force  from  the  terribly  in- 
tensified meaning  of  the  words  that  'the  night 
cometh  when  no  man  can  work/  yet  when  at 
times  I  think,  as  think  at  times  I  must,  of  the 
appalling  contrast  between  the  hallowed  glory 
of  that  creed  which  once  was  mine  and  the 
lonely  mystery  of  existence  as  now  I  find  it — 
at  such  times  I  shall  ever  feel  it  impossible  to 
avoid  the  sharpest  pang  of  which  my  nature  is 
susceptible."  13  Indeed  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
that  anyone  who  is  genuinely  laboring  for  moral 
and  social  ends  could  fail  to  welcome  the  great 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

truths  of  religion,  if  he  felt  that  they  were  suffi- 
ciently substantiated.  What  architect  can  have 
the  joy  in  erecting  an  exposition  building,  whose 
destruction  is  contracted  for  before  the  roof  is 
on,  that  he  would  have  in  rearing  a  cathedral  for 
the  centuries  ?  Surely  a  generation  that  mourns 
the  vandalism  of  the  Romans,  the  Goths  and 
the  Moslems,  and  that  is  ransacking  the  dust 
heaps  of  Egypt  and  the  mounds  of  Greece  and 
Mesopotamia  in  order  to  find  and  preserve 
what  remains  of  the  treasures  of  the  past,  cannot 
be  indifferent  to  the  question  whether  the  uni- 
verse as  a  whole  is  preserving  and  developing 
moral  values,  or  grinding  them  back  into  primi- 
tive desolation  as  by  slowly  advancing  conti- 
nents of  glacial  ice.  Morality  cannot  be  in- 
different to  the  truths  of  religion,  for  if  it  were, 
it  would  be  indifferent  to  its  own  fate.  If  there 
is  a  supreme  moral  power  in  the  universe,  then 
we  may  hope  that  our  little  deeds  for  righteous- 
ness will  be  taken  up  and  preserved  through 
its  vaster  achievements,  but  if  there  be  no 
such  power,  our  moral  work  is  but  a  making 
of  play  houses  on  the  seashore  for  the  next  tide 
to  wash  away. 

99 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

In  the  long  run,  therefore,  morality  needs  the 
support  of  religion,  and  we  may  rest  in  the 
faith  that  the  truly  moral  life,  however  its  hori- 
zon may  be  clouded  in,  does  indeed  have  a  vital 
relation  with  God. 

But  now  let  us  note  how  the  Pauline  doctrine 
of  the  Spirit  sets  the  historical  revelation  in  the 
personality  of  Christ  in  its  true  perspective.  In 
the  light  of  it  we  see  Jesus,  not  simply  as  a  fact 
in  history,  nor  even  solely  as  the  mighty  par- 
ticipator in  historical  events  and  shaper  of  his- 
torical issues,  but  also  as  the  interpreter  of  his- 
tory. In  him  we  see  perfectly  revealed  the 
forces  that  have  caused  whatever  real  progress 
the  world  has  made,  the  energies  of  moral  per- 
sonality. In  him  we  apprehend  what  the  in- 
carnation of  the  Divine  really  means,  and  as  he 
captivates  our  souls  and  enlists  them  in  the 
cause  of  his  kingdom,  we  become  conscious  of 
the  reality  and  meaning  of  the  Infinite  Moral 
Life  with  which  he  had  constant  fellowship. 
Jesus  has  his  supreme  significance  for  us  be- 
cause he  reveals  God  to  us  as  actually  imma- 
nent in  human  history,  and  so  also  as  im- 
manent in  our  present  world  of  toiling,  aspir- 


100 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

ing,  struggling  men.  No  one,  therefore,  really 
receives  a  revelation  of  God  from  Jesus  Christ 
who  does  not  also  have  an  experience  of  God 
through  the  development  of  moral  personality, 
and  on  the  other  hand  no  one  is  genuinely  de- 
veloping in  moral  insight  and  power,  who  does 
not,  just  so  far,  enter  into  spiritual  kinship 
with  Christ.  The  Infinite  Moral  Power  whose 
life  was  manifested  to  the  full  in  Jesus,  becomes 
for  all  who  will  to  live  the  life  of  faith  an  in- 
dwelling Spirit.  Thus  does  the  profound 
thought  of  Paul  bring  out  the  meaning  of  his- 
torical revelation  in  its  practical,  personal  appli- 
cation. 

And  now,  having  seen  how  the  revelation 
through  Jesus  and  the  believer's  personal  ex- 
perience of  God  blend  in  the  conception  of  the 
Spirit  of  God  as  immanent  in  the  life  of  faith, 
we  must  go  a  step  further  and  consider  the 
Christian  experience  as  thus  understood  in  its 
relation  to  other  types  of  religion,  for  this  will 
lead  to  a  further  interpretation  of  the  positions 
reached. 

The  place  of  the  religion  of  Jesus  among  the 

faiths  of  the  world  is  determined  at  once  by 

101 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

the  fact  that  he  transformed,  and  so  perpetuated, 
ethical  monotheism.  What  a  world-moulding 
achievement  this  was  can  only  be  indicated 
with  the  utmost  brevity  here.  India  has  given 
the  world  two  great  faiths,  the  product  of  a 
people  naturally  religious,  developed  with  mar- 
velous subtlety  and  variety  by  minds  of  the 
greatest  acuteness,  and  yet  ending  in  confusion, 
ineffectiveness,  and  stagnation,  because  when 
wrought  out  to  their  final  meanings  they  became 
nothing  but  a  mystical  monism.  Their  faith 
in  deity  became  a  worship  of  blank  oneness, 
in  which  all  ethical  distinctions  were  engulfed, 
and  the  practical  morality  which  they  cultivated 
was  in  principle  merely  negative.  In  the  Con- 
fucian system  we  see  the  opposite  error.  Posi- 
tive morals  and  the  social  order  are  everything, 
the  consciousness  of  the  divine  is  practically 
eliminated,  and  as  a  consequence  legalism  and 
traditionalism  gain  undisputed  sway.  No  other 
great  system  of  faith  save  the  Christian  has 
been  able  to  rise  above  both  these  errors.  The 
Persian  religion  developed  a  sharp  dualism,  in 
which  the  two  great  powers  of  good  and  evil 

confronted    one    another.     In    Neo-Platonism 

102 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

Greek  thought  ultimately  passed  into  a  mysti- 
cal monism  akin  to  that  of  India.  In  Judaism 
the  tendency  was  again  of  the  opposite  kind — 
that  is,  to  allow  morality  to  become  barren  and 
legalistic  because  of  the  lack  of  inwardness  and 
intimacy  in  men's  relation  to  God.  Though 
formally  the  heir  of  the  ethical  monotheism  of 
the  prophets,  Judaism  had  found  it  impossible 
to  preserve  the  two  elements  of  the  prophetic 
faith  in  living  unity.  In  Mohammedanism  the 
same  error  exists,  only  to  a  far  greater  degree. 
Allah,  though  the  one  God  of  all  the  universe, 
yet  has  little  or  no  relation  to  the  inward  life 
of  man. 

It  was  through  Jesus  Christ  that  this  problem 
of  the  ages  was  fully  wrought  out  for  men.  In 
the  first  place  he  gave  to  every  conception  and 
to  every  aspect  of  religion  an  ethical  meaning. 
He  saw  life  in  its  unconventional,  human  re- 
lations, and  knew  that  there  was  the  real  need 
and  the  real  opportunity  for  religion.  He 
showed  how  impossible  it  was  to  be  worshipful 
toward  God  and  arrogant  toward  men.  He 
repudiated  the  righteousness  that  could  not 
forget  itself  but  that  could  be  oblivious  of 

103 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

human  need.  He  saw  nothing  to  admire  in  the 
character  that  was  exemplary  but  pitiless.  He 
was  outraged  by  those  who  substituted  pedantry 
for  religion,  and  who  were  more  concerned  to 
keep  their  robes  unpolluted  than  to  cleanse  and 
uplift  the  lives  of  men.  He  showed  that  the 
institutions  of  religion,  prayer,  fasting,  and  the 
Sabbath  were  for  promoting  a  man's  character 
rather  than  his  reputation.  According  to  his 
thought  the  conception  of  neighbor  could  not  be 
limited  by  caste  or  blood,  but  was  to  be  applied 
whenever  relations  of  kindness  and  helpfulness 
were  possible.  And  finally  the  great  ideas  of 
man's  sonship  and  God's  kingdom  were  given  an 
entirely  ethical  content.  Godlikeness  was  the  test 
of  sonship  to  God,  and  doing  the  will  of  God 
was  what  constituted  entrance  into  his  kingdom. 

o 

Thus  the  religion  of  Christ  was  through  and 
through  the  religion  of  ethical  personality. 

But  in  the  second  place,  Christ  carried  the 
religious  consciousness  into  every  experience  and 
function  of  life.  The  clothing  of  the  lilies  and 
the  storms  on  the  sea  of  Galilee,  his  daily  work 
in  the  world  and  the  cup  pressed  to  his  lips  in 

the  garden — all  alike  were  from  the  hands  of 

104 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

the  Father.  Hence  the  filial  spirit  was  to  be 
carried  into  every  relation  of  life.  The  Pharisee 
thought  that  God  had  withdrawn  from  his 
world  since  the  glory  had  departed  from  Israel. 
Jesus  taught  men  to  know  that  he  was  always 
near.  The  ascetic  held  that  the  things  of  the 
physical  life  were  a  barrier  to  the  life  with  God. 
Jesus  taught  that  they  were  all  from  God,  and 
all  to  be  used  in  his  service.  The  formalist 
forgot  that  God  was  nigh  to  the  heart  of  man. 
Jesus  made  men  mindful  that  the  Father  seeth 
in  secret.  The  Jew  could  not  believe  that  God 
looked  with  equal  favor  upon  himself  and  upon 
the  Gentile.  Jesus  saw  his  Father's  hand  dis- 
tributing sunshine  and  rain  to  all  alike,  and 
taught  that  many  should  come  from  the  East 
and  the  West  and  sit  down  with  Abraham  and 
Isaac  and  Jacob  in  the  kingdom  of  God.  The 
filial  life  was  open  to  all  because  the  Father's 
love  was  all-embracing.  Thus  the  religion  of 
Christ  was  through  and  through  a  religion  of 
the  divine  immanence,  and  one  in  which  this 
faith  was  applied  no  less  to  human  history 
than  to  nature. 

In  these  two  great  characteristics  of  Jesus' 

105 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

work  we  see  the  transformation  which  he 
wrought  in  ethical  monotheism.  He  effected  a 
synthesis  between  the  religion  of  divine  imma- 
nence and  the  religion  of  ethical  personality,  thus 
protecting  the  latter  from  legalism  and  the  for- 
mer from  vague  mysticism,  and  giving  to  both 
an  unparalleled  depth  and  intensity.  This 
synthesis  he  accomplished  not  at  all  through 
outward  ecclesiastical  reform,  nor  through  the 
introduction  of  novel  ideas,  but  rather  through 
his  own  personality.  In  his  life,  in  his  practical 
spiritual  attitude  toward  God  and  nature  and 
man,  he  brought  into  full  and  unimpaired 
unity  spiritual  truths  that  the  world's  greatest 
souls  have  never  been  able,  apart  from  him, 
to  lay  hold  of  except  in  fragmentariness  and 
isolation.  God  ever  present  in  his  world  and 
capable  of  being  known  in  inward  experience, 
and  yet  as  the  consequence  of  this  no  deprecia- 
tion of  individuality  and  personality  but  their 
full  ethical  development,  for  in  precisely  this 
process  of  development  God  is  most  intimately 
known — this  we  may  well  believe  to  be  Christ's 
supreme  achievement,  as  viewed  in  the  light  of 

man's  religious  history. 

1 06 


THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  ETERNAL 

Our  pragmatic  method  requires  us  to  take  one 
step  further  in  this  discussion,  but  that  must 
be  reserved  for  the  next  lecture.  But  we  already 
have  expressed,  even  though  in  merely  outline 
fashion,  the  answer  which  Christian  theology 
has  to  make  to  the  great  problem  with  which 
the  present  lecture  has  been  concerned.  Man 
has  knowledge  of  God  in  many  ways,  but  the 
fullest  experience  of  him  is  conditioned  upon 
the  historic  revelation  in  the  personality  of 
Jesus  Christ.  Through  the  unique  worth  and 
power  of  his  personality  we  are  introduced  into 
that  religion  of  the  Spirit,  in  which  ethical 
monotheism  finds  its  fulfilment,  and  according 
to  which  we  have  an  abiding  fellowship  with 
God  and  Christ  through  the  development  of 
moral  personality.  The  great  apostle  of  the 
religion  of  the  Spirit  teaches  us  that  there  are 
three  things  that  abide — faith,  hope,  and  love- 
and  in  proportion  as  these  great  fruits  of  the 
Spirit  of  Christ  are  realized  in  us  we  have 
an  experience  of  the  Eternal. 


107 


Ill 

ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

'  I  AHERE  is  no  better  evidence  of  the  practical 
nature  of  truth  than  the  fact  that  the  great 
insights  have  to  be  won  afresh  by  each  succeed- 
ing generation.  Just  as  a  boy  cannot  be  sim- 
ply told  how  to  live  by  his  father,  but  must 
learn  his  final  lessons  in  the  same  way  that  his 
father  did — in  the  actual  struggles  of  life — so  one 
age  cannot  simply  repeat  the  life  of  a  preceding 
age,  but  must  go  on  to  grapple  with  new  con- 
ditions as  the  preceding  age  had  to  do,  thereby 
making  its  own  contribution  to  the  world's 
slowly  accumulating  treasuries  of  wisdom.  If, 
indeed,  an  age  attempts  to  do  merely  the  work 
of  repeating  the  thoughts  and  deeds  of  the  past, 
it  foredooms  itself  to  defeat.  It  becomes  an 
age  in  which  there  is  no  open  vision.  It  for- 
sakes the  fountain  of  living  waters  and  hews  out 

for  itself  cisterns,  broken  cisterns  that  can  hold 

1 08 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

no  water.  It  becomes  like  a  royal  house  that 
outlives  its  real  power.  The  pageantry  of  the 
past  is  preserved,  but  its  motives,  its  real  in- 
spiration and  meaning,  are  lost.  The  time 
which  a  succeeding  age  imitates  is  always  a 
creative  time.  It  therefore  can  be  imitated  in 
the  true  sense  only  as  it  is  allowed  to  inspire 
the  succeeding  age  to  some  new  creative  work. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  achievements  of 
the  past  ought  to  be  steadily  dropping  out  of 
our  sight.  On  the  contrary,  the  lapse  of  time 
often  enhances  their  significance.  As  you  sail 
down  the  Potomac  from  Washington  to  Mount 
Vernon  the  objects  that  filled  your  horizon 
when  you  were  in  the  city  shrink  into  insignifi- 
cance, but  Washington  monument  looms  up 
before  you  taller  than  ever.  So  there  are  in  the 
past  monumental  personalities  and  achieve- 
ments whose  significance  grows  upon  the  world 
as  its  horizon  widens.  If  the  attempt  merely 
to  repeat  the  past  inevitably  results  in  spiritual 
deadness,  the  notion  that  the  past  may  be 
ignored  and  forgotten  is  a  sure  recipe  for  spir- 
itual smallness.  In  truth,  it  is  only  by  appro- 
priating the  values  of  the  past  that  progress 

109 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

can  be  made,  and  every  truly  spiritual  achieve- 
ment is  costly  and  rare  enough  to  abide  in  the 
world's  memory  as  a  thing  of  fadeless  glory. 
When  Prometheus  stole  fire  from  heaven  he 
gave  to  mankind  a  power  that  it  never  will 
cease  to  need.  So  the  prophetic  personality, 
who  is  able  to  kindle  the  human  heart  with  the 
original  divine  fire,  never  will  be  outgrown. 

But  just  because  our  inheritance  from  the 
past  is  so  saturated  with  the  qualities  of  per- 
sonality, so  alive  with  human  aspiration  and 
endeavor,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  make  it  our 
own  except  as  it  becomes  to  us  the  source  and 
nourishment  of  fresh  aspiration,  of  new  en- 
deavor, and  of  a  type  of  life  that  has  its  own 
touch  of  originality.  Truths  won  by  faith  must 
be  known  by  faith,  and  the  faith  by  which  the 
truths  of  the  past  are  appropriated  remains  in 
the  soul  as  a  capacity  for  the  gaining  of  new 
truth.  Thus  does  the  spirit  of  humanity  move 
forward  and  upward  on  its  never-ending  flight. 

What  is  true  of  all  other  values  is  true  of  that 
supreme  spiritual  achievement  of  Jesus  Christ 
on  which  emphasis  was  laid  in  the  last  lecture 

— the  blending  of  faith  in  the  divine  immanence 

no 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

with  loyalty  to  the  supreme  worth  of  ethical  per- 
sonality. It  is  in  the  unique  poise  and  richness 
and  power  of  Jesus'  personal  life  that  this  truth 
receives  its  fullest  expression.  Both  of  its  ele- 
ments stand  out  distinct  and  clear  in  his  teach- 
ing, and  in  his  life  they  both  blend  with  each 
other.  In  the  perfect  trust,  obedience,  and  love 
of  his  active  personal  life  we  find  the  synthesis 
of  what  the  world  heretofore  had  been  able  to 
realize  only  in  a  partial  and  one-sided  way. 
The  truth  which  Christ  gained  for  the  world 
was  thus  conditioned  in  a  marked  degree  on 
the  attitude  of  faith,  which  characterized  all  his 
life.  The  appropriation  of  this  truth,  there- 
fore, by  other  men  and  other  times,  is  likewise 
conditioned  on  their  having  a  similar  attitude 
of  faith.  The  personality  of  Christ  stands  forth 
as  a  fact  in  history,  assuring  us  that  the  truths 
he  won  are  available  for  man.  It  stands  be- 
fore us  also  as  the  great  lodestone  of  faith,  draw- 
ing all  men  to  itself  and  imparting  to  them  its 
own  power.  But  the  full  significance  of  Christ's 
personality,  and  the  reality  and  depth  of  the 
life  with  God  which  he  opens  to  us,  can  be 
realized  only  in  a  progressive  way,  as  our  lives 


in 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

are  kindled  with  the  same  faith  which  he  pos- 
sessed. 

But  the  task  of  appropriating  afresh  the  fun- 
damental truth  of  the  Christian  revelation  has 
been  peculiarly  difficult  for  our  own  age.  The 
vital  quality  which  is  essential  to  Christian  faith 
has  had  to  be  maintained  in  the  face  of  an  enor- 
mously altered  view  of  the  world.  Each  age 
is  confronted  with  new  conditions,  but  our 
age  is  confronted  with  a  new  universe.  We 
have  come  to  see  that  our  universe  is  not  a 
thing  neatly  bounded,  but  one  that  stretches  out 
infinitely  in  space.  We  no  longer  think  that 
this  earth  on  which  we  live  was  called  into  be- 
ing at  a  flash,  but  recognize  that,  by  ceaselecsly 
revolving  in  the  lathe  of  nature,  it  has  been 
slowly  fashioned  into  its  present  shape.  We 
have  ceased  to  suppose  that  the  various  species 
of  plant  and  animal  life  were  first  constructed 
and  then  set  in  motion,  but  instead  conceive 
that  they  came  to  their  present  form  gradually, 
through  a  countless  succession  of  births  and 
deaths.  The  story  of  the  human  race  is  no 
longer  regarded  as  a  succinct  volume  with  well- 
defined  chapters;  we  are  aware  that  it  has  to  be 


112 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

caught  from  the  incantations  of  the  savage,  and 
the  runes  and  sagas  of  the  Norsemen;  that  it 
has  to  be  deciphered  from  broken  monuments 
and  torn  parchments;  or  compiled  from  the 
traditions  of  ancient  custom  and  ceremonial; 
that  it  has  to  be  pieced  together  out  of  myth- 
ologies and  sifted  out  of  the  debris  of  human 
superstition  and  bias.  Thus  while  our  world  is 
infinitely  richer  and  more  varied  than  that  of 
preceding  ages,  it  is  also  vastly  more  perplex- 
ing, and  the  task  of  giving  to  it  a  religious  in- 
terpretation has  been  correspondingly  difficult. 
We  doubtless  all  know  from  experience  some- 
thing of  the  problem  which  arises  when  we 
undertake  to  adjust  the  ideas  of  faith  to  our 
modern  conception  of  the  world,  but  that  it 
may  be  brought  before  us  in  all  its  force,  let 
me  recall  to  your  minds  those  lines  of  Matthew 
Arnold  in  his  poem  entitled  'Dover  Beach, 
in  which  he  gives  us  a  kind  of  elegy  of  faith  : 


Listen!   you  hear  the  grating  roar 

Of  pebbles  which  the  waves  draw  back,  and 

fling, 

At  their  return,  up  the  high  strand, 
Begin,  and  cease,  and  then  again  begin, 

"3 


" 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

With  tremulous  cadence  slow,  and  bring 
The  eternal  note  of  sadness  in. 


"  The  sea  of  faith 
Was  once,  too,  at  the  full,  and  round  earth's 

shore 

Lay  like  the  folds  of  a  bright  girdle  furled. 
But  now  I  only  hear 
Its  melancholy,  long,  withdrawing  roar, 
Retreating,  to  the  breath 

Of  the  night-wind,  down  the  vast  edges  drear 
And  naked  shingles  of  the  world. 

"  Ah,  love,  let  us  be  true 

To  one  another!   for  the  world,  which  seems 
To  lie  before  us  like  a  land  of  dreams, 
So  various,  so  beautiful,  so  new, 
Hath  really  neither  joy,  nor  love,  nor  light, 
Nor  certitude,  nor  peace,  nor  help  for  pain; 
And  we  are  here  as  on  a  darkling  plain 
Swept  with  confused  alarms  of  struggle  and 

flight, 
Where  ignorant  armies  clash  by  night." 

What  the  poet  so  sadly  mourns  for  is  just  that 
blending  of  the  loftiest  moral  idealism  with  the 
consciousness  of  a  God  present  in  the  world,  and 
intimately  related  to  the  life  of  man,  which  so 
uniquely  characterizes  Jesus.  The  moral  ideal- 
ism is  strong  with  Arnold,  but  the  assurance 

of  the  reality  and  nearness  of  the  divine  is  not, 

114 


ONE  .INCREASING   PURPOSE 

and  at  times  it  disappears  altogether.  And  the 
source  of  his  gloomy  doubt  is  the  apparent  aim- 
lessness  of  the  world.  Herein  consists  the  prob- 
lem with  which  the  discussion  of  to-day  is  to 
be  concerned — a  problem  to  which  the  men  of 
greatest  moral  earnestness  are  sure  to  be  most 
keenly  alive.  Is  the  world  about  us  governed 
by  moral  purpose,  or  is  it  the  "  darkling  plain >; 
of  which  the  poet  speaks,  where  'ignorant 
armies  clash  by  night"  ?  What  contribution 
can  theology  make  toward  the  solving  of  this 
urgent  human  problem,  and  toward  enabling 
us  once  more  to  grasp  with  vital  faith  the 
central  insight  of  Christianity  ?  The  train  of 
thought  we  are  to  consider  will  lead  us  to  deal 
briefly  with  the  following  topics:  'Changes  in 
the  Conception  of  Natural  Law,"  "The  Grow- 
ing Universe,"  and  "  Standards  of  Truth  and 
Value." 

I 

One  of  the  principal  sources  of  the  apparent 
aimlessness  of  the  world  is  the  prevailing  con- 
ception of  the  laws  of  nature.  These  laws  are 
thought  of  as  entirely  mechanical  in  their  opera- 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

tion.  They  are  the  laws  in  accordance  with 
which  the  planets  swing,  the  ether  pulsates,  the 
tides  ebb  and  flow.  They  represent  processes 
that  are  perfectly  calculable  and  also,  so  far  as 
their  intrinsic  nature  is  concerned,  perfectly 
aimless.1  According  to  these  laws  a  thing  keeps 
on  doing  forever  just  what  it  is  doing  now,  un- 
less it  is  interfered  with  by  something  external 
to  itself.  No  inherent  inward  agency  is  per- 
mitted in  a  mechanical  system — or  at  least, 
logically  none  is  admissible,  and  if  any  is  recog- 
nized, it  soon  becomes  a  troublesome  problem, 
which  must  be  explained  away  as  quickly  as 
possible.  Now  the  aimlessness  and  the  calcula- 
bility  go  together.  How  can  you  calculate 
exactly  what  a  thing  will  do  in  the  future 
unless  you  assume  that,  so  far  as  that  thing 
itself  is  concerned,  it  will  keep  on  doing  what  it 
is  doing  at  present  ?  Then  if  you  can  find  out 
what  other  things  are  going  to  interfere  with  it, 
and  assume  the  same  of  them,  you  can  make 
your  calculation.  But  any  inherent  tendency 
to  follow  a  certain  direction  in  spite  of  external 
influences  would  throw  you  off"  your  reckoning. 

Thus  the  more  the  reign  of  law  is  extended, 

116 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

the  more  aimless  does  the  world  become,  so 
long  as  our  conception  of  law  is  mechanical. 
If  law  in  this  sense  is  conceived  to  be  unlimited 
and  absolute  in  its  sway,  purpose  disappears 
from  the  universe,  and  our  faith  is  vain.  There 
remains  as  little  relation  between  human  aims 
and  interests,  even  the  most  spiritual,  and  the 
processes  of  the  world,  as  exists  between  the 
ambitions  of  the  Arctic  explorer  and  the  shift- 
ing polar  ice-pack  over  which  he  must  travel. 
A  drifting  derelict  of  the  sea  is  not  more  the 
plaything  of  chance,  or  more  certainly  doomed 
in  the  end  to  be  completely  wrecked,  than  are 
the  spiritual  values  of  mankind  in  a  universe 
where  mechanism  is  unqualifiedly  supreme. 
But  our  age  is  deeply  convinced  of  the  reign  of 
law,  and  hence,  if  law  and  mechanism  are  iden- 
tical, we  are  destined  to  be  haunted  by  the 
spectre  of  the  aimlessness  of  the  world. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which,  up  to  the  pres- 
ent time,  faith  has  striven  to  make  a  stand 
against  the  conclusions  to  which  the  mechanical 
conception  of  the  world  leads.  The  first  of 
these  ways  is  the  one  that  is  traditional  with 

theology.     It  is  the  theory  of  direct  creation  and 

117 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

miraculous  interposition.  It  insists  that  God 
at  the  outset  made  this  world  and  its  laws,  and 
that  from  time  to  time  he  has  intervened  to  set 
aside  those  laws  temporarily  for  the  purpose  of 
revealing  himself  and  accomplishing  the  salva- 
tion of  men.  The  difficulties  of  this  method  of 
sustaining  faith  were  thoroughly  discussed  by 
Dr.  Gordon  in  the  Taylor  Lectures  of  last  year, 
and  hence  we  need  not  dwell  on  them  now.2 
On  the  one  hand  such  a  method  limits  the  sway 
of  law  in  a  purely  arbitrary  way,  and  so  leaves 
science  and  faith  in  direct  antagonism.  On 
the  other  hand  it  does  not  rise  to  the  level  of  the 
faith  of  the  New  Testament,  because  it  fails  to 
realize  God's  immediate  presence  in  the  world 
and  his  intimate  relation  to  all  our  life.  The 
method  is  becoming  increasingly  difficult  for 
thinking  men,  and  one  of  the  urgent  tasks  of 
theology  is  to  replace  it  by  something  more 
adequate. 

The  second  way  probably  is  the  one  to  which 
the  more  philosophically  minded  among  us  have 
been  brought  up.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  phe- 
nomenalism, or  the  theory  that  the  universe  is 

done  in  duplicate.     It  says  mechanism  is  uni- 

118 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

versal  in  extent,  but  then  it  has  to  do  only  with 
appearances.  All  that  we  experience  is  a  part 
of  a  mechanical  system,  but  the  system  taken 
as  a  whole  is  only  a  shadow-world.  Behind 
the  scenes  is  the  true  world,  of  which  this  me- 
chanical scheme  of  things  is  only  the  manifes- 
tation. The  universe  wears  a  mask,  we  all 
wear  masks,  and  even  our  own  true  selves  are 
hidden  from  us  as  by  a  veil.  It  is  with  this 
masked  world  that  science  has  to  do,  and  here 
it  shows  mechanical  laws  to  be  absolute;  but 
faith  and  our  higher  reason  assure  us  that  back 
of  the  mechanism  is  another  world,  where 
moral  and  spiritual  forces  have  free  play. 

The  value  of  this  method  cannot  be  gainsaid. 
It  has  been  the  resource  of  too  many  spiritual 
thinkers  for  too  long  a  time  to  be  simply  set 
aside.  In  truth  spiritual  realities  do  not  lie 
upon  the  surface  of  experience,  nor  can  the 
ordinary  processes  of  science  be  relied  upon  to 
prove  their  existence.  But  yet  it  seems  as 
though  the  time  had  come  for  this  method  to 
undergo  reconstruction.  On  the  one  side  it 
leaves  too  close  at  hand  the  question  as  to  which 

after  all  is  the  shadow-world,  the  mechanical 

119 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

order  or  the  duplicate  realm  of  spiritual  reality 
declared  to  be  behind  it.  If  one  goes  to  the 
extreme  of  the  mechanical  view  and  surrenders 
psychology,  ethics,  history,  and  sociology,  all  to 
the  sway  of  the  mechanical  conception  of  law, 
the  authority  of  experience  comes  to  be  entirely 
on  the  mechanical  side,  and  the  insistence  that 
the  whole  fabric  of  mechanism  is  but  a  shadow 
becomes  exceedingly  difficult.  And  on  the 
other  side  this  view,  too,  leaves  certain  barriers 
in  the  way  of  the  ethical  monotheism  of  Jesus. 
The  world  of  our  experience  and  the  realm  of 
moral  and  spiritual  reality  are  related  artifi- 
cially, but  they  are  not,  as  with  Jesus,  vitally 
blended.  The  empirical  world  remains  in- 
trinsically aimless,  and  the  realm  of  spiritual 
reality  is  regarded  as  non-empirical,  and  thus 
the  two  realms  remain  in  practical  isolation. 
It  is  only  by  a  certain  violence  of  faith  that  a 
real  religious  life  can  be  maintained  from  this 
point  of  view. 

But  of  late  the  whole  problem  of  the  relation 
of  moral  purpose  to  the  world  has  begun  to 
take  on  a  different  aspect  as  the  result  of  certain 
changes  that  are  taking  place  in  the  conception 

1 20 


ONE  INCREASING   PURPOSE 

of  law  itself.  These  changes  have  arisen  partly 
from  the  difficulty  of  carrying  through  the  me- 
chanical conception  of  law,  and  partly  from  a 
new  conception  of  our  intellectual  nature  and 
its  relation  to  the  other  sides  of  our  life. 

The  first  of  these  changes  is  especially  em- 
phasized by  pragmatism.  It  appears  in  the 
fact  that  the  laws  of  nature  with  which  science 
furnishes  us  are  coming  to  be  conceived  not  so 
much  as  final  descriptions  of  an  unchanging 
order  of  things,  but  rather  as  working  theories 
which  are  always  subject  to  modification.3  They 
are  a  kind  of  shorthand  in  which  we  sum  up 
great  masses  of  experiences,  but  other  and  more 
improved  kinds  of  shorthand  are  quite  think- 
able. We  employ  them  just  as  we  employ  cata- 
logues and  railway  guides  and  diagrams,  be- 
cause they  give  us  brief  synopses  of  things  and 
help  us  to  arrive  quickly  at  the  results  which 
are  of  most  importance  to  us.  So  far  as  they 
serve  such  purposes  we  accept  and  trust  them. 
They  are  our  methods  of  handling  experience, 
some  of  them  quite  tentative,  others  so  estab- 
lished as  to  be  almost  second  nature,  but  all 
having  an  element  of  hypothesis  still  clinging 


121 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

to  them,  which  is  as  real,  if  not  as  large,  as  that 
which  attaches  to  the  recipes  of  a  cook-book. 
It  is  indeed  difficult  to  imagine  that  such  a  law 
as  that  of  gravitation  should  ever  undergo  any 
modification.  And  yet  science  cannot  think 
out  its  theories  without  conceiving  another  sub- 
stance, the  ether,  which  is  mysteriously  re- 
lated to  matter,  and  yet  which  is  not  subject  to 
gravitation.  Whether  the  relation  of  matter 
and  the  ether  will  ever  be  thought  out  success- 
fully, and  whether,  if  this  were  done,  a  modifi- 
cation of  the  law  of  gravitation  might  not  result, 
perhaps  no  one  is  at  present  competent  to  say. 
At  all  events  the  whole  history  of  the  develop- 
ment of  our  knowledge  of  nature  justifies  us  in 
saying  that  our  system  of  natural  laws  is  the 
joint  product  of  the  postulates  of  the  mind  and 
the  results  of  past  experience,  and  that  in  in- 
terpreting these  laws  neither  element  can  be 
safely  ignored. 

Two  important  consequences  follow  from 
recognizing  that  the  postulates  of  the  intellect 
enter  into  our  laws  of  nature.  One  of  these 
consequences  is  that  we  can  hardly  refuse  the 

claim  that  our  moral  and  religious  postulates, 

122 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

as  well  as  those  of  the  intellect,  should  have  a 
share  in  the  final  interpretation  of  the  world. 
Laws  derived  from  nature  under  the  guidance 
of  our  intellectual  needs  cannot  veto  interpreta- 
tions of  the  world  formed  under  the  guidance  of 
our  moral  and  religious  needs.  Just  as  in  our 
nation,  where  the  final  authority  rests  with  the 
people,  no  one  branch  of  the  government  has 
unconditional  power  in  determining  what  our 
statutes  shall  be,  so  when  it  is  recognized  that 
the  needs  of  the  mind  furnish  the  original  clues 
to  the  understanding  of  our  world,  we  see  that 
our  intellectual  and  moral  and  religious  natures 
all  must  have  a  hearing  in  making  up  the  final 
account. 

The  other  important  consequence  of  the  view 
that  our  laws  of  nature  are  working  hypotheses 
based  on  the  postulates  of  the  mind  is  that  it 
brings  home  to  us  how  much  of  reality  is  omitted 
by  the  most  elaborate  scheme  of  laws.4  A 
system  of  shorthand  is  a  device  for  omitting  a 
great  deal  which  must  be  restored  again  when 
the  full  copy  is  made  up.  The  argument  of  a 
play  abbreviates  the  actual  drama  in  a  certain 

way,  and  the  dramatic  critic's  review  abbreviates 

123 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

it  in  another  way.  Both  are  useful,  but  neither 
can  be  entirely  adequate  to  express  the  blending 
of  logic  and  passion  which  the  dramatist  origi- 
nally infused  into  his  work.  In  a  similar  fashion 
the  world  of  natural  law  is  an  abbreviation  of 
the  real  world.  Our  laws  of  nature  aid  us,  just 
as  does  the  shorthand  or  the  argument  or  the 
critical  review,  because  they  eliminate  so  much 
and  thereby  make  a  few  important  things  stand 
out  clearly.  Thus  mechanical  and  physical 
laws  disregard  the  qualities  of  things  for  the 
most  part,  and  deal  so  far  as  possible  only  with 
quantities.  Gravity,  for  example,  acts  on  a  tile 
that  gets  loosened  from  the  roof  and  on  the 
body  of  a  man  who  loses  his  balance  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  way.  But  from  other  points  of 
view  the  aspects  of  reality  of  which  mechanical 
laws  can  take  no  account  are  all-important. 
Qualities  are  just  as  real  as  quantities,  and  as 
we  ascend  to  the  realms  of  life,  mind,  and 
morals  they  become  the  matters  of  overshadow- 
ing consequence.  These  higher  realities  can 
no  more  be  reduced  to  a  scheme  that  deals 
only  with  quantities  than  the  value  of  genius 

can  be  estimated  in  dollars  and  cents. 

124 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

This  change  in  our  conception  of  the  laws 
of  nature  does  not  limit  the  actual  value  of  those 
laws  at  all.  As  working  theories  they  are  to  be 
used  for  all  that  they  are  worth.  But  the  change 
does  open  the  doorway  to  faith  and  to  the  use 
of  our  entire  higher  nature  in  the  discovery  of 
truth,  and  it  increases  our  hope  of  establish- 
ing a  kinship  between  the  soul  of  man  and  the 
world  of  our  actual  experience,  and  of  finding 
in  that  world  a  moral  meaning. 

The  second  change  which  is  coming  about  in 
our  conception  of  the  laws  of  nature  arises  out 
of  the  difficulties  that  the  mechanical  conception 
has  met  with,  and  affects  the  most  fundamental 
element  in  the  notion  of  law  itself.  It  is  coming 
to  be  recognized  that  the  most  general  meaning 
of  the  idea  of  natural  law  is  not  that  an  equiva- 
lence of  quantity  persists  through  all  change, 
but  rather  that  a  continuity  of  process  exists.5 
In  other  words  we  are  passing  from  a  me- 
chanical to  an  evolutionary  conception  of  law. 
Scientists  have  scarcely  begun  to  work  out 
formulas  of  quantity  for  a1!  the  complex  pro- 
cesses of  the  vegetable  and  animal  world,  and 
of  psychology  and  history.  It  is  most  doubtful 

"5 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

whether  this  ever  can  be  done.  But  the  facts 
in  these  realms  are  reduced  to  law  in  other 
ways.  A  continuity  of  process  is  traced  every- 
where— from  the  simpler  organisms  to  the  more 
complex,  from  species  to  species,  from  the  ani- 
mal to  the  human,  from  fable  and  mythology  to 
philosophy  and  science,  from  tribal  custom  to 
the  modern  state,  from  gross  superstitions  and 
meaningless  ceremonials  to  the  pure  and  be- 
neficent faith  of  an  ethical  religion.  The  prin- 
ciple of  continuity  is  thus  proving  immensely 
successful  in  reducing  to  law  great  realms  of 
experience  with  which  mechanical  conceptions 
seem  utterly  unable  to  cope.  Emphasis  on 
this  evolutionary  conception  of  law  does  not 
require  us  to  disregard  the  principle  of  mechan- 
ism, so  far  as  it  has  been  already  established, 
nor  prevent  us  from  using  it  as  a  working  hy- 
pothesis wherever  it  promises  to  be  fruitful. 
But  it  does  enable  us  to  organize  and  interpret 
a  far  wider  array  of  facts  than  the  mechanical 
conception,  and  so  proves  itself  to  be  more 
fundamental. 

Two  specific  advantages  of  regarding  continu- 
ity as  the  essential  element  in  the  idea  of  law 

126 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

must  be  singled  out  here  for  brief  mention. 
In  the  first  place,  the  principle  of  continuity 
enables  us  to  recognize  and  deal  with  that 
which  is  new,  according  as  our  experience  pre- 
sents it  to  us.6  In  a  mechanical  system  that 
which  is  new  is  entirely  out  of  place.  Noth- 
ing can  be  introduced  into  such  a  system,  ex- 
cept it  be  of  the  same  kind  as  what  is  already 
there,  without  disorganizing  the  whole,  and 
nothing  new  can  ever  come  out  of  such  a  sys- 
tem. But  in  an  evolutionary  system  novelties 
are  constantly  coming  to  pass.  The  infinitely 
varied  beauty  of  flowers  in  a  summer  meadow, 
the  strange  creatures  that  pass  through  the 
paths  of  the  seas,  the  wonderful  diversity  of 
form  and  coloring  in  insect  and  bird,  the  beasts 
of  the  field,  so  heterogenous  in  form,  so  differ- 
ently equipped  with  functions  and  instincts, 
the  human  kind  with  its  unending  series  of  in- 
dividuals, each  differing  from  every  other  in 
features,  powers,  and  personality — these  are  all 
comprehended  by  the  evolutionist  in  a  single 
theory,  one  main  presupposition  of  which  is  the 
principle  of  variation,  the  constant  appearance 

of  newness.     All  that  the  evolutionist  requires 

127 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

is  that  the  coming  of  the  new  should  not  involve 
a  breach  with  the  old,  but  that  the  two  should 
be  connected  by  a  continuous  process. 

Wherever  continuity  is  traced  the  practical 
value  of  a  law  is  secured,  for  a  principle  of  con- 
trol is  placed  in  our  hands.7  Knowing  the  con- 
ditions which  are  antecedent  to  an  event  we 
can  foretell  that  event  next  time,  or  reproduce 
it,  as  the  case  may  be.  And  that  is  just  what 
laws  are  for.  That  is  the  reason  for  working 
out  the  mechanical  laws  themselves.  To  be 
sure,  absolute  control  or  calculability,  as  we 
have  seen,  can  be  had  only  where  the  process 
is  mechanical.  But  then  absolute  control  is,  in 
the  human  realm  at  least,  just  what  we  ought 
not  to  have,  nor  is  it  to  be  expected  lower  down 
in  the  scale  in  a  world  so  rich  in  mystery  as  ours. 

A  second  advantage  of  the  principle  of  con- 
tinuity is  that  it  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that 
the  processes  of  the  world  have  an  inherent 
tendency  in  a  definite  direction.  A  mechanical 
process,  as  has  been  already  brought  out,  is 
essentially  aimless.  It  also  can  be  reversed  at 
any  time.  The  element  of  direction  is  acci- 
dental. An  engine  will  run  just  as  well  back- 

128 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

ward  as  forward,  if  only  there  is  some  force  to 
throw  the  lever.  A  grindstone,  as  perhaps  some 
of  us  may  remember,  can  be  turned  both  ways. 
But  this  is  not  true  of  the  higher  processes  of 
nature.  They  have  a  definite  direction,  and 
they  cannot  be  thought  of  as  running  in  the 
opposite  way.  Thus  Professor  Ward,  who  lays 
much  emphasis  on  the  irreversibility  of  nature, 
writes:  "The  absurdity  of  a  reversal  of  or- 
ganic processes  is  evident,  the  tree  shrinking 
back  into  the  seed,  life  beginning  in  a  corpse  and 
ending  in  a  birth,  everything  genealogical  run- 
ning backward,  natural  selection  and  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  not  excepted."  And  going 
on  to  psychical  processes  he  adds:  'Facing  the 
future  we  are  efficient,  facing  the  past  we  are  help- 
less. What  is  done  cannot  be  undone;  over  what 
is  still  to  do  we  can  give  or  withhold  our  fiat."8 
Moreover,  what  makes  the  reversibility  of 
such  processes  unthinkable  is  the  fact  that  the 
tendency  in  a  certain  direction  is  somehow  in- 
herent in  the  processes  themselves.  It  consists 
of  an  inward,  spontaneous  pressure  along  the 
line  in  which  the  process  is  moving,  which  ac- 
tively resists  the  environment  so  far  as  it  stands 

129 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

in  the  way.  Such  an  immanent  tendency  in  a 
specific  direction  is  the  presupposition  of  all 
evolution.  The  evolutionist  makes  much  of 
the  struggle  for  existence,  but  this  implies  a  will 
to  live  on  the  part  of  the  struggler,  and  the  will 
to  live  commonly  takes  the  form  of  a  striving 
for  a  fuller  life.  Higher  up  in  the  scale  the  same 
principle  appears  as  man's  definite  conscious 
purpose  to  attain  an  end.  Lower  down  it  may 
be  nothing  but  the  crudest  and  blindest  organic 
want.  But  everywhere  some  form  of  imma- 
nent spontaneous  tendency  in  a  definite  direc- 
tion must  be  recognized  as  the  basis  of  any  ade- 
quate explanation.9  Now  this  is  just  what  we 
are  able  to  do,  when  we  realize  that  continuity 
of  process  is  the  essential  element  in  the  idea 
of  law.  Immanent  tendency,  which  is  so  in- 
consistent with  the  notion  of  mechanism,  is 
entirely  in  accord  with  the  principle  of  con- 
tinuity. But  this  latter  principle  at  the  same 
time  accomplishes  the  purpose  for  which  laws 
are  sought  by  enabling  us  to  predict  and  control, 
and  as  it  does  this  over  far  wider  ranges  of 
experience  than  the  principle  of  mechanism,  its 

superior  rationality  is  evident. 

130 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

Let  us  sum  up  what  has  been  said  thus  far 
in  regard  to  the  changed  conception  of  law. 
First,  it  recognizes  that  the  laws  of  nature 
which  we  formulate  are  dependent  upon  the 
postulates  of  the  mind,  and  as  a  result  it  both 
leads  us  to  admit  the  rightfulness  of  using  moral 
and  religious  postulates  as  well  as  those  of  the 
intellect  in  our  interpretation  of  the  world,  and 
causes  us  to  realize  that  our  laws  of  nature  are 
but  the  briefest  abstracts  of  a  world  whose 
wealth  of  reality  overflows  the  achievements  of 
the  intellect  and  requires  the  fullest  spiritual 
experience  for  its  understanding.  Secondly,  the 
changed  view  of  law  makes  the  principle  of 
continuity  more  fundamental  than  that  of 
mechanism.  This  makes  it  possible  for  us  to 
accept  and  deal  with  that  which  is  genuinely 
new  in  experience,  and  it  is  entirely  consistent 
with  the  fact  that  there  is  an  immanent  ten- 
dency in  things  making  in  a  certain  definite 
direction.  Thus  the  changed  conception  of  law 
enables  us  to  take  an  important  step  toward 
solving  the  problem  arising  out  of  the  apparent 
aimlessness  of  the  world.  It  gives  support  to 
the  faith  that  the  world  is  the  manifestation  of 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

one  increasing  purpose,  and  encourages  us  to 
believe  that  the  progress  of  science  itself  will 
afford  important  corroborations  of  this  faith. 

And  now  we  must  pass  to  the  second  of  the 
topics  mentioned  at  the  outset,  that  of  the 
growing  universe. 


II 

The  prevailing  idea  that  the  universe  as  a 
whole  is  static  must  be  counted  as  one  of  the 
things  that  have  made  it  difficult  to  deal  with 
the  problem  of  the  world's  apparent  aimless- 
ness,  and  that  consequently  has  hindered  our 
age  in  the  full  appropriation  of  ethical  monothe- 
ism. There  are  two  principal  forms  in  which 
this  idea  is  held.  The  universe  may  be  thought 
of  as  being  static  in  the  same  sense  as  a  sta- 
tionary engine.  In  such  an  engine  the  various 
parts  move,  but  the  whole  does  not.  It  under- 
goes no  structural  change,  and  it  does  not 
move  toward  a  goal.  For  a  universe  thought 
of  in  this  way  time  would  be  real,  but  there 
would  be  no  progress.  The  changes  that  take 
place  within  it  have  no  effect  upon  its  structure, 

132 

. 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

and  hence  it  comes  to  nothing  more  than  it 
was  in  the  beginning.  In  spite  of  the  reality 
of  time  and  change  such  a  universe  can  ac- 
complish nothing  except  slowly  to  run  down.10 
This  is  the  mechanical  universe  which  we  have 
just  been  considering,  and  in  practical  effect 
it  is  statically  conceived.  The  other  form  of 
the  idea  that  the  universe  is  static  is  that  found 
in  absolute  idealism.  The  static  character  of 
the  absolute  idealist's  conception  of  the  uni- 
verse is  bound  up  with  his  denial  of  the  full 
reality  of  time.  If  from  the  metaphysical  point 
of  view  time  is  not  fully  real,  then  reality  is 
essentially  changeless  and  static,  and  we  have 
a  universe  for  which  as  a  whole  there  is  no 
progress. 

Our  immediate  task,  however,  is  not  to  offer 
a  detailed  criticism  of  this  idea  of  a  static 
universe.  The  mechanical  conception  has  just 
been  criticized  sufficiently  for  our  present  pur- 
pose, while  the  absolute  idealist's  form  of  the 
idea  received  some  discussion  in  the  first  lecture 
and  will  come  up  for  criticism  in  the  next 
lecture  in  connection  with  our  study  of  the  prob- 
lem of  evil.  Our  present  object  is  rather  to 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

bring  out,  in  contrast  to  the  idea  that  the  uni- 
verse is  static,  certain  characteristics  of  the 
conception  of  the  growing  universe,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  this  conception  can 
render  us  important  aid  in  solving  our  problem. 
The  conception  that  the  universe  is  growing 
carries  with  it,  in  the  first  place,  the  acceptance 
of  the  full  reality  of  time.  Time  is  the  form  of 
our  entire  experience,  as  all  philosophers  admit, 
and  the  attempt  to  set  it  aside  in  our  ulti- 
mate view  of  reality  involves  us  in  the  gravest 
difficulties,  as  has  been  shown  already  in  part 
and  as  will  be  brought  out  yet  more  fully.  In 
the  second  place,  the  conception  of  the  growing 
universe  recognizes  that  genuinely  new  things 
and  events  are  actually  coming  to  pass — the 
very  recognition  which  we  have  seen  is  leading 
to  a  changed  conception  of  natural  law.  In 
the  third  place — and  this  is  the  crucial  point- 
this  conception  involves  the  belief  that  the  new 
things  and  events  which  come  to  pass  modify 
the  existing  order  of  things  in  the  direction  of  the 
enlargement  and  enrichment  of  the  whole.  Thus 
from  this  stand-point  the  universe  is  in  the  mak- 
ing. It  has  genuine  unity  now,  but  a  higher 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

unity  is  coming  to  pass.  The  oneness  of  the 
universe  exists  now  in  the  sense  of  continuity. 
That  is  to  say,  nothing  affects  our  universe 
that  is  not  in  some  sense  a  member  of  it,  and 
whose  relations  with  it  are  not  capable  of  being 
traced  out  as  an  unbroken  process.  This  is 
the  faith  of  science,  for  which  abundant  veri- 
fication is  being  furnished.  Moreover  the  one- 
ness of  continuity  is  supplemented  by  much 
unity  of  organization,  but  in  this  respect  the 
unity  cannot  be  thought  of  as  complete.  The 
universe  is  in  process  of  becoming  organized, 
and  a  higher  degree  of  organization  is  to  be 
attained.  In  other  words,  the  universe  is  to 
be  thought  of  as  a  living  whole,  and  at  the 
same  time  as  evolving  into  a  still  richer  and 
more  harmonious  form.  It  is  this  conception 
of  the  universe — or  one  in  important  respects 
similar  to  it — which  the  recent  writings  of  Pro- 
fessors Hoffding  and  James  support,  and  vari- 
ous features  of  it  are  to  be  found  in  the  views  of 
not  a  few  important  modern  thinkers.11 

Now  this  conception  of  the  growing  universe 
and  the  faith  of  ethical  monotheism  render  each 
other  mutual  support,  and  in  bringing  out  this 

135 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

fact  we  shall  find  the  solution  of  our  problem. 
Let  us  begin  with  the  services  which  the  view 
that  the  universe  is  growing  can  render  to 
ethical  monotheism. 

According  to  ethical  monotheism  God  is  to  be 
conceived  of  as  an  essentially  active  being — a 
being  who  has  real  purposes  which  he  desires 
to  have  fulfilled,  and  who  is  constantly  exerting 
his  energy  toward  their  fulfilment,  a  being 
whose  very  essence  consists  in  creativeness,  in  the 
joyous  and  abundant  forth-putting  of  his  might 
for  the  actualizing  of  his  inexhaustible  thought. 
It  is  true  that  theology  has  been  prone  to  form 
its  conception  of  God  on  the  analogy  of  our 
intellectual  consciousness,  and  so  to  think  of 
him  as  a  being  without  activity  or  change.  The 
pathetic  fallacy  has  betrayed  men  often,  but 
none  more  often,  or  more  pathetically,  than  the 
theologian  and  philosopher.  But  there  is  small 
doubt  that  God,  as  we  pray  to  him,  trust  in  him, 
work  with  him,  is  to  us  an  active  God  in  the 
most  essential  and  ultimate  sense.  To  ethical 
monotheism  as  a  living  faith  God's  being  is 
that  of  a  Will  eternally  active  and  creative; 

it  is  that  of  a  Life  which  manifests  itself  cease- 

136 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

lessly  in  new  forms;  it  is  a  being  of  infinite 
Goodness  and  Love,  seeking  to  bestow  itself 
ever  more  abundantly  upon  its  creatures.12 

Now  such  a  conception  of  God  as  this  really 
requires  the  thought  that  the  universe  is  growing. 
On  the  one  hand  it  presupposes  that  the  world 
should  possess  continuity  and  a  high  degree  of 
organization  now,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  im- 
plies that,  intricate  as  the  fabric  of  existence 
already  is,  it  is  to  be  yet  more  closely  inter- 
woven and  to  reveal  a  yet  sublimer  pattern. 
Or  to  put  the  same  thought  in  the  simpler  lan- 
guage of  religious  faith,  all  is  from  God  and  all 
is  sustained  by  him,  but  not  all  is  according  to 
his  will,  though  that  will  shall  yet  be  done  on 
earth  as  it  is  in  heaven.  To  be  most  in  accord 
with  the  faith  in  an  active  God  the  universe  must 
contain  the  partial  realization  of  ideals  that  are 
divine  in  worth  and  at  the  same  time  the  potency 
of  their  fuller  realization.  It  must  be  capable 
of  being  interpreted  as  the  expression  of  one 
increasing  purpose.  But  it  is  only  a  growing 
universe  that  can  be  so  interpreted,  and  hence 
the  possibility  of  conceiving  the  universe  in  this 
way  is  of  vital  importance  to  ethical  monotheism. 

137 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

But  there  is  another  way  in  which  the  idea 
of  the  growing  universe  supports  ethical  mono- 
theism. It  enables  us  to  establish  an  analogy 
between  the  processes  of  the  universe  as  a 
whole  and  the  relations  which  ethical  mono- 
theism believes  to  prevail  between  God  and 
human  life.  Let  us  see  how  this  is. 

The  world  of  nature  is  continuous  throughout, 
and  yet  within  this  world  we  find  the  living  cell, 
a  centre  of  spontaneous  activity.  But  the  cell 
in  turn  is  found  for  the  most  part  as  a  member 
of  a  complex  organism,  and  as  such  a  mem- 
ber its  action,  which  as  compared  with  the  in- 
animate world  is  unique,  becomes  continuous 
with  a  higher  order  of  being.  As  organisms 
rise  in  the  scale  of  life  we  find  the  cells  becom- 
ing more  and  more  specialized  so  as  to  form 
different  kinds  of  tissue,  which  in  turn  make 
possible  a  greater  variety  of  organs  and  a  more 
complex  and  efficient  organism.  This  ascend- 
ing process  is  of  course  capable  of  being  traced 
out  in  great  detail,  but  all  that  we  need  to  notice 
is  that  it  is  conditioned  everywhere  upon  the 
formation  of  centres  of  spontaneous  activity, 
and  the  controlling  of  these  centres  in  the  ser- 

138 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

vice  of  the  organic  life  of  the  whole.  In  these 
general  features  this  process  is  closely  anal- 
ogous to  the  ideas  of  ethical  monotheism. 

According  to  ethical  monotheism  our  being  is 
continuous  with  the  being  of  God,  and  yet 
we  are  in  course  of  development.  Hence  there 
is  a  fuller  unity  with  God  in  store  for  us.  It  is 
possible  for  us  to  express  more  of  his  life,  and 
to  be  in  closer  relation  to  him.  But,  by  virtue 
of  the  paradox  which  is  the  secret  of  the  re- 
ligious life,  this  fuller  unity  with  God  comes 
about  only  through  the  development  of  individ- 
uality. The  more  diversified  our  spiritual 
interests,  the  richer  and  more  manifold  our 
insights,  the  more  broadly  humane  our  rela- 
tions with  men,  by  so  much  the  more  is  our  in- 
timacy with  God  made  full  and  deep.13  It  is 
a  grievous  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  indefi- 
nite personality  has  the  greatest  capacity  for 
God,  or  that  vague  and  inarticulate  moods  are 
the  sovereign  means  of  communion  with  him. 
Rather  it  is  the  ripe  and  symmetrically  devel- 
oped personality  which,  under  normal  con- 
ditions, is  closest  to  God  and  expresses  most 
fully  the  mystery  of  his  life.  Inarticulate 

139 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

moods  indeed  have  their  place,  as  do  the  soft 
lights  and  the  incense  in  the  spacious  cathedral, 
but  they  signify  nothing  except  as  they  are  in- 
cluded in  a  nobly  designed  and  well-built  char- 
acter. It  is,  to  be  sure,  not  primarily  to  great- 
ness, as  we  ordinarily  conceive  it,  that  the  life 
with  God  belongs — not  to  greatness  understood 
as  a  mere  matter  of  the  dimensions  of  the  in- 
tellect or  of  other  faculties.  It  belongs  rather 
to  any  personality,  no  matter  what  its  capacity, 
which  is  unfolding  into  sincere  and  earnest  ex- 
pression its  latent  powers.  It  is  in  moral  growth 
that  ethical  monotheism  finds  the  most  real 
and  full  relation  to  God,  and  this  is  the  view 
which  preserves  the  inwardness  of  religion  and 
yet  makes  it  accessible  to  all. 

Now  in  the  transition  from  the  realm  of  bi- 
ology to  that  of  personality  and  morals  of  course 
new  factors  of  great  consequence  come  in.  Sen- 
sation and  perception  become  conscious  thought, 
and  impulse  and  instinct  become  purposeful 
action.  But  this  is  not  the  only  point  in 
the  universe  where  that  which  is  new  has  to  be 
recognized,  and  on  the  other  hand  these  new 

factors  do  not  do  away  with  the  important  con- 

140 


ONE  INCREASING   PURPOSE 

tinuity  of  process  which  exists  between  the 
lower  and  the  higher  realms.  This  process  which 
is  manifest  through  such  wide  ranges  of  reality 
involves  but  two  stages — first,  the  development 
of  new  centres  of  spontaneous  activity,  and 
secondly,  the  winning  of  these  centres  into  har- 
monious relations  with  the  whole,  so  that  they 
contribute  to  the  enhancement  of  its  life.  Low 
down  in  the  scale  this  means  simply  the  process 
of  organic  growth.  On  the  highest  level  it 
means  the  coming  of  God's  kingdom,  for  which 
God  himself  is  striving  with  all  the  power  of 
his  infinite  love.  Thus  does  the  conception  of 
the  growing  universe  give  support  to  ethical 
monotheism  and  aid  us  in  discovering  in  our 
world  the  evidence  of  one  increasing  purpose. 

But  at  this  point  we  are  naturally  confronted 
with  an  objection,  which  runs  something  like 
this:  granted  that  the  idea  of  a  growing  uni- 
verse as  a  conception  is  in  accord  with  ethical 
monotheism;  granted  too  that  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  the  universe  in  this  way;  and  once  more, 
granted  that  there  is  much  growth  in  various 
parts  of  the  universe — yet  how  can  it  be  shown 

that  the  universe  as  such  is  really  growing  ?     In 

141 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

other  words,  how  can  we  be  assured  that  the 
whole  is  actually  progressing  ? 

The  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  recog- 
nizing that  the  conception  of  the  growing  uni- 
verse can  be  carried  out  to  completion  only  as  a 
religious  faith.  By  this  I  do  not  mean  that 
from  the  scientific  point  of  view  this  conception 
is  arbitrary  or  merely  speculative.  To  the  prag- 
matist  all  general  conceptions  of  the  world,  and 
even  all  laws  of  nature,  contain  an  element  of 
faith.  Moreover  this  faith  in  the  growing  uni- 
verse has  much  to  verify  it  in  the  realm  of 
natural  science.  The  world  as  we  now  find  it 
appears  to  be  the  result  of  a  process  of  growth, 
and  similar  processes  are  still  going  on.  The 
statement  that  the  idea  of  the  growing  universe 
ultimately  takes  us  into  the  realm  of  religious 
faith  means,  not  that  the  idea  has  no  verifica- 
tion, but  simply  that  its  fullest  verification  comes 
only  through  religious  experience.  Thus  we 
are  in  a  position  to  see  how  the  conception  of 
the  growing  universe  is  in  turn  supported  and 
supplemented  by  ethical  monotheism. 

The  essential  thing  about  ethical  monotheism, 

from  the  stand-point  of  verifying  the  conception 

142 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

of  the  growing  universe,  is  that  it  takes  man's 
highest  experience  as  his  most  adequate  key  to 
the  nature  and  meaning  of  the  world.  It  is 
mindful  of  the  fact  that  this  universe,  mys- 
terious though  it  be,  has  made  possible  the  de- 
velopment of  moral  life,  sustains  that  life  in  its 
activities,  and  provides  for  a  vastly  richer  un- 
folding in  the  future;  and  it  believes  that  here 
is  the  clue  to  the  structure  and  purport  of  the 
whole.  Just  as  Isaiah  is  to  be  understood  by  his 
prophecies,  Sophocles  by  his  tragedies,  Michael 
Angelo  by  his  Sistine  frescoes,  Lincoln  by  his 
administration,  so  the  universe  is  to  be  under- 
stood by  the  lofty  faith,  the  spiritual  struggles, 
the  embodied  ideals,  the  mighty  achievements 
of  patience  and  sacrifice  that  the  higher  ranges 
of  human  evolution  have  brought  forth.  Hence 
ethical  monotheism  declares  that  Moral  Power 
is  the  supreme  reality  in  the  universe,  that  a 
Divine  Life  pervades  the  world  and  takes  up  all 
things  into  itself. 

Now  when  one  adopts  such  a  point  of  view 
as  a  living  and  working  faith,  he  is  in  a  position 
to  verify  the  progress  of  the  world  as  in  no  other 
way.  On  the  one  hand  the  attitude  of  faith 

143 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

brings  the  soul  into  harmony  with  the  Divine 
Spirit,  so  that  it  is  able  to  apprehend  his  revela- 
tions in  things  that  to  others  are  unintelligible. 
One  who  has  this  attitude  has  acquired  the 
grammar  of  the  divine  language  and  is  able  to 
hold  converse  with  the  Eternal.  Nature  and 
history  and  his  own  personal  experience  be- 
come to  him  a  revealing  of  one  increasing  pur- 
pose. All  things  work  together  for  good  to 
him,  the  lover  of  God.  The  prophetic  per- 
sonality, who  is  apt  to  be  regarded  as  too  ideal 
for  this  material  and  practical  world,  becomes 
to  the  mind  of  faith  the  fullest  interpretation  of 
its  meaning.  The  commonplace  things  and 
ordinary  happenings  of  daily  life  are,  to  the  eye 
of  faith,  vivid  with  the  Heavenly  Father's  love. 
And  even  amid  the  fiercest  struggles  and  the 
heaviest  sorrows  faith  has  proven  itself  able  to 
say,  as  Jesus  did  when  he  spoke  of  his  cross, 
'He  that  sent  me  is  with  me;  he  hath  not  left 
me  alone."  And  on  the  other  hand  the  life  of 
faith,  in  and  through  its  active  endeavors  to  do 
the  Father's  will,  becomes  itself  incorporated 
into  his  being  in  a  new  and  higher  way.  The 

infinite    thought  finds  a  large  measure  of  ex- 

144 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

pression  in  the  actively  believing  soul,  and  in 
the  moral  energy  of  such  a  soul  there  is  a  new 
increment  added  to  the  realization  of  his  will. 
When  by  faith  the  human  spirit  identifies  itself 
with  the  best  that  it  knows,  it  becomes  a  sharer 
to  the  full  measure  of  its  capacity  in  the  Divine 
Life,  and  it  makes  its  own  contribution  to  that 
higher  unity  which  we  call  the  kingdom  of  God. 
Thus  in  the  discoveries  and  the  active  energies 
of  faith  we  gain  the  fullest  verification  of  the 
progress  of  the  world,  the  most  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  this  mysterious  universe  in  which 
we  live  is  but  the  manifestation  of  one  increasing 
purpose. 

We  must  now  turn  aside  for  a  moment  to 
compare  our  general  results  with  certain  views 
of  Professor  James,  which,  as  coming  from  the 
founder  of  pragmatism,  have  an  especial  in- 
terest for  us  in  this  connection.  Professor 
James  designates  his  view  of  the  universe  as 
pluralism.  What  he  means  by  this  can  best  be 
defined  in  contrast  to  the  type  of  monism 
espoused  by  the  absolute  idealists.  According 
to  this  type  of  monism  the  universe  is  timeless 
and  eternally  comolete.  Pluralism,  as  defined 

145 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

by  Professor  James,  means  simply  the  denial  of 
this  doctrine;  it  denotes  a  universe  that  is  not 
timeless  and  that  is  incomplete.  But  such  a 
definition  leaves  exceedingly  vague  the  question 
as  to  what  the  positive  character  of  the  universe 
is.  Pluralism  so  defined  has  the  widest  possi- 
ble range  of  meanings,  and  includes  views  that 
are  utterly  different  in  character.  It  may  de- 
note a  universe  that  is  a  mere  sand  heap,  a 
multitude  of  objects  with  little  or  no  connection 
with  each  other,  or  it  may  denote  a  universe 
that  is  almost  completely  unified.  As  Professor 
James  says:  "Let  God  but  have  the  least  in- 
finitesimal other  of  any  kind  beside  him,  and 
empiricism  and  rationalism  might  strike  hands 
in  a  lasting  treaty  of  peace."14  That  is  to 
say,  such  a  view  would  be  pluralistic  too. 
Obviously  Professor  James  has  formed  his  defi- 
nition of  pluralism  for  polemic  purposes.  It  is 
designed  as  a  means  of  making  war  on  the  rigid 
monism  of  the  absolute  idealists,  but  as  a  con- 
sequence it  has  little  value  as  a  description  of  a 
particular,  positive  view  of  the  world. 

Now  according  to  ethical  monotheism,  as  we 

have  interpreted  it    nothing  is  completely  other 

146 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

than  the  being  of  God.15  By  the  energizing 
of  his  will  all  things  are  originated  and  sustained. 
But  on  the  other  hand  this  universe  is  not  fin- 
ished. Characters  at  least  are  still  in  the  mak- 
ing, and  the  kingdom  of  God  is  far  from  having 
fully  come.  From  the  ethical  point  of  view  it  is 
impossible  to  say  that  God  is  literally  and  com- 
pletely all  and  in  all.  Thus  it  would  seem  that 
ethical  monotheism  should  neither  seek  the 
protectorate  of  a  rigid  monism  nor  allow  itself  to 
be  stampeded  by  pluralism,  but  that  it  should 
stand  forth  as  an  independent  metaphysical 
point  of  view.  The  definition  of  monism  as 
given  by  its  chief  sponsors  is  too  restricted,  and 
that  of  pluralism  is  too  loose,  to  do  justice  to  the 
facts  of  life  when  moral  and  religious  experience 
is  included,  and  we  should  insist  on  refusing 
allegiance  to  either  of  these  terms  till  one  or  the 
other  of  them  has  been  remolded  and  developed 
in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  an 
ethical  metaphysics. 

Another  view  which  Professor  James  has  pro- 
claimed is  that  God  must  be  regarded  as  finite.16 
This  he  holds  to  be  necessary  if  we  are  to  think 
of  God  as  striving  for  an  end  not  now  attained, 

147 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

and  are  to  believe  with  the  prophet  that  in  all 
our  afflictions  he  is  afflicted.  To  speak  of  God 
as  infinite  is  to  deny  that  there  is  anything  that 
he  lacks;  but  how  is  this  possible  in  a  world 
where  time  and  change  are  real  ?  Now  there 
is  a  purely  logical  use  of  the  term  infinite  which 
does  indeed  make  it  inapplicable  to  God.  Ac- 
cording to  this  use  nothing  definite  can  be 
affirmed  of  God,  because  that  would  make  him 
finite.  None  but  the  pure  mystic  can  find 
satisfaction  in  conceiving  of  God  as  infinite 
in  this  sense.  But  the  more  general  religious 
use  of  the  term  presupposes  a  certain  definite- 
ness  in  our  idea  of  God.  Thus  in  Christian 
thought  God  is  conceived  of  as  Spirit,  as  Love, 
as  essentially  active  in  the  realization  of  the 
good.  And  then  the  conception  that  God  is  infi- 
nite stands  for  faith  in  the  supremacy  of  such  an 
active  loving  Spirit  in  the  world  of  our  experience, 
and  in  the  adequacy  of  his  power  for  bringing 
that  world  to  its  true  goal.  This  would  seem 
to  be  a  pragmatic  use  of  the  term.  According 
to  the  pragmatic  method  every  term  must  be 
traced  up  to  what  it  stands  for  in  concrete 

experience.      Following    this    method    we    may 

148 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

say  that  the  idea  of  infiniteness  as  applied  to 
God  stands  for  man's  continued  experience 
that  God's  power  is  adequate  for  all  his  need, 
and  for  the  faith  thereby  awakened  that  the 
same  power  is  adequate  for  securing  the  final 
triumph  of  good  in  the  world.  An  essentially 
active  God  must  be  conditioned  at  every  moment 
on  his  previous  acts.  The  only  important  ques- 
tion is,  will  he  through  the  whole  series  of  acts 
achieve  his  goal  ?  The  conception  that  God 
is  infinite  should  not  be  understood  to  mean 
that  for  him  there  is  no  real  achievement,  nor 
that  his  achievement  is  free  from  striving,  but 
should  be  employed  only  as  an  expression  of  the 
faith  that  his  triumph  is  sure. 

Thus  the  relation  of  God  to  his  universe  is 
both  immanent  and  transcendent.  God  is 
immanent  in  his  universe  because  all  its  proc- 
esses have  their  origin  and  support  in  his 
eternal  activity.  And  yet  we  distinguish  the 
universe  from  God  because  the  forth-putting  of 
his  energy  results  in  the  formation  of  subordinate 
centres  of  activity,  which  through  the  process  of 
evolution  become  in  turn  organized  into  living 

unity  with  him,  so  that  his  immanence  is  main- 

149 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

tained.  God  is  transcendent  because  the 
universe  is  the  manifestation  of  one  increasing 
purpose,  and  because  that  purpose,  and  the 
power  for  its  realization,  are  eternally  existent 
in  God.17 

Ill 

We  must  now  proceed  to  our  third  topic,  that 
of  standards  of  truth  and  value.  The  topic  is 
introduced  here,  not  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
it  the  treatment  which  it  intrinsically  deserves, 
but  for  the  reason  that  a  remaining  aspect  of  our 
problem  requires  us  to  take  it  up  for  brief 
consideration.  We  have  sought  to  solve  the 
problem  of  the  world's  apparent  aimlessness 
by  combining  the  fundamental  conceptions  of 
Christianity  with  an  evolutionary  philosophy. 
This  appears  in  our  adoption  of  pragmatism, 
which  teaches  that  the  whole  body  of  truth  is 
evolving,  and  also  in  our  acceptance  of  the  idea 
of  a  growing  universe.  But  there  are  very 
many  who  will  protest  that  such  a  solution  for 
such  a  problem  is  thoroughly  specious.  They 
will  urge  that  in  order  to  know  whether  things 
are  evolving  or  not  one  must  have  a  standard. 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

Mere  motion  is  not  necessarily  progress.  If 
the  landscape  were  really  whirling  by  us  when 
we  travel  in  an  express  train,  as  it  appears 
to  do,  even  the  fastest  express  would  make  no 
more  progress  than  a  man  in  a  tread-mill.  In 
order  to  show  that  motion  is  indeed  progress 
one  must  measure  it  by  some  standard  that  is 
fixed.  Hence  if  one  supposes  everything  to 
be  evolving — the  whole  body  of  truth  and  the 
entire  universe — it  may  turn  out  that  nothing 
is  evolving,  for  the  supposition  leaves  one  with- 
out any  absolutely  fixed  truths  and  values  to 
serve  as  standards  of  measurement.  It  is  not 
legitimate  to  escape  from  the  difficulty  by 
appealing  to  the  Christian  religion,  for  by  the 
hypothesis  that  too  is  a  part  of  the  supposedly 
evolving  process.  Accordingly  it  will  be  urged 
that  the  foregoing  reasoning  has  furnished 
us  no  practical  solution  of  the  problem  of 
purpose  in  the  world,  because  all  efforts  on  such 
a  basis  to  determine  what  is  the  purpose  of  the 
world  are  doomed  to  failure  for  lack  of  fixed 
standards  of  truth  and  value. 

Now  we  all  may  agree  that  too  much  emphasis 
can  hardly  be  laid  upon  the  importance  of  trust- 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

worthy  standards  of  truth  and  value.  Stand- 
ards in  the  spiritual  realm  are  no  less  important 
than  in  the  mathematical  and  mechanical 
realm,  and  constant  efforts  should  be  made  to 
perfect  them.  But  the  character  of  the  stand- 
ards needed  in  the  spiritual  realm  would  natu- 
rally be  somewhat  different  from  those  required 
in  dealing  with  mechanism.  The  question, 
then,  for  us  to  weigh  is  whether  an  evolving 
process  cannot  itself  furnish  us  with  standards, 
and  whether  standards  which  come  from  within 
the  process  itself  are  not  necessarily  more 
serviceable  than  those  which  are  absolutely 
fixed  and  rigid,  and  therefore  essentially  ex- 
ternal to  the  process  to  be  measured. 

There  are  three  considerations  that  come  up 
for  our  attention  in  this  connection.  The 
first  is  that  though  the  whole  body  of  truth  be 
growing,  the  rate  of  growth  in  its  different  parts 
varies  greatly.  There  are  always  truths  which 
are  practically  stable,  and  others  which  are 
plastic  and  mobile,  and  the  former  furnish  a 
basis  for  the  growth  of  the  latter.  Let  us 
take  an  illustration  from  the  organic  world. 
In  every  highly  developed  organism  we  find  a 

152 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

skeleton  and  around  it  a  mass  of  tissues  and 
organs  endowed  with  varying  degrees  of  plas- 
ticity and  facility  of  movement.  Without  the 
skeleton  the  organism  would  be  shapeless  and 
inefficient;  without  the  mobile  parts  the  skeleton 
would  be  inert.  All  parts,  including  the  skele- 
ton, grow  and  change.  In  fact  absolute  fixity 
in  the  skeleton  would  be  as  fatal  as  would  too 
little  stability.  But  in  the  relative  stability  of 
the  skeleton  we  find  that  which  makes  possible 
vigor  and  accuracy  of  action.  So  in  the  field 
of  truth  we  have  our  axioms,  which  form  the 
stable  framework  of  our  thought,  and  then  the 
more  plastic  portions,  varying  all  the  way  from 
opinions,  poetic  fancies,  statistics,  customs, 
and  individual  rules,  up  to  scientific  laws, 
moral  sentiments,  philosophic  and  religious 
insights.  The  axioms  serve  as  the  basis  for  the 
development  of  the  complex  system  of  which 
the  whole  body  of  truth  consists.  They  are  the 
standards  by  which  we  test  our  experience,  and 
which  make  possible  its  coherence  and  unity. 
The  pragmatist  simply  points  out  that  these 
standards  have  come  to  pass  by  a  process  of 
growth,18  and  that  there  are  signs  that  a  certain 

IS3 


O^    THh 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

amount  of  growth  is  still  possible.  Now  if 
this  view  meant  that  our  axioms  really  have  no 
more  validity  than  our  current  opinions,  it  might 
be  a  ground  for  bewilderment  or  alarm.  But 
on  the  contrary,  pragmatism  brings  home  to  us 
most  forcibly  how  deeply  imbedded  in  experience 
these  axioms  are,  and  so  gives  us  the  best  of 
reasons  for  using  them  as  standards.  A  farmer 
does  not  cease  to  plant  his  crops,  when  the  pre- 
cession of  the  equinoxes  is  explained  to  him, 
nor  do  men  stop  building  for  future  generations 
on  that  account.  So  the  doctrine  that  our 
axioms  are  part  of  a  growing  whole  does  not 
destroy  their  worth  as  standards,  but  rather 
enhances  that  worth,  because  it  brings  out  their 
organic  relation  to  the  rest  of  experience. 

The  second  consideration  is  that  whatever 
changes  come  about  in  our  standards  of  truth 
and  value  result  from  the  use  of  those  very 
standards.  Hence  the  changes  should  be  re- 
garded, not  as  the  destruction  of  the  old  stand- 
ards, but  as  an  improved  edition  of  them. 
There  are  certain  literary  persons  who  always 
are  telling  us  that  the  English  language  is  de- 
generating. They  find  that  the  standards  of 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

taste  are  becoming  modified  in  the  process  of 
time,  and  that  even  the  grammar  of  our  tongue 
is  undergoing  some  changes,  and  so  they  think 
that  the  language  is  breaking  down.  But  as  we 
look  back  over  the  history  of  our  language  we 
see  that  it  is  through  the  use  of  existing  forms 
and  standards  that  the  changes  have  come  about, 
and  that  the  result  in  the  long  run  has  been  to 
increase  the  vigor,  richness,  and  flexibility  of 
our  speech.  So  we  may  well  believe  that,  since 
our  standards  are  themselves  the  product  of 
experience,  whatever  changes  in  them  are 
brought  about  through  their  further  use  in  the 
interpretation  of  experience  will  only  result 
in  their  perfecting. 

The  third  consideration  has  to  do  with  the 
objection  that,  unless  you  demonstrate  a  priori 
what  the  goal  of  the  universe  is,  it  will  remain 
quite  possible  that  what  you  believe  to  be  the 
goal  is  not  really  such,  and  that  it  may  be  not 
even  in  line  with  the  actual  goal.  The  reply 
to  this  objection  is  found  in  the  fact  that,  wher- 
ever the  new  truths  and  values  gained  are 
also  in  the  main  inclusive  of  the  old,  we  have 
proof  not  only  of  the  fact  of  progress  but  also  of 

155 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

the  direction  of  progress,  and  so  are  able  to  form 
a  practical  conception  of  the  world's  true  goal. 
To  bring  out  the  meaning  of  this  point  let  us 
take  a  particular  instance  from  the  sphere  of 
social  values.  The  social  epoch  preceding  the 
present  was  marked  by  the  development  of 
individualism,  and  the  great  worth  of  that 
development  is  obvious  to  every  student  of 
history.  Now  centralization  appears  to  be  the 
tendency  of  governments,  and  collectivism  is 
clearly  in  the  ascendant  in  the  field  of  industry. 
How  in  the  midst  of  these  changes  can  we  tell 
whether  we  are  practically  reverting  to  an  older 
order  of  things,  or  going  off  on  a  tangent,  or 
really  making  progress  ?  It  seems  clear  that  if 
the  new  social  order  can  include  and  conserve 
the  values  of  individualism  at  the  same  time 
that  it  brings  us  certain  new  values,  we  shall 
be  really  making  progress.  So  it  is  throughout 
the  entire  realm  of  truths  and  values.  It  is  pos- 
sible for  us  to  progress  and  to  know  that  we 
are  progressing  without  the  aid  of  the  a  priori 
demonstrations  of  an  absolute  philosophy,  so 
long  as  the  new  values  and  truths  that  the 
future  may  have  in  store  for  us  include  and 

156 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

take  up  into  themselves  at  least  the  highest 
among  those  which  we  now  possess. 

The  considerations  just  presented  are  capable 
of  much  fuller  development,  but  enough  has 
been  said  to  show  that  a  pragmatic  and  evolu- 
tionary view  of  the  world  and  of  truth  is  con- 
sistent with  the  adoption  of  definite  standards 
of  truth  and  value,  and  hence  that  there  is  no 
intrinsic  reason  why  such  a  view  should  not  aid 
us  in  solving  the  problem  of  purpose  in  the  world. 
It  remains  for  us  but  to  note  the  essential 
harmony  between  Christianity  and  the  foregoing 
evolutionary  conception  of  our  intellectual  and 
spiritual  standards. 

That  for  which  Christianity  stands  is  pri- 
marily a  type  of  life,  a  specific  kind  of  relation 
between  man  and  God  and  between  man  and 
man.  In  the  preceding  lecture  the  central 
characteristic  of  this  type  of  life  was  brought 
out,  and  was  seen  to  consist  in  the  blending 
of  the  consciousness  of  God's  immanence  in  the 
human  soul  with  the  life  of  service,  the  growth 
of  character,  the  development  of  moral  person- 
ality. In  Christianity  this  type  of  life,  in  which 
the  ethical  and  the  religious  are  blended,  ranks 

157 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

above  everything  else.  Neither  institutions  nor 
ceremonials  nor  doctrines  can  justly  claim  to 
be  of  the  same  importance.  Hence  the  essential 
content  of  Christianity  has  always  found  its 
best  expression  in  vital  terms.  Religion  consists 
in  that  higher  righteousness  whose  law  is  love, 
says  Jesus  in  the  synoptic  gospels;  it  consists  in 
possessing  eternal  life  here  and  now,  we  find  him 
saying  in  the  fourth  gospel;  it  means  the  inward 
presence  of  the  Divine  Spirit  as  a  permanent 
power  for  life,  says  Paul.  And  in  the  same 
key  are  the  messages  of  the  prophets  before  the 
time  of  Christ,  and  the  greatest  interpretations 
of  our  faith  since  his  time.  Now  it  is  the  charac- 
teristic of  these  vital  terms  that  they  retain  their 
significance  and  power  through  the  ages,  while 
more  rigid  conceptions  become  outgrown.  They 
assimilate  new  associations,  reveal  with  the  lapse 
of  time  greater  depths  of  meaning,  and  give 
evidence  of  a  permanent  capacity  for  inspiring 
men.  This  vital  quality  in  the  essential  ideas  of 
Christianity  is  one  great  evidence  of  its  adapt- 
ability to  an  evolutionary  view  of  the  world. 

Again   Christianity   as   an   historical   religion 
finds    the    supreme    revelation    of   God    in    a 

158 


ONE  INCREASING   PURPOSE 

personality.  Jesus  Christ  through  his  spirit 
and  character  is  a  more  intensive  revelation 
of  God  than  the  writings  which  record  his  life, 
or  the  church  which  has  arisen  from  his  work, 
or  any  code  that  may  be  derived  from  his  teach- 
ings. What  it  means  for  our  faith  that  it 
centres  in  a  supreme  personality  no  theology  will 
ever  be  able  fully  to  estimate,  but  one  of  the 
great  meanings  is  surely  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  it  possesses  an  unexampled  source  of  in- 
spiration for  moral  and  spiritual  progress. 
The  call  of  Jesus  Christ  is  to  an  ever  more 
abundant  life,  and  who  will  foretell  the  age  that 
shall  no  longer  need  that  call  ? 

Once  more,  when  we  compare  Christianity 
with  other  religions,  one  of  the  most  momentous 
points  of  contrast  is  to  be  found  in  just  this  ca- 
pacity for  progress  which  Christianity  possesses 
and  which  the  other  great  religions  of  the  world 
have  so  largely  lacked.  Confucianism  with  its 
absolute  reverence  for  a  definite  social  order 
belonging  to  the  remote  past,  Buddhism  and. 
Hinduism  with  their  negative  and  non-social 
morality,  Judaism  with  its  national  limitations, 
Mohammedanism,  so  legalistic  and  unspiritual 

159 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

— all  conspicuously  lack  that  capacity  for  prog- 
ress which  we  have  seen  to  be  inherent  in  the 
Christian  faith,  and  in  this  lack  is  their  undoing. 
It  is  to  its  inexhaustible  capacity  for  progress  that 
we  must  look  for  the  ultimate  justification  of  our 
faith  that  Christianity  is  the  absolute  religion.19 
In  these  qualities  of  Christianity — in  its 
vital,  personal,  and  progressive  character — we 
have  evidence  of  its  essential  adaptability  to  an 
evolutionary  view  of  the  world.  So  far,  then, 
from  being  forced  to  conclude  that  an  evolu- 
tionary philosophy  is  fatal  to  all  standards  of 
truth  and  value,  and  destructive  of  the  essential 
ideas  of  Christianity,  we  have  reached  a  quite 
opposite  conclusion.  We  have  come  to  see 
that  those  standards  framed  in  accordance  with 
an  evolutionary  philosophy  are  of  the  greatest 
worth,  because  they  are  organically  related  to 
the  realities  which  they  are  to  test,  and  that  such 
a  philosophy  can  accept  as  the  content  of  its 
highest  standards  the  great  ideas  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion. 

In  following  the  successive  steps  of  the  dis- 
cussion in  which  we  have  sought  to  deal  with 

1 60 


ONE  INCREASING   PURPOSE 

the  problem  of  the  world's  apparent  aimless- 
ness,  I  trust  that  the  general  character  of  the 
solution  proposed  has  not  been  lost  sight  of. 
We  have  found  much  help  in  the  changed 
conception  of  natural  law  which  is  appearing 
in  many  quarters;  we  have  seen  the  advantage 
of  substituting  the  conception  of  the  growing 
universe  for  the  thought  that  it  is  static;  we 
have  seen  the  worth  of  the  pragmatic  and 
evolutionary  conception  of  spiritual  standards, 
and  their  compatibility  with  Christian  ideas. 
But  the  solution  of  our  problem  in  the  last 
analysis  belongs  now  as  ever  to  religious  faith. 
The  object  of  our  discussion  has  been  to  remove 
certain  obstacles  from  the  way  of  faith,  to 
defend  its  rights,  and  to  show  that  it  is  met 
more  than  half-way  by  our  most  satisfactory 
theories  of  the  world.  But  the  ultimate  solution 
of  our  problem  lies  in  the  realm  of  religious 
experience.  It  consists  in  spiritually  appropriat- 
ing the  central  truth  of  Christianity,  the  ethical 
monotheism  of  Jesus,  in  which  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  immanence  of  God  and  active  self- 
dedication  to  the  moral  ideal  are  perfectly 

blended.     Jesus   has   taught  mankind   how  to 

161 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

live  the  eternal  life  in  the  midst  of  time.  As 
his  spirit  becomes  more  and  more  the  motive 
power  of  our  lives,  we  understand  the  meaning 
of  that  saying  of  the  apostle,  "Now  are  we  the 
sons  of  God,  and  it  doth  not  yet  appear  what  we 
shall  be.  But  we  know  that  when  he  shall 
appear,  we  shall  be  like  him;  for  we  shall  see 
him  as  he  is."  It  is  when  such  an  experience 
becomes  a  settled  possession  of  our  inner  life 
that  we  are  best  able  to  understand  the  world 
about  us  as  the  manifestation  of  one  increas- 
ing purpose. 

'Then  life  is — to  wake  not  sleep, 

Rise  and  not  rest,  but  press 
From  earth's  level  where  blindly  creep 

Things  perfected,  more  or  less, 
To  the  heaven's  height,  far  and  steep, 

'Where,  amid  what  strifes  and  storms 

May  wait  the  adventurous  quest, 
Power  is  Love — transports,  transforms 

Who  aspired  from  worst  to  best, 
Sought  the  soul's  world,  spurned  the  worms'. 

:<I  have  faith  such  end  shall  be: 

From  the  first  Power  was — I  knew. 
Life  has  made  clear  to  me 

That,  strive  but  for  closer  view, 
Love  were  as  plain  to  see. 

162 


ONE  INCREASING  PURPOSE 

*  When  see  ?     When  there  dawns  a  day, 

If  not  on  the  homely  earth, 
Then  yonder,  worlds  away, 

Where  the  strange  and  new  have  birth, 
And  Power  comes  full  in  play."  20 


163 


IV 

MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

discussion  of  the  highways  of  thought 
resulted  in  the  adoption  of  that  one  which 
leads  us  deepest  into  life,  and  finds  the  test  of 
truth  not  only  in  the  experiences  of  the  senses 
and  the  categories  of  the  intellect,  but  also  in 
the  sense  of  beauty,  in  the  postulates  of  the 
moral  nature,  and  in  the  victories  and  defeats 
of  our  practical  life.  Our  study  of  certain 
typical  ways  in  which  men  have  sought  the 
experience  of  the  Eternal,  while  finding  much 
of  value  in  mysticism,  ultimately  took  us  out 
of  doors  into  the  daylight  of  human  history  and 
amidst  the  activities  in  which  moral  personality 
is  developed.  Again,  our  consideration  of  the 
problem  of  the  world's  apparent  aimlessness 
has  led  us  to  see  that  the  most  adequate  modern 
views  of  the  cosmos  corroborate  strongly  the 

faith  that  the  whole  is  becoming  the  expression 

164 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

of  one  increasing  purpose.  But  all  of  these 
solutions,  genuine  as  they  surely  are,  never- 
theless confront  us  the  more  directly  with  another 
of  humanity's  problems,  and  the  most  urgent  of 
them  all.  This  is  the  problem  of  moral  evil. 
In  the  pathway  of  upward  development  we  have 
fellowship  with  God,  but  what  befalls  us  when 
we  go  astray  ?  How,  in  this  universe  of  God,  can 
we  go  astray  ?  Does  God  cast  off  his  people  ? 
Do  we  stumble  that  we  may  fall  ?  In  our  fall  is 
there  any  pain  to  him,  and  is  there  any  hope  of 
recovery  for  us  ?  Whether  we  do  well  or  ill,  is 
all  to  the  glory  of  God  ?  If  not,  whose  is  the 
shame  ? 

The  thought  of  the  ruin  of  any  human 
interest  brings  an  overshadowing  gravity  upon 
one's  spirit.  The  sheep  graze  peacefully  in 
the  sunshine  on  the  mounds  of  Mesopotamia, 
but  shall  we  forget  that  one  of  those  mounds 
is  the  ruin  of  Nineveh  ?  Sable  Island  might 
hold  our  attention  only  for  its  bleak  picturesque- 
ness,  did  we  not  know  that  hundreds  of  ships  had 
beaten  themselves  to  pieces  on  its  rocks.  That 
desolated  spot  by  the  street  might  concern  us  no 
more  than  an  abandoned  brick-kiln,  if  it  did 

165 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

not  contain  the  ashes  of  a  home.  Napoleon's 
dreams  of  empire  cannot  arouse  the  merely 
peaceful  interest  that  we  take  in  those  of  Sir 
Thomas  More,  when  we  remember  what  devas- 
tation the  former  brought  to  Europe.  So  we 
cannot  take  the  universe  in  a  merely  light- 
hearted  way,  when  once  its  moral  catastrophes 
have  come  home  to  us.  The  history  of  the 
ruined  and  buried  splendors  of  the  moral 
world,  the  shipwrecked  characters,  the  devas- 
tated loves,  the  wide  havoc  that  one  man's  sin 
may  work  in  society,  are  calculated  to  arouse  our 
thinking  out  of  the  superficiality  into  which  it 
is  so  apt  to  fall,  with  the  stern  demand  that  we 
face  the  facts  of  life,  and  that  we  make  any 
conclusion  which  we  venture  to  put  forward  bear 
most  directly  on  those  facts.  It  is  in  the  possible 
issues  of  the  moral  life  for  good  or  ill  that  the 
deep  tragedy  of  existence  lies.  Here  is  where 
the  glory  and  the  gloom  of  life  enfold  each 
other  with  a  more  than  Rembrandtian  mystery. 
This  is  indeed  the  place  for  faith  to  do  its  boldest 
work.  But  must  faith  work  in  an  altogether 
blind  way  ?  Or  are  there  great  convictions 

founded  in  experience  to  sustain  it  ?     And  in 

j  66 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

particular,  can  the  monotheism  of  Jesus  Christ 
be  adopted  as  a  belief  that  is  loyal  at  once  to 
the  facts  and  the  ideals  involved,  and  so  as  a  true 
basis  for  the  endeavors  of  faith  ?  The  problem 
of  moral  evil  is  then  our  present  theme,  and  the 
discussion  of  it  can  best  be  brought  into  relation 
to  the  preceding  lectures  by  taking  up,  first, 
the  treatment  of  this  problem  given  by  absolute 
idealism,  and  secondly,  the  solution  to  which 
our  interpretation  of  Christian  theology  leads. 


The  treatment  of  the  problem  of  moral  evil 
by  absolute  idealism,  especially  as  it  is  found 
in  Professor  Royce's  writings,  is  governed  by 
certain  motives  which  give  it  great  strength. 
One  of  these  motives  appears  in  the  determina- 
tion to  give  full  recognition  to  the  reality  of 
moral  evil,  and  not  to  let  the  vision  of  the  painful 
contrasts  which  actually  exist  in  the  moral  world 
be  blurred  by  the  doctrine  of  the  oneness  of  all 
reality.  A  second  motive  is  the  desire  to 
show  that  God  is  most  intimately  related  to  the 

moral  struggles  of  our  lives,  that  he  triumphs 

167 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

in  our  successes  and  suffers  in  our  defeats. 
A  third  motive  is  manifested  in  the  effort  to  prove 
that  the  resources  of  God  are  adequate  for 
overcoming  all  moral  evil,  and  that  his  triumph 
is  sure.  These  are  all  motives  which  inevitably 
arise  in  the  morally  earnest  soul,  and  a  doctrine 
that  really  does  justice  to  each  deserves  a  hearty 
welcome.  We  therefore  shall  do  well  to  estimate 
the  teachings  of  absolute  idealism  in  regard  to 
our  theme  by  considering  how  far  they  give  to 
these  motives  satisfactory  expression. 

Beginning  with  the  motive  first  mentioned, 
we  are  led  to  ask  how  far  absolute  idealism 
succeeds  in  giving  full  recognition  to  the  reality 
of  moral  evil.  A  theory  which  is  to  explain  a 
set  of  facts  must  not  end  by  explaining  them 
away.  Particularly  is  this  true  in  the  ethical 
realm,  for  the  facts  nevertheless  remain,  and, 
like  reefs  in  a  fog-bank,  are  all  the  more  a  source 
of  danger  because  of  the  theory  that  obscures 
them.  Now  Professor  Royce  emphasizes  the 
reality  of  evil  by  distinguishing  his  conception 
of  it  sharply  from  that  of  mysticism.  To  the 
philosophical  mystic  evil  in  all  its  forms  is 

ultimately   unreal.     This  is    because    unreality 

1 68 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

pertains  to  everything  finite.  God  alone  has 
true  being,  and  our  individuality  is  only  an 
illusory  separation  from  him.  Hence  our  pur- 
suit of  what  is  selfish  or  of  anything  evil  is  like- 
wise an  illusion,  a  mere  chasing  of  phantoms, 
as  we  shall  discover  when  we  have  "awakened 
from  the  dream  of  life."  Over  against  such  a 
conception  Professor  Royce  declares,  'For 
us,  evil  is  certainly  not  an  unreality.  It  is  a 
temporal  reality,  and  as  such  is  included  within, 
and  present  to,  the  eternal  insight.  What  we 
have  asserted  throughout  is  that  no  evil  is  a 
whole  or  complete  instance  of  being.  In  other 
words,  evil,  for  us,  is  something  explicitly  finite; 
and  the  Absolute  as  such,  in  the  individuality 
of  its  life,  is  not  evil,  while  its  life  is  unquestion- 
ably inclusive  of  evil,  which  it  experiences, 
overcomes,  and  transcends."1 

Now  how  is  this  emphasis  on  the  reality  of 
evil,  moral  as  well  as  physical,  related  to  the 
accompanying  doctrine  that  the  Absolute  is  in- 
clusive of  all  which  is  and  all  which  happens, 
and  at  the  same  time  is  perfectly  good  ?  The 
reasoning  is  in  general  somewhat  as  follows. 

Finite  beings  and  the  Absolute  are  logically  nec- 

169 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

essary  to  each  other.  Without  finite  beings  as 
the  objects  of  his  consciousness,  the  Absolute 
would  be  unconscious,  in  short  would  be  noth- 
ing, just  as  without  the  Absolute  we,  who  are 
nothing  but  the  objects  of  his  experience,  should 
not  exist.  But  now,  in  order  that  the  objects 
of  the  Absolute's  experience  may  be  definite  and 
individual,  the  finite  beings  must  be  endowed 
with  some  element  of  will,  for  all  products  of 
mere  intellect  are  abstract;  it  is  impulse  and 
will  that  give  concreteness  to  a  being.  What 
we  are  to  understand  by  an  act  of  will  is  there- 
fore something  unique,  something  not  reducible 
to  general  formulas.  Hence  it  never  can  be  com- 
pletely determined  by  causes,  but  is  in  a  meas- 
ure essentially  free.  But  with  freedom  goes  the 
possibility  of  moral  evil.  When  a  purpose 
forms  itself  within  us,  we  may  conform  it  to  our 
sense  of  moral  obligation,  or  we  may  carry  it 
out  by  suppressing  that  sense.  When  we  do 
the  latter,  we  sin.  Thus,  according  to  Royce's 
admirable  definition,  fTo  sin  is  consciously  to 
choose  to  forget,  through  a  narrowing  of  the  field 
of  attention,  an  Ought  that  one  already  recog- 


nizes."2 


170 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

But  our  wills  must  be  parts  of  the  Absolute, 
as  everything  else  is.  Just  as  our  consciousness 
is  an  integral  part  of  his  consciousness,  so  are 
our  wills  integral  parts  of  his  will.  Says 
Professor  Royce,  'You  can  indeed  assert:  I 
alone,  amongst  all  the  different  beings  of  the 
universe,  will  this  act.  That  it  is  true  that  God 
here  also  wills  in  me,  is  indeed  the  unquestion- 
able result  of  the  unity  of  the  divine  conscious- 
ness. But  it  is  equally  true  that  this  divine 
unity  is  here  and  now  realized  by  me,  and  by 
me  only,  through  my  unique  act.  My  act,  too, 
is  a  part  of  the  divine  life  that,  however  frag- 
mentary, is  not  elsewhere  repeated  in  the  divine 
consciousness.  When  I  thus  consciously  and 
uniquely  will,  it  is  I  then  who  just  here  am 
God's  will,  or  who  just  here  consciously  act 
for  the  whole."3  Now  all  this  must  be  as  ap- 
plicable to  our  bad  acts  as  to  our  good  acts. 
Our  bad  acts  may  be  counterbalanced,  or 
''overcome,"  as  Royce  always  hastens  to  add, 
by  other  good  acts,  but  nevertheless  they  re- 
main as  constituents  of  the  life  of  the  Absolute. 

But  we  must  pause  to  ask  whether  this  at- 
tempt to  affirm  at  one  and  the  same  time  that 

171 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

moral  evil  is  real,  and  that  it  is  as  genuinely  a 
constituent  of  the  Absolute  as  anything  else,  has 
succeeded.  Can  all  our  acts  be  identical  parts 
of  the  Absolute's  will  and  at  the  same  time  free 
and  so  moral  or  immoral  ?  It  would  seem  not. 
Our  actions  must  have  a  measure  of  freedom  with 
respect  to  God  as  well  as  with  respect  to  other 
things,  if  they  are  really  to  be  reckoned  in  the 
moral  realm.  But  in  absolute  idealism  this 
is  not  the  case,  for  the  Absolute's  experience  is 
eternally  complete.  Past,  present,  and  future  are 
alike  immediately  before  him.  But  our  actions 
are  a  part  of  the  Absolute's  experience,  and 
for  this  very  reason  our  lives  are  complete  from 
the  eternal  point  of  view.4  Now  this  gives 
us  a  genuinely  deterministic  view  of  our  lives. 
It  matters  little  to  show  that  our  actions  are  not 
the  necessary  result  of  natural  causes,  if  from  the 
ultimate  point  of  view  they  stand  completely 
determined.  The  discharge  from  a  shot-gun  is 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  much  a  unit  as 
the  discharge  from  a  rifle,  and  is  as  much  de- 
termined by  the  fire-arm.  It  signifies  nothing 
that  each  several  shot  has  a  path  of  its  own,  and 

that  it  is  only  partially  interfered   with  by  the 

172 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

other  shot,  because  after  all  its  course  is  primarily 
shaped  by  the  discharging  weapon.  But  when 
you  add  to  this  the  supposition  that  the  charges 
are  eternally  fired  off,  that  the  shot  are  reposing 
in  the  target  as  well  as  being  in  the  cartridge 
and  on  the  way,  that  what  they  shall  hit  is 
eternally  settled,  then  it  hardly  seems  possible 
to  argue  that  each  several  shot  had  an  aim 
of  its  own.  So  if  all  our  deeds  are  by  their 
very  nature  identical  parts  of  the  Absolute's  ex- 
perience, and  if  that  experience  is  necessarily 
complete,  then  from  the  highest  point  of  view 
our  lives  stand  finished  with  our  future  deeds, 
whether  predominantly  righteous  or  wicked, 
arranged  in  order.  The  whole  doctrine  comes 
to  this,  that  whatever  we  shall  do  we  must  do, 
in  order  that  the  Absolute  may  be  what  he 
eternally  is.  Thus  the  doctrine  fails  to  be  faith- 
ful to  one  of  its  main  motives,  the  desire  not  to 
blur  the  reality  of  moral  evil.  For  while  our 
finite  lives  are  not  reduced  to  illusions,  as  by 
the  mystics,  yet  the  moral  nature  of  our  actions 
is  obscured,  because  from  the  ultimate  point  of 
view  they  possess  no  freedom. 

But  while  the  reality  of  moral  evil  is  slighted 

173 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

so  far  as  freedom  enters  into  it,  from  another 
point  of  view  it  is  given  too  much  reality.  That 
is  to  say,  it  is  given  a  permanence  in  reality  that 
is  a  source  of  dismay  to  moral  effort.  For  the 
evil  deed  is  as  much  a  constituent  of  the  Ab- 
solute's life  as  anything  else.  Just  as  the  family 
pictures  in  a  baronial  castle  include  portraits 
of  the  youthful  and  the  aged,  the  dissipated 
and  the  virtuous,  all  on  the  same  wall,  so  in  the 
life  of  the  Absolute  the  bad  of  our  finite  lives  is 
just  as  actually  an  element  as  the  good.  The 
evil  is  there  to  stay.  So  Professor  Royce  writes: 
'What  you  mean  when  you  say  that  evil  in  this 
temporal  world  ought  not  to  exist,  and  ought 
to  be  suppressed,  is  simply  what  God  means 
by  seeing  that  evil  ought  to  be  and  is  endlessly 
thwarted,  endured,  but  subordinated.  You 
can  never  clean  the  world  of  evil;  but  you  can 
subordinate  evil."5  Now  the  idea  of  a  world 
clean  of  evil  may  be  too  much  for  our  faith, 
but  that  there  is  a  process  of  cleansing  going 
on,  which  is  able  more  and  more  to  reduce 
the  scope  of  evil,  we  must  believe,  and  we  must 
have  faith  that  this  is  true  from  the  most 
metaphysical  point  of  view  that  we  can  conceive. 

174 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

But  we  must  turn  to  the  second  motive 
which  enters  into  the  theory  of  moral  evil  put 
forward  by  absolute  idealism,  especially  that 
of  the  Roycean  type.  We  described  it  as  the 
desire  to  show  that  God  is  most  intimately 
related  to  the  moral  struggles  of  our  lives,  that 
he  triumphs  in  our  successes  and  suffers  in  our 
defeats.  Whatever  we  may  think  of  the  doc- 
trine that  the  moral  evil  of  men  is  an  integral 
part  of  God's  life,  we  surely  do  long  to  recognize 
that  the  struggle  with  evil  is  one  in  which  he 
really  shares.  This  is  the  deepest  motive  in 
the  current  liberal  theology  of  our  land,  and  by 
all  means  it  should  be  given  full  development. 
The  vigor  with  which  this  note  is  sounded  by 
Professor  Royce  has  much  to  do  with  the  hold  his 
writings  have  on  that  portion  of  our  ministry 
which  is  alive  to  theological  questions. 

Professor  Royce  sets  in  relief  his  view  of  God's 
relation  to  the  struggle  with  moral  evil  by  con- 
trasting it  with  the  view  that  men  are  essentially 
independent  of  God  in  their  existence,  and  for 
that  reason  are  free  moral  agents.6  According 
to  such  a  view  God  creates  men  out  of  hand, 
endows  them  with  faculties,  and  then  holds 

175 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

them  accountable  for  their  deeds.  His  relation 
to  the  moral  life  of  man  is  that  of  administering 
the  rewards  and  punishments  that  human 
actions  deserve.  It  is  thus  external  in  its 
character,  rather  than  intense  and  vital.  Such 
a  view  has  been  already  weighed  in  the  balances 
by  theology  and  found  wanting.  It  makes 
impossible  an  appreciation  of  the  depth  of  the 
Christian  gospel.  It  makes  atonement  a  stum- 
bling-block and  foolishness  instead  of  the  wis- 
dom and  the  power  of  God.  Moreover  it  over- 
looks, as  Professor  Royce  shows,  one  of  the 
world-old  facts  of  human  experience,  which 
is  felt  with  new  keenness  by  this  generation, 
the  solidarity  of  men's  moral  life.  The  sins  of 
the  fathers  are  visited  upon  the  children  from 
generation  to  generation.  The  wanton  deeds 
of  one  man  cause  thousands  to  stumble.  The 
selfishness  of  the  few  compels  the  multitudes 
to  drink  from  polluted  rivers.  The  greed  of 
landlords  reduces  the  life  of  tenants  to  a  slow 
suffocation.  The  striker  in  his  passion  for  re- 
prisal dynamites  our  bridges.  The  uncleanness 
of  the  poor  sows  the  seeds  of  disease  in  the 

pathway  of  all.     A  reckless  speculator  brings 

176 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

to  a  standstill  an  entire  industry.  Goethe 
taints  his  wonderful  genius  with  license,  to  the 
lasting  harm  of  Germany.  On  the  other  hand 
our  civilization  gets  its  progressiveness  and  its 
resisting  power  from  the  tissues  of  interwoven 
moral  lives  so  characteristic  of  our  modern 
world.  Great  achievements  are  never  the  single- 
handed  products  of  great  men.  To  the  genius 
of  the  great  has  to  be  added  the  faithfulness 
and  integrity  of  multitudes  of  average  men, 
in  order  that  anything  large  and  lasting  may  be 
accomplished.  The  toil,  the  patience,  the 
suffering  of  countless  men  must  enter  into 
the  warfare  with  evil  and  the  production  of 
good,  if  permanent  achievements  are  to  be 
made. 

But  if  the  moral  relations  between  man  and 
man  are  thus  intimate  and  organic,  how  pale 
and  devoid  of  soul-stirring  power  is  the  concep- 
tion which  represents  God  as  a  mere  umpire, 
assigning  to  each  man  his  deserts.  A  Deity 
that  is  only  externally  related  to  moral  issues 
can  have  only  a  nominal  supremacy  in  human 
lives.  Such  a  Deity  can  at  best  be  only  the 

titular  head  of  the  universe,  and  will  be  speedily 

177 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

superseded,  so  far  as  real  authority  is  concerned, 
by  men's  highest  moral  ideals.  These  may  be 
more  abstract  in  their  form,  but  they  will  prove 
more  dynamic  in  practical  effect,  than  the 
External  Ruler,  to  whom  conventional  homage 
may  still  be  paid.  Hence  Professor  Royce 
renders  a  most  valuable  service  to  religion  and 
theology,  when  he  insists  with  reiterated  em- 
phasis that  God  is  a  sharer  in  all  our  struggles 
with  evil,  and  that  we  on  our  part  by  the  very 
strain  and  passion  of  our  moral  endeavor,  and 
by  all  the  defeats  and  victories  that  we  experience 
in  sustaining  the  moral  cause,  are  entering  into 
the  life  of  God.  From  such  a  view-point  our 
moral  struggles  gain  a  significance  which  trans- 
forms them.  They  are  seen  to  lead  not  to  the 
depletion  but  to  the  fulfilment  of  life.  They 
become  transfigured,  for  we  see  them  to  be 
the  means  whereby  we  may  hold  converse  with 
Moses  and  Elias,  may  hear  the  voice  of  the 
Father  out  of  the  overshadowing  cloud,  and  thus 
may  enter  in  some  measure  into  the  mysteries 
of  the  mind  of  Christ. 

But  we  already  have  found  that  the  formal 

doctrines  of  absolute  idealism  sometimes  work 

178 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

to  the  obscuring  of  the  very  insights  that  they 
are  designed  to  interpret.  So  it  is  here.  As 
was  brought  out  in  the  first  lecture,  absolute 
idealism,  with  all  its  emphasis  on  the  immanence 
of  God,  has  difficulty  in  representing  him  as 
really  immanent  in  history.  This  is  because 
time  is  the  necessary  form  of  history,  and  of  all 
personal  and  moral  life,  so  far  as  we  can  con- 
ceive them  with  any  definiteness,  while  if  God 
is  the  Absolute  portrayed  by  the  idealists, 
time  is  not  fully  real  for  him.  The  conse- 
quence of  this  is  that  all  which  is  done  in  human 
history  is  the  work  of  the  different  finite  con- 
sciousnesses that  enter  into  it.  In  fact  all  that 
happens  in  this  world  of  ours  is  the  work  of 
man  and  nature,  or  rather  the  finite  psychic 
powers  which  really  constitute  nature.  God, 
as  such,  does  not  act  in  time.  He  is  the  in- 
cluder  of  all  events  but  not  an  actor  in  the  midst 
of  events.  And  thus  we  see  once  more  how 
sharp,  from  the  stand-point  of  the  practical 
interests  of  life,  is  the  dualism  that  absolute 
idealism  creates  between  the  Temporal  and  the 
Eternal  Order.  We  are  told  that  Russia  is 

governed  by  the  bureaucracy  rather  than  by  the 

179 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

czar.  This  situation  may  serve  to  illustrate  our 
present  difficulty.  If  all  the  concrete  decisions 
and  actions  of  the  Russian  government  are  the 
work  of  the  system  of  bureaucrats,  then  the  only 
function  of  the  czar  is  to  furnish  a  nebulous 
kind  of  authority  for  whatever  happens.  If 
he  could  be  spirited  away,  everything  would  go 
on  as  before,  so  long  as  the  people  believed  him 
to  be  there.  So  in  this  universe  of  ours,  if  God 
is  to  be  thought  of  as  active  in  events  only 
as  he  is  represented  by  some  form  of  finite  con- 
sciousness, he  is  sovereign  more  in  name  than 
in  fact.  He  is  as  much  the  merely  titular 
head  of  the  universe,  though  he  be  called  the 
Absolute,  as  was  the  External  Ruler,  whom 
both  philosophy  and  liberal  theology  have 
rejected.  He  is  after  all  not  one  who  is  striving, 
suffering,  and  triumphing  with  us  in  the  great 
drama  of  the  world's  redemption.  From  the 
pragmatic  point  of  view  the  latter  thought  is 
too  precious  to  be  enmeshed  and  rendered 
impotent  by  a  priori  deductions  from  the  general 
concept  of  being. 

The  third  motive  which  we  noted  as  influen- 
tial in  the  treatment  of  the  problem  of  moral 

1 80 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

evil  by  absolute  idealism  is  the  desire  to  attain 
to  a  certainty  that  the  outcome  of  the  moral 
struggle  will  be  the  triumph  of  the  good.  This 
is  one  of  the  most  powerful  motives  that  any 
philosophy  can  employ,  and  though  some 
thinkers  may  feel  compelled  to  ignore  it,  none 
should  deliberately  put  a  slight  upon  it.  It  ill 
becomes  the  sheltered  philosopher  or  the  man 
of  culture,  who  is  the  heir  of  all  the  ages,  to 
assume  that  his  fellows,  standing  in  the  thick 
of  society's  moral  conflicts,  do  not  need  the 
assurance  that  the  cause  of  the  good  will  tri- 
umph. There  is  in  such  an  attitude  something 
of  that  arrogance  which  the  robustly  healthy 
sometimes  display,  but  which  the  true  physician 
never  permits  in  himself.  Even  the  most 
valiant  spirit  will  sometimes  come  out  of  the 
conflict  hardly  bestead  and  faint,  and  in  need 
of  all  the  reassurance  that  religion  and  philoso- 
phy can  give  him,  and  surely  the  great  mass  of 
toiling  and  suffering  souls  do  not  err  when 
they  seek  for  an  assured  faith  in  an  ultimate 
victory  of  the  good. 

Now    Professor    Royce    gives    frequent    and 

noble   expression    to    the   very   assurance   that 

181 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

the  moral  struggler  needs;  the  triumph  of  the 
good  is  most  certain;  it  is  grounded  in  the  nat- 
ure of  God;  we  who  are  faithful  to  our  moral 
tasks  share  in  the  triumph.  It  is  in  and  through 
our  endeavors,  our  persistence,  our  bearing  of 
life's  strain,  and  our  vigilance  in  discovering 
and  grappling  with  its  opportunities,  that  God 
comes  to  the  victory  which  is  his.  But  just  as 
so  many  of  the  measures  passed  by  our  legis- 
lative bodies  contain  at  some  vital  point  a 
provision  which  nullifies  their  really  salutary 
features,  so  it  is  with  the  doctrine  by  which 
Professor  Royce  would  convince  us  that  the 
moral  cause  will  be  victorious.  And  unfortu- 
nately the  nullifying  portion  consists  of  the 
very  argument  by  which  the  needed  conviction 
should  be  supported.  We  are  told  that  the 
triumph  is  sure  because  it  exists  in  the  eternal 
world  as  a  reality  present  to  God.  This  is  a  mat- 
ter of  a  priori  demonstration.  But  the  eternal 
world  is  just  the  whole  temporal  order,  present, 
past,  and  future,  spread  out  in  completeness 
and  seen  in  its  unity.  Thus  moral  victory 
is  certain  in  the  universe  because  that  which 

from  our  stand-point  is  future  and  undetermined 

182 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

is  from  the  ultimate  point  of  view  an  accom- 
plished fact. 

Now  such  an  argument  tends  to  rob  the 
certainty  that  it  is  designed  to  produce  of  its 
moral  worth,  and  this  for  two  reasons.  In  the 
first  place,  the  assurance  to  be  desired  is  one 
that  not  only  will  bring  tranquillity  to  the  mind, 
but  also  will  lift  the  moral  energies  to  their 
highest  and  steadiest  efficiency.  But  the  doc- 
trine offered  us  can  at  best  yield  only  the  former 
benefit,  and  fails  to  secure  the  latter.7  It  cannot 
properly  be  said,  as  it  sometimes  has  been,  that 
the  doctrine  of  the  complete  determinateness 
of  the  world  from  the  ultimate  point  of  view 
is  calculated  to  lead  men  to  sin,  but  what  it 
does  do  is  to  leave  men  where  they  are,  whatever 
the  moral  level  may  be  at  which  they  find  them- 
selves. At  the  utmost  it  may  aid  men  to  undergo 
what  must  be  undergone,  but  it  does  not  con- 
tribute toward  increasing  the  scope  and  in- 
tensity of  the  moral  life.  This  cannot  be  done 
by  the  doctrine  that  from  the  most  adequate 
point  of  view  the  universe  is  a  finished  scheme 
of  facts.  The  kind  of  assurance  that  has  real 
practical  efficiency  is  not  the  product  of  a  priori 

183 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

reasoning  at  all.  It  has  its  roots  rather  in  an 
inward  religious  experience  of  the  reality  and 
power  of  God  in  this  our  world  of  time;  and  the 
reasoning  in  which  such  an  experience  finds 
support  is  that  which  gathers  additional  evidence 
of  God  from  as  wide  ranges  of  human  expe- 
rience as  possible.  In  the  strength  of  such  a 
personal  and  historical  revelation  of  God  one 
may  face  a  future  that  is  real,  and  by  no  means 
wholly  determined  even  from  the  most  meta- 
physical stand-point,  with  abundant  cheer  and 
overflowing  spiritual  energy. 

The  second  reason  why  the  argument  under 
consideration  tends,  in  part  at  least,  to  defeat 
its  own  end  is  that  this  very  certain  triumph 
which  it  is  supposed  to  prove  is  after  all  a 
hollow  one.  No  evil  is  done  away  with  accord- 
ing to  this  teaching.  The  theory  explicitly 
forbids  us  to  think  that  evil  can  be  rooted  up 
and  stamped  out.  All  that  it  admits  of  is  that 
evil  should  be  counterbalanced  or  overbalanced 
by  some  good.  The  most  desperate  wrongs, 
which  have  wrought  wide  and  lasting  havoc 
among  men,  remain  in  the  consciousness  of  the 

Absolute,     condemned,     subordinated,      'over- 

184 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

come,"  but  as  genuinely  real  as  ever.  It  is 
as  if  one  were  to  sculpture  a  smile  on  the  faces 
in  the  Laocoon  group  and  call  the  whole  a 
portrayal  of  triumph,  while  the  serpents  forever 
coil  around  the  struggling  figures,  whose  hands 
in  turn  forever  vainly  clutch  the  serpents' 
throats.  As  one  thinks  this  theory  through,  one 
can  hardly  avoid  the  feeling  that  the  moral 
triumph  in  which  one  puts  one's  faith,  even 
though  less  demonstrably  certain  than  this, 
should  be  more  genuine  in  its  progress  and  more 
adequate  in  its  consummation. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  theories  of  absolute 
idealism  are  ill  adapted  to  do  justice  to  the 
great  ethical  and  religious  interests  involved  in 
the  problem  of  moral  evil.  Our  sense  that  the 
moral  issues  are  real  from  the  most  metaphysical 
stand-point,  our  consciousness  that  we  are 
sharers  with  God  in  struggle  and  victory,  and 
our  faith  that  the  good  wTill  triumph  because 
we  inwardly  know  and  actively  appropriate  the 
power  of  God  as  revealed  in  Jesus  Christ  and 
in  the  universal  moral  workings  of  his  Spirit — 
all  these  great  practical  convictions  not  only 
fail  of  adequate  interpretation  but  are  in  a 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

serious  measure  put  to  confusion,  by  the  a  priori 
deductions  of  absolute  idealism.  Consequently 
we  are  thrown  back  upon  religious  experience 
itself,  and  its  inductive  interpretation  in  the 
light  of  history  and  of  experience  in  general, 
as  the  true  means  of  dealing  with  this  great 
problem  of  moral  evil. 

II 

Proceeding  then  to  the  second  part  of  our 
discussion,  we  ask  what  solution  of  our  problem 
can  Christian  theology  afford  ?  And  first  let 
us  recall  certain  general  results  gained  in  the 
preceding  lecture,  for  the  sake  of  the  light  they 
may  throw  upon  our  investigation.  In  that 
lecture  we  undertook  to  seek  for  an  adjustment 
between  the  ethical  monotheism  of  Jesus  and 
the  most  adequate  modern  views  of  the  world, 
and  in  so  doing  we  were  led  to  distinguish 
ethical  monotheism  from  rigid  monism  as  well 
as  from  vague  pluralism,  and  to  maintain  it  as 
an  independent  metaphysical  point  of  view. 
Our  argument  involved  a  series  of  conceptions 
which  we  need  now  briefly  to  summarize. 

We  found  the  conception  of  God  for  which 

1 86 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

ethical  monotheism  stands  to  be  that  of  an  es- 
sentially active  being,  who  is  constantly  putting 
forth  his  power  for  the  accomplishment  of  his 
eternal  purposes.  This  is  the  prophets'  con- 
ception of  God,  and  is  the  one  required  by  the 
New  Testament  thought  of  him  as  Spirit,  as 
Love,  as  the  Father  who  ever  worketh  for  his 
children.  It  is  the  conception  involved  in  any 
view  of  God  that  is  predominantly  ethical. 
With  this  conception  fitted  in,  as  we  saw,  the 
view  that  time  is  unqualifiedly  real,  and  that 
the  universe  as  a  whole  is  growing  in  time,  even 
when  considered  from  the  metaphysical  stand- 
point. This  means  that  though  the  universe 
be  thought  of  as  continuous  throughout,  yet  new 
forms  of  life  are  constantly  coming  to  pass,  which 
when  organized  and  brought  into  harmony  with 
the  rest,  contribute  to  the  enrichment  of  the 
life  of  the  whole.  But  this  process  of  develop- 
ment and  organization  is  still  going  on,  and 
cannot  be  supposed  to  be  an  actually  accom- 
plished fact  even  to  the  view  of  God  himself. 

Here  already  we  can  see  one  of  the  great 
advantages  that  ethical  monotheism,  when  it 
employs  the  foregoing  conceptions,  gives  us  as 

187 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

compared  with  the  rigid  monism  of  the  absolute 
idealist.  It  enables  us  to  regard  moral  evil  as 
something  to  be  eliminated  from  the  universe, 
and  actually  to  be  put  out  of  existence.  We 
can  believe  that  our  struggle  with  moral  evil  is 
resulting  in  its  progressive  annihilation,  and 
can  look  forward  to  the  great  consummation, 
for  which  God  himself  is  striving,  when  moral 
evil  shall  be  no  more.  This  is  a  far  more 
potent  doctrine  than  that  of  the  absolute 
idealist,  because  it  makes  the  moral  warfare 
real,  and  the  victory  hoped  for  real,  and  lays 
the  strongest  emphasis  on  the  vigilance  and 
energy  of  each  moral  spirit.  Whereas  to  de-  ' 
clare,  as  the  absolute  idealist  does,  that  from 
the  highest  point  of  view  the  moral  consum- 
mation really  exists,  and  that  moral  evil,  thus 
regarded,  is  eternally  overcome,  is  like  crushing 
the  commerce  of  an  enemy  with  a  paper  block- 
ade. The  whole  traffic  of  wrong  goes  on  as 
before,  and  the  supremacy  of  righteousness  is 
made  no  whit  more  evident. 

But  how,  in  a  universe  pervaded  by  the  life 
of  God,  is  moral  evil  at  all  possible  ?  A  suffi- 
cient answer  to  this  question  of  the  ages  will 

1 88 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

not  be  expected  here,  and  I  make  no  attempt  to 
offer  such  an  answer.  My  only  suggestion  is 
that  the  conception  of  the  growing  universe 
places  us  at  a  point  of  vantage  for  considering 
such  a  question  and  throws  a  certain  amount  of 
light  upon  it.  Let  us  see  how  this  is. 

In  the  preceding  lecture  we  described  the 
growth  of  the  universe  as  being  conditioned  in 
general  on  a  twofold  process — the  formation  of 
centres  of  spontaneous  activity,  and  the  con- 
trolling of  these  centres  in  the  service  of  the 
organic  life  of  the  whole.  But  in  a  world  so 
constituted  the  possibility  of  moral  evil  would 
seem  to  be  involved  inevitably,  as  soon  as  the 
level  of  conscious  thinking  is  reached.  Here 
the  spontaneity  that  we  find  lower  down  be- 
comes genuinely  and  consciously  free.  Courses 
of  action  are  not  only  not  completely  determined, 
but  the  alternative  possibilities  are  definitely 
presented  to  consciousness  for  choice.  In  this 
realm  the  higher  unity  comes  about,  so  far  as 
any  individual  is  concerned,  only  by  moral 
action,  and  the  forces  brought  to  bear  upon 
any  individual  to  enlist  it  in  the  service  of  the 

whole  must  be  moral  forces.     This  means  that 

189 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

it  always  is  possible  for  the  individual  to  set 
his  own  good  over  against  that  of  others,  and 
in  the  pursuit  of  his  ends  to  work  them  injury; 
just  as  also  it  is  always  possible  for  him  to  make 
some  fleeting  personal  good  the  object  of  his 
desire  instead  of  controlling  his  conduct  for  the 
sake  of  wholeness  of  life.  Fulness,  richness,  and 
complexity  of  life  come  to  pass  only  through 
growth,  and  growth  takes  place  by  the  organi- 
zation of  centres  of  spontaneous  activity  into  a 
higher  unity;  this  involves  the  possibility  that 
the  spontaneous  centres  may  so  act  as  to  waste 
instead  of  develop  their  energies,  that  they 
may  fail  to  nourish  each  other,  and  that  they 
even  may  introduce  poison  into  each  other's 
life.  When  such  waste  or  perversion  of  power 
takes  place  in  the  realm  of  personality,  moral 
evil  arises.  Continuity  between  the  sinning 
personality  and  the  lives  of  other  men  and  of 
God  does  not  cease  to  exist,  but  it  becomes 
fraught  with  pain.  The  vital  issue  is  raised 
as  to  whether  it  shall  be  through  the  redemption 
of  the  sinning  personality  or  through  its  self- 
dissolution  that  the  higher  unity  of  the  kingdom 

of  God  is  attained. 

190 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

It  is  here  that  the  shadow  of  tragedy  falls 
most  darkly  upon  the  world.  Few  are  they 
for  whom  the  upward  pathway  does  not  some- 
times lead,  for  however  brief  a  moment,  along 
the  margin  of  the  abyss.  Still  fewer  are  those 
whose  memory  can  bring  back  no  time  when 
they  have  been  a  source  of  moral  injury  to  other 
lives — whether  because  of  deeds  done  or  moral 
support  withheld.  And  there  is  absolutely  no 
one  who  does  not  find  his  life  most  perplexingly 
bound  up  with  social  conditions  and  institu- 
tions that  are  working  disaster  to  the  lives  of 
multitudes.  It  therefore  is  a  strange  and 
hollow  sort  of  moral  rectitude  which  leaves  a 
man  without  a  deep  sense  of  kinship  with  his 
sinning  brother,  such  as  these  lines  of  Lowell 
contain : 


''  Looking  within  myself,  I  note  how  thin 

A  plank  of  station,  chance  or  prosperous  fate, 
Doth  fence  me   from  the  clutching  waves  of  sin;- 
In  my  own  heart  I  find  the  worst  man's  mate, 
And  see  not  dimly  the  smooth-hinged  gate 

That  opes  to  those  abysses 
Where  ye  grope  darkly, — ye  who  never  knew 
On  your  young  hearts  love's  consecrating  dew 
Or  felt  a  mother's  kisses, 

191 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

Or  home's  restraining  tendrils  round  you  curled; 
Ah,  side  by  side  with  heart's-ease  in  this  world 
The  fatal  night-shade  grows  and  bitter  rue!" 

And  when  we  add  to  this  the  recognition  that 
we  are  co-implicated  in  the  sin  of  others,  whether 
by  specific  deeds  or  because  we  inertly  tolerate 
social  wrong,  we  become  aware  that  the  stern- 
est and  most  haunting  sorrow  of  human  life  is 
couching  at  our  door.  We  see  that  this  problem 
of  moral  evil  is  the  deepest  problem  of  existence, 
on  the  successful  solution  of  which  the  worth 
of  the  universe  turns. 

But  now  we  should  note  that  as  we  have 
passed  from  the  view  of  moral  evil  presented 
by  absolute  idealism  to  the  more  realistic  con- 
ception of  it  which  is  characteristic  of  ethical 
monotheism,  a  change  of  emphasis  has  taken 
place  with  regard  to  the  central  issue  of  the 
problem  itself.  With  absolute  idealism  the 
prime  question  is,  why  is  evil  here  ?  how  may 
it  be  interpreted,  so  that  when  seen  in  its  full 
context  it  may  be  understood  as  a  part  of  a 
perfect  whole  ?  With  ethical  monotheism  the 
question  as  to  why  evil  is  here  drops  into  a  sec- 
ondary place,  and  the  prime  question  is,  how 

192 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

is  evil  to  be  overcome  ?  Ethical  monotheism 
is  concerned  not  so  much  with  the  '*  interpre- 
tation "  of  evil  as  with  its  elimination.  From 
this  point  of  view  the  ultimate  solution  of  the 
problem  will  be  religious  and  practical  rather 
than  primarily  intellectual.  It  will  consist  in 
the  actual  manifestation  of  a  power  adequate 
for  the  conquest  of  moral  evil,  and  in  the  increas- 
ing dominance  of  that  power  in  the  inner  life 
and  the  social  relations  of  men. 

The  problem  as  thus  practically  conceived 
finds  its  solution  in  the  principle  of  atonement 
embodied  in  the  Christian  revelation.  Let  us 
at  once  define  the  sense  in  which  the  con- 
ception "atonement'3  is  used  here.  The  term 
in  order  to  be  serviceable  to  us  must  be  di- 
vested of  the  associations  with  which  com- 
mercial and  penal  and  governmental  theories 
have  surrounded  it.  It  must  be  understood 
as  belonging  altogether  to  the  moral  realm. 
By  atonement,  then,  we  shall  mean  the  process 
of  recovering  the  sinful  personality  into  a  life 
with  God,  and  of  neutralizing  the  moral  wrong 
done  by  man  to  man,  through  the  power  of  self- 
sacrificing  love.  The  word  atonement  is  best 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

adapted  to  our  purpose,  in  spite  of  the  physical 
and  legal  meanings  so  long  given  to  it  and 
which  have  grown  so  hollow  to  modern  thought, 
because  it  best  suggests  the  injustice  that  all 
sin,  whether  inward  or  outward,  involves  toward 
other  men,  and  the  tremendous  cost  of  the 
moral  process  by  which  sin  is  overcome. 

Now  the  revelation  of  the  principle  of  atone- 
ment in  Jesus  Christ  involves  two  supreme 
insights,  through  which  our  most  adequate 
solution  of  the  problem  of  moral  evil  comes. 
The  first  of  these  is  that  the"  supreme  power  in 
the  universe  is  an  atoning  God.  The  atone- 
ment that  Christianity  really  teaches  us  to 
believe  in,  when  seen  in  its  full  dimensions, 
consists  of  a  principle  eternally  active  in  the 
nature  of  God.  The  conception  of  God  which 
the  New  Testament  presents  is  that  of  a  God 
who  always  is  striving  for  the  moral  recovery 
of  his  erring  children.  His  tenderness  and 
forbearance  toward  the  sinful  are  visible  in  the 
sunshine  and  rain  which  he  sends  upon  them 
as  upon  the  good.  His  forgiving  love  is  seen  in 
the  joy  with  which  he  welcomes  back  the 

wayward  son  who  is  no  more  worthy  of  the 

194 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

name.  He  is  the  shepherd  who  seeks  the 
lost  sheep  until  he  finds  it.  He  so  loved  the 
world  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son  that 
those  who  believe  might  not  perish.  He  was 
in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  unto  himself. 
No  adequate  appreciation  of  New  Testament 
thought  can  fail  to  emphasize  both  that  our  sin 
is  always  a  source  of  pain  to  God,  and  that  his 
efforts  to  reclaim  us  from  its  power  are  un- 
ceasing. 

In  just  such  a  failure,  however,  is  to  be  found 
one  of  the  gravest  mistakes  of  theology.  The 
tendency  of  theology  has  been  to  recognize 
atonement  not  only  supremely  but  exclusively 
in  Christ's  death  on  the  cross.  But  to  limit 
atonement  to  a  single  event  in  history,  however 
full  of  tragic  sublimity  we  may  know  that 
event  to  be,  is  to  narrow  its  power  and  to  rob 
the  faith  in  God's  Fatherhood  of  its  deepest 
meaning.  It  makes  the  relation  of  God  to 
man's  need  throughout  the  great  reaches  of 
history  far  too  negative.  It  represents  his 
forgiveness  as  a  merely  passive  attitude,  whereas 
it  really  is  an  active  and  seeking  force.  Just 
as  Jesus  was  not  content  with  declaring  to 

195 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

the  man  sick  of  palsy  that  his  sins  were  forgiven, 
but  went  on  to  make  the  evidence  of  forgive- 
ness as  full  and  effective  as  possible  by  healing 
him,  so  the  Heavenly  Father  cannot  be  con- 
tent to  wait  for  the  return  of  his  children  to 
himself,  but  unremittingly  surrounds  them  with 
the  influence  of  his  atoning  love.  Washing- 
ton's patriotism  was  not  a  matter  of  a  single 
campaign,  but  was  coextensive  with  his  coun- 
try's need.  It  kept  him  at  the  head  of  the 
Continental  army  through  all  its  sufferings 
and  defeats  and  desperate  victories,  and  brought 
him  back  after  the  war,  from  what  might  have 
been  deemed  a  well-earned  rest,  to  service  in 
the  presidency.  Can  atoning  love  be  a  less 
persistent  and  essentially  active  principle  in  the 
divine  nature  than  was  patriotism  in  Washing- 
ton, or  than  is  the  spirit  of  compassion  in  all 
the  great  servants  of  men  ? 

We  most  exalt  the  meaning  of  the  cross  of 
Christ  when  we  relate  it  most  closely  to  the 
eternal  activities  of  God.  If  we  understand 
Christ's  sacrifice  of  himself  to  be  the  supreme 
revelation  of  God's  heart,  which  is  eternally 

seeking  to  express  itself  to  our  understanding, 

196 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

then  indeed  we  can  regard  that  sacrifice  as  an 
event  of  cosmic  significance.  The  work  of 
Christ  is  not  merely  a  ( provision ':  for  the 
salvation  of  men;  it  is  rather  the  most  pure 
and  intense  embodiment  that  we  know  or  can 
imagine  of  the  work  that  the  Heavenly  Father 
cannot  cease  to  do  so  long  as  the  moral  need 
of  men  continues  to  move  him  with  compas- 
sion. 

This  thought  of  the  essential  saviourhood 
of  God  has  been  admirably  set  forth  by  Pro- 
fessor Stevens  in  his  'Christian  Doctrine  of 
Salvation 5;  in  an  important  chapter  on  'The 
Eternal  Atonement."  'To  me,"  wrote  Pro- 
fessor Stevens,  "the  words  'eternal  atonement' 
denote  the  dateless  passion  of  God  on  account 
of  sin;  they  mean  that  God  is,  by  his  very  nat- 
ure, a  sin-bearer — that  sin  grieves  and  wounds 
his  heart,  and  that  he  sorrows  and  suffers  in 
consequence  of  it.  It  results  from  the  divine 
love — alike  from  its  holiness  and  from  its 
sympathy — that  'in  all  our  afflictions  he  is 
afflicted/  Atonement  on  its  'Godward  side' 
is  a  name  for  the  grief  and  pain  inflicted  by 

sin  upon  the  paternal  heart  of  God.     Of  this 

197 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

divine  sorrow  for  sin  the  afflictions  of  Christ 
are  a  revelation.  In  the  bitter  grief  and 
anguish  which  he  experienced  on  account  of 
sin,  we  see  reflected  the  pain  and  sorrow  which 
sin  brings  to  the  divine  love.  Thus  Christ's 
work  is  grounded  in  an  eternal  fact — the  sin- 
bearing  and  suffering  of  God.  In  whatever 
sense  Christ  was  the  Representative  of  God 
so  that  in  him  men  see  the  Father,  in  whatever 
degree  he  was  the  interpreter  and  example  of 
the  divine  feeling  toward  sin,  in  that  sense  and 
degree  his  suffering  with  and  for  men  in  their 
sins  has  its  ground  in  the  vicarious  suffering  of 
the  eternal  Love/'8 

In  this  faith  that  atonement  is  an  eternal 
principle  in  the  nature  of  God  we  find  the  basis 
of  Christianity's  capacity  to  solve  the  problem 
of  moral  evil.  If  the  supreme  power  in  the 
universe  is  spending  its  energy  ceaselessly  to 
recover  men  from  their  sinfulness,  then  our 
human  struggle  with  sin  may  be  waged  with 
the  largest  hope,  and  we  may  believe  that  the 
might  of  moral  evil  in  the  world  is  being  pro- 
gressively overcome. 

But  we  now  must  turn  our  thought  to  the 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

other  great  insight  embodied  in  Jesus'  revela- 
tion of  the  principle  of  atonement.  It  is  that 
the  life  of  sonship  toward  God  involves  for 
us  an  active  participation  in  his  atoning  work. 
The  son  must  share  the  spirit  of  the  Father. 
The  filial  life  must  be  animated  by  the  same 
great  motives  and  dedicated  to  the  same  pro- 
found spiritual  tasks  as  is  the  Father's  life. 
Just  as  no  one  is  fully  a  member  of  a  home  who 
does  not  actively  share  to  the  extent  of  his 
capacity  in  promoting  the  interests  of  the  home, 
so  no  one  is  fully  a  member  of  the  family  of 
God  who  does  not  seek  to  live  for  the  same 
great  ends  for  which  the  Father  lives.  But  no 
motive  lies  deeper  in  the  heart  of  God  than 
the  atoning  love  by  which  he  seeks  to  recover 
his  erring  children.  Hence  in  this  atoning 
love  we  too  must  actively  share.  It  must  fill 
our  hearts  with  its  glow  and  go  forth  from  us 
as  an  effective  influence  for  the  healing  and 
quickening  of  the  lives  of  other  men. 

Here  again  theology  has  failed  for  the  most 
part  in  setting  forth  the  full  meaning  of  the 
Christian  faith  in  atonement.  And  this  failure 

has  been  due  largely  to  the  artificial  separation 

199 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

made  between  our  sonship  and  the  sonship  of 
Christ.  The  motive  for  such  a  separation, 
to  be  sure,  was  most  justifiable  and  important. 
It  consisted  in  the  desire  to  exalt  the  supremacy 
of  Christ  over  human  life.  But  the  means  em- 
ployed were  such  as  to  defeat  the  end  aimed 
at.  To  seek  to  exalt  Christ  by  making  an 
artificial  separation  between  his  sonship  and 
ours  tends  to  diminish  his  practical  power 
over  our  lives.9  In  other  words  his  real  suprem- 
acy is  sacrificed  to  a  nominal  one.  In  the  polit- 
ical sphere  it  used  to  be  assumed  that  the  man 
who  was  to  rule  over  his  fellowmen  must  be 
derived  from  a  special  strain  of  blood.  Such 
men  were  thought  to  have  a  nobler  kind  of 
humanity  in  them  and  so  to  be  fitted  for  sov- 
ereignty. Such  ideas  are  now  obsolete  among 
us.  The  one  who  is  deemed  worthy  of  author- 
ity is  the  one  who  has  shown  the  largest  capacity 
for  service.  The  man  who  by  breadth  of 
intellect,  purity  of  character,  and  force  of  will 
has  accomplished  things  far  beyond  the  power 
of  others,  and  who  has  been  able  to  lead  his 
fellowmen  on  to  achievements  such  as  by 
themselves  they  never  could  have  attained- 


200 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

this  is  the  man  whom  we  recognize  as  possessing 
the  largest  amount  of  humanity,  and  to  whom 
we  gladly  accord  political  sovereignty.  So  it 
is  in  the  spiritual  realm.  Divinity  belongs  to 
him  who  rendered  to  the  world  an  unexampled 
divine  service  and  whose  power  to  engender 
in  other  men  the  godlike  life  knows  no  limit. 
In  this  way,  and  not  by  artificial  barriers  between 
us  and  Christ,  we  may  approach  to  an  under- 
standing of  his  sonship,  which  yet  will  disclose 
to  us  ever  new  vistas  of  meaning  as  our  fellow- 
ship with  him  grows  intimate. 

But  the  artificial  separation  between  Christ's 
sonship  and  ours  has  led  men  to  think  of  atone- 
ment as  exclusively  his  work,  and  has  obscured 
to  their  vision  the  idea  of  our  participation  in 
that  work.  It  has  made  men  forget  that  Christ 
accomplishes  his  atonement  for  each  one  of 
us  only  as  he  implants  his  spirit  in  us.  The 
atoning  work  of  Christ's  life  and  death  were 
indeed  sufficient,  in  the  sense  that  they  re- 
vealed as  nothing  else  could  the  depths  of  the 
divine  love.  But  how  fatal  to  translate  this 
sufficiency  into  something  that  tends  to  hinder 

the    full    current    of   that    love    from    flowing 

201 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

through  the  broad  channels  of  Christian  dis- 
cipleship  to  a  world  in  need! 

There  is  another  artificial  separation  made  by 
theology  which  has  beclouded  the  insight  we 
are  seeking  to  set  forth.  It  consists  in  the  fact 
that  Christ's  sonship  and  his  atoning  work 
have  been  left  unrelated  to  each  other  in  his  own 
life.  His  sonship  has  been  regarded  as  official, 
and  so  has  not  been  thought  of  as  essentially 
connected  with  the  work  which  he  did  for  men. 
Here  again  theology  has  put  asunder  what  God 
joined  together.  It  has  failed  to  see  that  for 
Jesus  sonship  meant  his  consciousness  of  union 
with  God  as  it  was  realized  in  and  through 
his  service  of  his  fellowmen  and  his  sacrifice 
for  them.  His  sonship  was  inseparable  from 
his  living  incorporation  into  human  deeds 
of  those  depths  of  atoning  love  which  he  knew 
filled  the  heart  of  God.  His  sense  of  unreserved 
dedication  to  the  Father's  work,  his  absolute 
concentration  of  spirit  upon  doing  the  Father's 
will,  his  living  union  with  the  Father — these 
are  our  best  means  of  interpreting  his  conscious- 
ness of  being  the  well-beloved  Son.  This  in- 
deed has  been  perceived  and  powerfully  set 

202 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

forth  by  the  Ritschlians,  who  have  insisted 
that  Jesus*  sonship  should  not  be  separated  from 
his  fidelity  to  the  vocation  given  him  by  the 
Father.  But  for  average  theological  thinking 
the  separation  still  exists.  And  its  effect  has 
been  to  obscure  the  full  practical  meaning  of 
the  principle  of  atonement  as  it  was  embodied 
in  the  life  and  sacrifice  of  Christ.  We  have 
failed  to  see  that  Christ's  atoning  work  has  in- 
terpreted the  filial  life  for  us  all.  We  enter  into 
fulness  of  sonship  toward  God  in  proportion  as 
we  actively  express,  according  to  the  range  of 
our  influence,  his  spirit  of  healing  and  redeem- 
ing love.  Many  and  many  a  disciple  of  our 
Lord  indeed  has  risen  to  these  higher  levels  of 
the  filial  life,  but  the  full  meaning  and  worth 
of  what  they  experienced  and  accomplished  has 
been  hidden  from  the  rank  and  file  of  Chris- 
tians by  the  limitations  in  current  theology 
which  we  have  just  noted. 

The  early  church  possessed  this  practical 
meaning  of  the  atoning  principle  to  a  greater 
degree  than  have  later  times.  The  apostles 
were  not  only  witnesses  and  ambassadors,  but 

men   conscious   of  being   filled   with    the   very 

203 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

Spirit  of  God  that  was  in  Christ.  They  came 
at  last  to  the  point,  even  as  Jesus  foretold,  where 
they  were  able  to  drink  the  cup  that  he  drank 
and  to  be  baptized  with  the  baptism  that  he  was 
baptized  with.  Paul  bore  about  in  his  body 
the  marks  of  the  Lord  Jesus,  and  strove  to 
know  the  fellowship  of  his  sufferings,  and  to 
fill  up  that  which  was  behind  of  the  afflictions 
of  Christ.  The  apostolic  consciousness  of  be- 
ing children  of  God  did  not  mean  exemption 
from  the  more  tragic  side  of  Christ's  experience 
and  service.  On  the  contrary  it  affirmed  that 
we  are  joint-heirs  with  Christ,  "if  so  be  that  we 
suffer  with  him,  that  we  may  be  also  glorified 
with  him/5 

But  the  full  significance  of  faith  in  the  atoning 
God  and  in  the  capacity  of  the  filial  life  for  shar- 
ing in  the  work  of  atonement  becomes  evident 
only  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  twofold  char- 
acter of  moral  evil,  and  definitely  apply  our  faith 
to  both  aspects.  Moral  evil  always  taints  the 
life  of  the  doer,  and  also  wrongs  the  lives  of 
others.  A  conception  of  atonement  that  bears 
on  only  one  of  these  aspects  is  incomplete. 

Perhaps  our   modern    ethical   theories,   viewed 

204 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

from  this  stand-point,  have  not  escaped  a  certain 
one-sidedness.  Let  us  endeavor  to  relate  our 
thought  to  both  of  these  aspects  of  moral  evil. 
And,  first,  the  taint  that  is  left  in  the  doer  of 
evil.  It  manifests  itself  at  times  even  in  the 
most  well-ordered  life.  A  feverishness  in  the 
blood,  an  arrogance  and  brittleness  of  temper, 
a  narrowed  and  clouded  vision,  a  dull  and 
heavy  egoism  settling  down  upon  the  soul,  a 
will  strong  only  in  impatience,  and  fretful  and 
futile  in  its  moral  endeavor — such  are  some  of 
the  symptoms  which  show  that  the  debilitating 
effects  of  sin  are  at  work  in  a  life  that  for  the 
most  part  is  exemplary  in  its  conduct.  Again 
we  find  moral  evil  producing  a  thorough  cor- 
ruption of  the  entire  personality — perverting  its 
instincts,  exhausting  its  powers,  debasing  all 
natural  possibilities  of  good.  The  first  signs 
of  this  moral  taint  may  be  merely  a  frivolous 
use  of  personal  capacities,  or  they  may  consist 
in  a  cold  self-regard,  or  a  sinister  blending  of 
passion  with  the  spirit  of  calculation.  The 
results  of  its  working  may  be  subtle  and  obscure, 
or  shockingly  swift  and  violent.  But  however 

varied  the  symptoms  of  the  immoral  in  men's 

205 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

characters,  they  all  betoken  that  some  baleful 
influence  has  invaded  the  organic  life  of  the 
personality,  so  that  none  of  its  activities  has 
its  normal  value  and  power. 

To  human  lives  thus  tainted  or  corrupted 
Christianity  comes  with  its  principle  of  atone- 
ment. The  secret  of  this  principle  lies  in  the 
health-giving  power  of  the  spiritual  personality. 
When  the  springs  of  our  life  have  become 
contaminated,  our  true  resource  is  to  flood 
them  from  the  purer  springs  above  us.  When 
our  spiritual  organism  has  become  infected 
with  some  form  of  sinfulness,  we  need  to  be 
removed  to  an  atmosphere  in  which  the  seeds 
of  the  disease  cannot  live.  But  such  curative 
and  revivifying  influences  in  the  moral  realm 
are  the  property  of  the  spiritual  personality. 
It  is  through  the  healing  of  a  holy  companion- 
ship that  the  will  is  made  sound,  the  heart 
purified  and  deepened,  and  the  moral  vision  re- 
stored to  clearness.  Moral  strength  is  born  of 
moral  fellowship.  The  power  that,  after  sin  has 
done  its  debilitating  work,  can  set  the  currents 
of  spiritual  life  flowing  strongly  in  us  once  more 

is  the  influence  of  another  personality  in  which 

206 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

strength  and  tenderness,  pure  spiritual  vision 
and  knowledge  of  human  weakness,  unfailing 
energy  in  moral  endeavor  and  profound  patience, 
are  intimately  blended. 

Both  of  the  insights  which  enter  into  the 
Christian  principle  of  atonement  are  indis- 
pensable here.  The  full  and  adequate  means  of 
moral  renewal  is  the  faith  in  the  reality  and 
forgiving  love  of  the  Heavenly  Father.  The 
symphony  of  man's  spiritual  redemption  is 
our  Lord's  parable  of  the  father's  unquench- 
able yearning  for  his  grievously  sinful  son  in 
the  fifteenth  chapter  of  Luke.  This  parable 
preserves  to  us  Jesus'  deepest  interpretation  of 
human  experience.  Through  all  the  outward 
aspect  of  the  world  and  of  life — in  sunshine  and 
rain,  in  the  clothing  of  flowers  and  the  feeding 
of  birds,  in  the  tranquil  starlit  night  and  the 
violent  tempest,  in  the  toil  of  men  and  the  un- 
conscious grace  of  children— in  every  phase 
of  human  experience  Jesus  perceived  the 
revealing  of  the  Father's  infinite  compassion. 
To  bring  men  to  a  living  perception  of  this 
momentous  truth  was  the  underlying  motive 

of  his  ministry.     That  God's  atoning  love  is 

207 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

constantly  going  forth  for  man's  recovery,  with 
striving  and  suffering  and  exhaustless  patience, 
never  forsaking  us  in  all  our  waywardness  and 
sin,  and  that  God's  companionship  is  always 
open  to  those  who  will  turn  to  him  in  faith — 
that  is  the  fundamental  message  of  Christ's 
gospel  to  the  world  in  its  moral  need. 

But  in  the  atoning  work  by  which  we  are 
brought  back  from  sinfulness  to  moral  health 
the  children  of  God  also  bear  a  part.  They 
supply  something  of  that  spiritual  fellowship 
through  which  the  sick  soul  is  to  be  restored 
to  vigor  again.  Who  of  us  is  there  who  has 
not  received  from  some  high-minded  and  strong- 
hearted  friend  that  ministry  of  moral  healing 
which  is  of  the  very  essence  of  atonement? 
Can  we  not  perceive  in  the  fidelity  of  such  a 
friend  a  manifestation  of  the  grace  of  our  Lord 
and  Saviour,  Jesus  Christ?  Must  we  not 
recognize  that  the  spirit  of  sonship  in  a  man 
endows  him  with  the  privilege  and  power  of 
sharing  in  the  redemptive  labors  of  God  ? 
So  indeed  does  the  leaven  of  the  divine  Spirit 
work;  the  sodden  and  sinful  life  becomes  per- 
meated with  vital  power  again,  because  men 

208 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

in  whom  the  atoning  grace  of  God  dwells  trans- 
mit to  it  what  they  in  turn  have  received. 

The  experience  of  the  Christian  consciousness 
is  that  the  power  to  remove  the  taint  of  sin 
flows  supremely  from  Christ.  But  this  by  no 
means  conflicts  with  the  two  great  insights 
which  have  been  set  forth  as  the  essence  of  the 
principle  of  atonement.  On  the  contrary  the 
supremacy  of  Christ's  redemptive  power  is  based 
on  the  fact  that  the  principle  of  atonement  has 
this  twofold  character.  Christ's  life  of  sacrifice 
has  its  meaning  for  us  as  the  clear  and  pro- 
found expression  of  what  is  eternally  in  the 
heart  of  God.  His  life  and  death  inevitably 
lose  in  vital  power  with  us,  if  we  recognize  no 
eternal  atonement.  And  on  the  other  hand  the 
climax  of  his  redemptive  mission  in  each  of  us 
is  reached  only  as  we  in  turn  participate  to  the 
full  extent  of  our  capacity  in  a  like  work  for 
others.  Thus  the  adequacy  of  Christ's  princi- 
ple of  atonement  appears  in  the  very  fact  that 
it  brings  to  bear  all  the  spiritual  forces  of  the 
universe  upon  the  problem  of  moral  evil. 

But  the  principle  of  atonement,  if  it  is  to 

meet  the  deepest  needs  of  our  age,  must  have 

209 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

its  bearing  not  only  on  the  taint  that  pervades 
the  life  of  the  one  who  does  wrong  but  also  upon 
the  moral  injuries  caused  to  those  who  are 
wronged.  It  is  a  weakly  sentimental  and  mor- 
bid kind  of  religion  that  calls  upon  a  man  to 
mourn  over  the  guilt  which  his  sin  brings  upon 
himself  but  at  the  same  time  allows  him  to 
forget  the  moral  injury  that  it  causes  others. 
Our  modern  ethical  sense  revolts  at  such 
ignoble  futility.  A  religion  which  merely  con- 
soles us  for  the  wrongs  we  have  done  is  a 
menace  to  moral  progress.  It  is  dangerous 
simply  to  deodorize  what  requires  to  be  disin- 
fected. Have  we  injured  the  soul  of  another  ? 
Have  we  been  coolly  indifferent  to  the  moral 
emergency  of  our  neighbor,  or  failed  to  stand 
by  a  friend  in  the  hour  of  his  direst  need  ? 
Then  our  first  thought  should  be,  not  how  we 
may  get  relief  from  the  memory  that  afterwards 
haunts  us,  but  how  those  wounds  of  our  in- 
flicting are  to  be  healed,  and  how  the  spiritual 
pain  that  we  justly  suffer  is  to  be  turned  to 
account  as  a  moral  force. 

Nor   is   the   sphere   of  specific   personal   re- 
sponsibility  the   only   one   where   the    modern 

210 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

conscience  feels  that  moral  injuries  call  for 
atonement.  Our  political,  industrial,  and  so- 
cial institutions,  beneficent  though  they  may 
be  shown  to  be  in  a  large  measure,  neverthe- 
less have  ghastly  by-products  of  moral  injury 
which  sometimes  assume  enormous  proportions. 
Children  stunted  by  premature  toil,  women 
debilitated  by  cruel  conditions  of  work,  laboring 
men  embittered  by  the  ruthless  exploitation 
of  their  labor,  business  men  who  are  forced  to 
choose  between  cheapening  their  honor  and 
ruining  their  fortunes,  young  men  and  women 
with  absolutely  no  chance  to  know  what  man- 
hood and  womanhood  mean — has  the  Christian 
principle  of  atonement  no  bearing  upon  such 
moral  sufferers  as  these  ?  And  if  it  has  none, 
can  we  possibly  sustain  the  claim  that  the  prob- 
lem of  moral  evil  is  to  find  its  solution  through 
the  Christian  religion  ? 

If  it  is  true  that  the  church  has  had  no  clear, 
definite  response  to  make  to  the  appeal  of  the 
morally  wronged,  the  fault  lies  with  our  theology, 
or  with  the  practice  of  our  faith,  and  not  with 
the  original  significance  of  the  Christian  gospel. 
Nothing  more  deeply  stirred  the  heart  of  Jesus, 


211 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

or  more  quickly  set  in  motion  the  mighty  moral 
forces  of  his  nature,  than  the  needs  of  those 
who  were  the  victims  of  other  men's  sinf  Iness. 
At  the  beginning  of  his  ministry  in  Nazareth 
he  characterizes  his  mission  in  those  words 
quoted  from  ancient  prophecy:  'He  hath  sent 
me  to  proclaim  release  to  the  captives,  .  .  . 
to  set  at  liberty  them  that  are  bruised/3  The 
multitudes  of  his  people  moved  him  to  com- 
passion, because  they  were  'as  sheep  having 
no  shepherd/3  His  sternest  condemnation  was 
pronounced  upon  those  who  caused  their  weaker 
fellowmen  to  stumble,  and  who  bound  burdens 
upon  them  too  grievous  to  be  borne.  Surely 
Jesus'  gospel  was  shaped  originally  to  meet  the 
needs  of  those  who  are  morally  maimed  by  the 
indifference,  frivolity,  recklessness,  and  cruelty 
of  other  men. 

And  when  we  conceive  the  principle  of  atone- 
ment in  its  full  compass,  as  we  already  have 
endeavored  to  do,  then  we  are  in  a  position 
to  see  how  directly  the  Christian  gospel  applies 
to  just  this  aspect  of  the  moral  problem.  The 
hope  that  the  effects  of  the  moral  injury  wrought 
among  men  will  be  overcome  rests  upon  the 


212 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

twofold  character  of  the  Christian  principle  of 
atonement.  The  law  that  sonship  toward 
Goc1  includes  man's  participation  in  the  work 
of  atonement  is  of  the  utmost  moment  here. 
Just  as  American  slavery  required  the  sacrifices 
of  the  Civil  War,  just  as  the  Opium  War  has 
added  urgency  to  the  missionary's  call  to  China, 
just  as  Spain's  misrule  made  morally  necessary 
Colonel  Waring's  work  in  cleansing  Havana  of 
the  yellow  fever  at  the  cost  of  his  life,  so  wherever 
greed,  oppression,  neglect  of  duty,  or  the  wanton 
pursuit  of  pleasure  and  power  are  making  the 
conditions  of  life  cruel  and  moral  development 
impossible,  there  is  need  of  atoning  work  by 
the  followers  of  Christ.  He  who  claims  God  as 
his  Father  and  Jesus  as  his  Saviour  is  thereby 
enlisted  in  the  cause  of  redressing  the  spiritual 
injuries  of  mankind.  The  Christian  is  under 
bonds  to  grapple  with  the  m@ral  evil  in  the  world, 
not  only  in.  its  individual  forms,  but  as  it  is 
intrenched  in  our  social  institutions,  and  to  do 
his  uttermost  toward  driving  it  from  the  field. 
He  is  bound  to  take  up  the  cause  of  the  wronged 
all  over  this  world,  and  to  endeavor  in  the 

strength    of   Christ's    spirit    to    do    something 

213 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN   PROBLEMS 

toward  atoning  to  these  moral  sufferers  for 
the  injuries  inflicted  upon  them  by  their  fellow- 
men. 

But  this  work  of  atoning  for  the  moral  wrong 
that  men  have  suffered  is  far  from  a  merely 
human  work.  Our  Heavenly  Father  effects 
the  same  end  by  methods  vaster  and  subtler 
than  we  are  able  to  command  or  even  to  com- 
prehend. The  mighty  processes  of  nature  are 
gently  remedial  in  their  influence  upon  man's 
life,  and  infinitely  more  faithful  than  are  any 
human  ministrations.  The  recuperative  powers 
within  the  soul  itself  are  constantly  replenished 
from  the  life  of  God.  And  where  human  wills 
become  effective  as  a  means  of  atonement,  it 
is  because  they  have  been  brought  into  accord 
with  the  divine  purpose,  and  have  been  taken 
up  into  the  highest  activities  of  God's  life. 
Our  entire  human  striving  for  the  conquest  of 
the  effects  of  moral  evil  ultimately  derives  its 
efficiency  from  the  reality  and  power  of  the 
atoning  God. 

It  should  not  be  supposed  that  the  two  as- 
pects of  the  problem  of  moral  evil  which  we 

have  been  considering  are  found  entirely  sep- 

214 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

arate  from  each  other  among  men.  On  the 
contrary  it  is  doubtless  true  that  the  maimed 
life  is  to  some  extent  morally  tainted,  and  that 
the  most  morally  corrupt  life  is  such  in  part  by 
reason  of  injuries  wrought  by  other  men.  Yet 
it  remains  a  fact  that  the  outstanding  features 
of  any  moral  problem  are  now  mainly  of  the 
one  sort  and  again  mainly  of  the  other,  and  that 
the  Christian  principle  of  atonement  can  be 
applied  in  its  full  range  and  power  only  as 
the  essential  distinction  between  the  two  chief 
aspects  of  moral  evil  is  preserved.  When  the 
problem  itself  is  fully  grasped,  and  when  atone- 
ment is  more  widely  perceived  to  be  both  an 
eternal  principle  in  the  nature  of  God  and  a 
principle  of  life  that  should  be  manifest  in  every 
child  of  God,  then  the  conquest  of  moral  evil 
will  go  forward  with  new  vigor  and  effectiveness. 
Let  me  urge  upon  the  students  of  this  school  of 
theology  the  task  of  clarifying,  broadening,  and 
deepening  the  conception  of  atonement  in  the 
church  to-day,  so  that  this  great  doctrine  of  our 
faith  shall  not  become  like  a  tattered  battle-flag 
in  a  hall  of  honor — something  under  which  men 
once  sacrificed  their  lives,  but  to  which  now  they 

215 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

simply  lift  their  hats — but  shall  be  still  the 
actual  rallying-point  for  our  spiritual  forces, 
the  inspiring  emblem  that  leads  men  on  toward 
the  subdual  of  moral  evil  and  the  consequent 
triumph  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 

The  principal  features  of  the  Christian  solution 
of  the  problem  of  moral  evil  are  now  before  us. 
Let  us  recall  in  a  summary  way  what  they 
are.  In  the  first  place  Christian  thought 
presupposes  that  moral  evil  is  to  be  progres- 
sively eliminated  from  the  universe.  This 
thought,  though  impossible  on  the  basis  of  the 
rigid  monism  of  the  absolute  idealist,  we  found 
to  be  in  accord  with  the  principles  of  ethical 
monotheism  as  previously  developed.  With 
regard  to  the  origin  of  moral  evil  no  complete 
explanation  has  been  offered,  since  a  complete 
explanation  of  that  which  is  essentially  irra- 
tional is  not  to  be  hoped  for.  But  it  was  shown 
that  the  possibility  of  moral  evil  seems  to  be 
inseparable  from  those  processes  of  growth  by 
which  the  kingdom  of  God  is  coming  to  pass. 
But  with  Christianity  the  prime  question  is  not 
how  evil  originated,  nor  how  it  may  be  "inter- 
preted," but  how  it  can  be  overcome  and  anni- 

216 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

hilated.  This  question  finds  its  answer  in  the 
principle  of  atonement  embodied  in  the  life  and 
death  of  Jesus  Christ.  Two  great  insights  are 
involved  in  this  principle:  first,  that  atone- 
ment is  inherent  and  eternally  active  in  the 
nature  of  God,  and  second,  that  man's  filial 
life  with  God  involves  his  active  sharing  in 
God's  atoning  work.  As  for  Christ's  relation 
to  the  principle  of  atonement,  it  can  be  only 
magnified  by  giving  that  principle  the  widest 
possible  range.  Finally  the  significance  of  atone- 
ment appears  most  fully  when  it  is  applied  to 
both  of  the  two  great  aspects  of  moral  evil. 
Applied  to  the  taint  or  corruption  in  the  doer 
of  moral  evil,  atonement  works  through  the 
health-giving  power  of  spiritual  companion- 
ship, divine  and  human.  Applied  to  the  moral 
injuries  inflicted  on  other  men,  atonement  means 
the  bringing  to  bear  of  the  spiritual  forces  of 
the  universe  on  the  task  of  neutralizing  the 
effects  of  such  injuries  and  of  subduing  the 
agencies  that  caused  them. 

As  we  bring  our  study  to  a  close  we  should 
not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  solution  of  the 

problem  of  moral  evil  to  which  we  have  been 

217 


THEOLOGY  AND  HUMAN  PROBLEMS 

led  is  essentially  practical  in  its  nature.  This 
means  not  only  that  the  solution  in  the  end  has 
to  be  put  into  practice,  but  also  that  the  final 
evidence  of  its  adequacy  comes  only  as  we  adopt 
it  in  faith  and  actually  experience  its  power  in 
our  inner  life  and  our  social  service.  When  this 
is  done  we  become  aware  that  the  deepest  ex- 
perience of  the  Eternal  comes  to  pass  through 
the  workings  of  atonement  in  and  through  our 
lives.  To  this  truth  the  greatest  prophets  of 
our  faith  bear  witness  from  Hosea  to  the  present 
time.  To  some  minds  the  temptation  to  con- 
vert this  practical  solution  into  a  complete 
theoretical  solution  always  will  be  alluring. 
A  scheme  of  things  in  which  every  single  fact 
of  experience  is  represented  as  a  matter  of 
rational  necessity  certainly  has  its  attractions. 
But  we  have  had  ample  evidence  that  efforts  in 
this  direction  are  fraught  with  danger  and  are 
futile  in  the  end.  It  really  should  commend  the 
conclusions  to  which  we  have  been  led  that  they 
do  not  attempt,  in  advance  of  the  actual  experi- 
ments of  life,  to  clear  up  every  mystery  con- 
nected with  the  problems  with  which  they 

deal.     Above  all  with    regard  to  moral   evil  it 

218 


MORAL  DEPTHS  AND  HEIGHTS 

is  enough  for  us  to  know  by  inward  experience 
that,  however  it  comes  into  the  world,  it  will  not 
ultimately  defeat  the  purpose  of  God.  In  spite 
of  it,  and  by  the  very  conquest  of  it,  that  new 
and  higher  unity  of  spiritual  life  which  consti- 
tutes God's  kingdom  is  in  process  of  realization. 
For  we  are  persuaded  "that  neither  death,  nor 
life,  nor  angels,  nor  principalities,  nor  powers, 
nor  things  present,  nor  things  to  come,  nor 
height,  nor  depth,  nor  any  other  creature,  shall 
be  able  to  separate  us  from  the  love  of  God, 
which  is  in  Christ  Jesus  our  Lord." 


219 


NOTES 


Note  i,  page  13. — Conception  of  God,  p.  353;  also  315  ft. 
and  347,  348.  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  I,  420  ft., 
vol.  II,  pp.  122  ff.;  142;  227,  228;  231-233. 

Note  2,  page  15.— Professor  Royce  in  his  Conception  of 
God  gives  a  marvellously  concise  statement  of  the  argument 
for  absolute  idealism,  which  he  has  fully  elaborated  in  his 
great  work,  The  World  and  the  Individual.  For  a  good 
sketch  of  the  same  process  of  reasoning  see  Blewett's  The 
Study  of  Nature  and  the  Vision  of  God,  pp.  64-79  (Toronto, 
Briggs,  1907). 

Note  3,  page  20. — The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  I, 
pp.  440-441.  While  in  this  passage  Professor  Royce  main- 
tains that  both  God's  will  and  our  finite  wills  get  "expressed" 
in  the  world,  he  limits  the  idea  of  efficiency  to  finite  beings. 

Note  4,  page  20. — To  this  point  it  might  be  objected  that 
if  we  think  of  God  as  an  actor  in  history  whose  deeds  count 
in  addition  to  our  deeds,  we  are  implicitly  employing  the 
idea  of  miraculous  intervention.  But  this  is  not  necessarily 
the  case,  except  in  the  most  attenuated  sense  of  the  term 
miraculous.  God  may  work  through  finite  consciousnesses, 
which  he  inspires.  (Compare  on  this  point  James's  Will  to 
Believe,  page  184  and  foot-note.)  But  as  Royce  rightly 
teaches,  if  God  be  not  a  reality  in  time,  the  idea  of  efficiency 
does  not  apply  to  him. 

Note  5,  page  20. — A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  40,  114 
et  passim. 

Note  6,  page  20. — See  especially  the  chapter  entitled  "The 
Temporal  and  the  Eternal." 

221 


NOTES 

Note  7,  page  22. — The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  I, 

PP-  348-349. 

Note  8,  page  26. — For  students  who  read  only  English, 

Kant's  three  Critiques  and  his  Prolegomena  are  available  in 
translation:  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  translated  by 
Max  Miiller;  The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  translated 
by  Abbott  (Longmans);  The  Kritik  of  Judgment,  translated 
by  Bernard;  Kant's  Prolegomena  to  Any  Future  Metaphysic, 
translated  by  Mahaffy  and  Bernard.  Selections  from  Kant, 
by  John  Watson,  forms  the  best  introduction  to  the  study  of 
Kant  for  the  English  student.  For  an  excellent  brief  in- 
terpretation of  Kant's  philosophy  see  Hoffding's  History 
of  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.  II.  All  of  the  foregoing  works 
except  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  are  published  by 
Macmillan. 

Note  9,  page  29. — Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Vorrede  zur 
zweiten  Ausgabe,  p.  xxx.  See  Watson's  Selections,  p.  6. 

Note  10,  page  29. — See  The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason 
(cited  under  note  8)  and  Watson's  Selections,  beginning  p. 
261. 

Note  u,  page  30. — For  passages  in  the  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vernunft  in  which  Kant  takes  this  position  see  the  second 
German  edition,  pp.  772,  773;  832,  833;  838,  839;  and  the 
section  "  Vom  Meinen,  Wissen  und  Glauben,"  pp.  848  ft. 

Note  12,  page  30. — Prolegomena  (English  translation, 
referred  to  under  note  8),  pp.  125,  128;  compare  the  closing 
sections  of  the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  and  the  Critique 
of  Judgment. 

Note  13,  page  33. — Some  of  the  principal  works  in  the 
field  of  systematic  theology  by  members  of  the  Ritschlian 
school,  which  may  be  read  in  translation,  are:  the  third 
volume  of  Ritschl's  great  work  on  Justification  and  Recon- 
ciliation, and  Kaftan's  The  Truth  of  the  Christian  Religion, 
both  published  by  T.  &  T.  Clark;  Herrmann's  Communion 
with  God  (Putnam).  A  translation  of  Ritschl's  Unterricht 
in  der  christlichen  Religion  may  be  found  in  Swing's  Theology 
of  Albrecht  Ritschl.  Lobstein's  An  Introduction  to  Protestant 

222 


NOTES 

Dogmatics  (University  of  Chicago  Press)  forms  a  good  intro- 
duction to  Ritschlian  thought.  The  best  treatise  in  English 
on  the  work  of  this  school  is  Garvie's  The  Ritschlian  Theology 
(T.  &  T.  Clark).  A  good  sketch  and  estimate  of  Ritschlian- 
ism  may  be  found  in  W.  A.  Brown's  The  Essence  of  Christian- 
ity (Scribner). 

Note  14,  page  34. — The  best  treatment  of  the  Ritschlian 
conception  of  "value-judgments"  is  Reischle's  Werturteile  und 
Glaubensurteile,  Halle,  1900.  See  also  W.  A.  Brown,  Es- 
sence of  Christianity,  pp.  254  ft. 

Note  15,  page  41. — Some  of  the  works  by  the  recognized 
leaders  of  the  pragmatic  school  of  thought,  which  either 
expound  the  doctrine  itself  or  embody  its  principles,  may 
be  mentioned  here:  by  William  James,  The  Will  to  Be- 
lieve, Pragmatism,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  The  Meaning  of 
Truth  (all  published  by  Longmans);  by  Dewey,  Studies  in 
Logical  Theory  (University  of  Chicago  Press);  by  Schiller, 
Humanism,  and  Studies  in  Humanism  (Macmillan).  Hoff- 
ding's  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  and  The  Philosophy  of 
Religion  (both  published  in  their  English  translation  by 
Macmillan),  deserve  to  be  studied  equally  with  the  foregoing 
works.  The  writer  is  in  full  accord  with  the  pragmatists, 
although  his  doctrines  apparently  were  worked  out  apart 
from  the  direct  influence  of  the  pragmatic  school.  A  valua- 
ble article  by  McGiffert  on  "The  Pragmatism  of  Kant"  in  the 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods 
serves  to  emphasize  the  naturalness  of  the  transition  from 
the  highway  of  the  critical  philosophy  to  the  highway  of 
pragmatism. 

Note  16,  page  43. — W.  James,  Psychology,  vol.  II,  chap. 

22. 

Note  17,  page  45. — W.  James,  Pragmatism,  lectures  II  and 
VI;  Dewey,  "The  Control  of  Ideas  by  Facts,"  The  Journal 
of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods,  vol.  IV, 
pp.  197  ff.,  253  ft.,  309  ft. 

Note  18,  page  47. — Schiller,  "Axioms  as  Postulates."  in 
Personal  Idealism,  edited  by  Sturt  (Macmillan). 

223 


NOTES 

Note  19,  page  49. — For  a  defence  of  empirical  metaphysics 
from  the  stand-point  of  the  theologian  see  Theologie  und  Meta- 
physik,  by  Wobbermin,  whose  general  affiliations  are  with  the 
Ritschlian  school;  his  later  book,  Der  christliche  Gottesglaube 
in  seinem  Verh'dltnis  zur  heutigen  Philosophic  und  Natur- 
wissenschajt,  exemplifies  the  method  of  empirical  metaphysics 
applied  to  questions  in  the  philosophy  of  religion.  Compare 
Knox's  Taylor  lectures  for  1903,  The  Direct  and  Funda- 
mental Proofs  oj  the  Christian  Religion  (Scribner),  p.  40. 

For  the  value  of  practical  attitudes  in  the  discovery  of 
truth  see  James's  Will  to  Believe,  especially  the  first  three 
essays. 

Note  20,  page  51. — A  position  similar  to  that  of  the  prag- 
matists  on  this  point  is  that  of  Sigwart;  see  his  Logik,  vol.  II, 
pp.  19-23.  Compare  Aikins,  The  Principles  oj  Logic,  pp. 

423-425- 

Note  21,  page  54. — Professor  James  has  done  much  toward 

showing  how  from  the  pragmatic  point  of  view  we  may  think 
of  God  as  being  immanent  in  history  by  his  chapter  on 
"The  Compounding  of  Consciousness"  in  his  Pluralistic 
Universe. 

Note  22,  page  54. — Dewey,  "The  Evolutionary  Method  as 
Applied  to  Morality,"  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  XI,  pp. 
107  ff.  and  353  ft.  See  also  my  article  on  "The  Influence  of 
Pragmatism  Upon  the  Status  of  Theology"  in  the  Garman 
commemorative  volume,  entitled  Studies  in  Philosophy  and 
Psychology  (Houghton,  Mifflin,  1906). 

Note  23,  page  55. — Troeltsch,  Die  Absolutheit  des  Christen- 
tums  und  die  Religions geschichte. 

II 

Note  i,  page  67. — Imitation  of  Christ,  book  III,  chap.  24. 
Note  2,  page  68. — Theologia  Germanica,  chap.  15,  cj.  chap. 

22. 

Note  3,  page  70. — The  eminent  Old  Testament  critic 
Duhm  is  a  conspicuous  example  of  those  who  believe  that 

224 


NOTES 

the  ultimate  basis  of  religion  is  the  mystical  consciousness, 
though  how  far  his  conviction  rests  upon  personal  mystical 
experience  his  fine  reserve  does  not  permit  us  to  know.  See 
his  pamphlet,  Das  Geheimnis  in  der  Religion  (Mohr,  Leip- 
sic,  1896). 

Note  4,  page  76. — The  vigorous  criticism  of  mysticism  by 
the  theologians  of  the  Ritschlian  school  has  exerted  a  most 
important  influence  over  modern  thought  upon  the  subject. 
The  English  reader  can  learn  the  prevailing  Ritschlian  atti- 
tude best  from  Herrmann's  Communion  with  God  (Putnam). 
Harnack  frequently  treats  of  mysticism  in  his  History  of 
Dogma,  see  especially  vol.  Ill,  pp.  97-108.  An  excellent 
brochure  on  mysticism  from  the  Ritschlian  stand-point  is 
Reischle's  Ein  Wort  zur  Controverse  uber  die  Mystik  in  der 
Theologie  (not  translated).  Professor  James  has  stimulated 
greatly  the  interest  of  religious  thinkers  in  mysticism  by  his 
treatment  of  the  subject  in  his  Varieties  of  Religious  Ex- 
perience, lectures  XVI  and  XVII.  Compare  my  discussion 
of  Herrmann  and  James  in  an  article  entitled  "Faith  and 
Mysticism"  in  The  American  Journal  of  Theology,  vol.  VIII, 
pp.  502  ft.  For  historical  treatments  of  the  subject  the  read- 
er may  consult  Inge's  Christian  Mysticism  (Scribner)  and 
Jones's  Studies  in  Mystical  Religion  (Macmillan). 

Note  5,  page  78. — Theologia  Germanica,  chap.  n. 

Note  6,  page  82. — See  Garvie,  The  Ritschlian  Theology, 
chap.  7;  and  compare  Harnack,  Christianity  and  History, 
translated  by  Saunders  (London,  1896). 

Note  7,  page  84. — See  especially  Herrmann's  Faith  and 
Morals,  and  his  Communion  with  God,  chap.  3,  et  passim 
(both  published  by  Putnam). 

Note  8,  page  86. — Herrmann,  Communion  with  God, 
chap.  2. 

Note  9,  page  87. — Ritschl,  Justification  and  Reconciliation, 
pp.  442  ff. 

Note  10,  page  91. — See  Troeltsch  on  "Wesen  der  Religion 
und  der  Religionswissenschaft,"  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart: 
die  christliche  Religion,  II,  p.  487. 

225 


NOTES 

Note  n,  page  92.  —  See  Die  vergleichende  Religions- 
forschung  und  der  religiose  Glaube,  by  Chantepie  de  la  Saus- 
saye;  compare  also  Troeltsch,  "Die  Selbstandigkeit  der 
Religion,"  in  the  Zeitschrijt  fur  Theologie  und  Kirche,  vols.  V 
and  VI,  and  Kaftan's  rejoinder,  "Die  Selbstandigkeit  des 
Christentums,"  in  the  same  journal,  vol.  VI;  for  a  broad  and 
admirable  statement  of  the  Ritschlian  position,  see  Reischle's 
Theologie  und  Religions  geschichte. 

Note  12,  page  92.  —  See  references  under  note  19,  lect- 
ure I. 

Note  13,  page  98.  —  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  by 
Physicus,  pp.  84  if.  ;  quoted  by  Foster,  in  The  Finality  of  the 
Christian  Religion,  p.  199. 

Ill 

Note  i,  page  116.  —  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism, 
vol.  II,  pp.  88,  89. 

Note  2,  page  118.  —  Religion  and  Miracle  (Houghton,  Mif- 
flin  Company). 

Note  3,  page  121.  —  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  57  ft.,  189  ft. 
Compare  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  vol.  II,  lect- 
ure XX. 

Note  4,  page  123.  —  Ward,  op.  cit.,  pp.  282,  283. 

Note  5,  page  125.  —  Hoffding,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy, 
chap.  2;  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  vol.  II,  p.  82. 

Note  6,  page  127.  —  James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp. 
395-400;  Hoffding,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  23,  and 
Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  66;  Otto,  Naturalism  and  Re- 
ligion, pp.  51  ft.  (Putnam);  King,  Reconstruction  in  Theology, 

PP-  83  ft- 

Note  7,  page  128.  —  Dewey,  "The  Evolutionary  Method 

as  Applied  to  Morality,"  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  XI,  pp. 


Note  8,  page  129.  —  Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism, 
vol.  II,  p.  81. 

Note  9,  page  130.  —  Otto,  Naturalism  and  Religion,  chaps. 

226 


NOTES 

4-9;    Paulsen,    Introduction    to    Philosophy,    pp.     185    ff., 


Note  10,  page  133.  —  Mach,  Popular  Science  Lectures,  p. 
178. 

Note  n,  page  135.  —  Hoffding,  Problems  of  Philosophy, 
chap.  3,  and  preface  (by  W.  James),  and  Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion, pp.  68,  165-167,  197,  247,  et  passim;  James,  A  Plu- 
ralistic Universe,  especially  appendix  C;  compare  Troeltsch, 
article  cited  above  (under  lecture  II,  note  10),  p.  488. 

Note  12,  page  137.  —  Compare  W.  A.  Brown,  The  Essence 
of  Christianity,  p.  290. 

Note  13,  page  139.  —  Compare  Hoffding  on  Schleiermacher, 
History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.  II,  pp.  199,  207. 

Note  14,  page  146.  —  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  312. 

Note  15,  page  147.  —  Compare  Foster,  Finality  of  the 
Christian  Religion,  p.  238. 

Note  1  6,  page  147.  —  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  in,  124. 

Note  17,  page  150.  —  Rauwenhoff,  Religionsphilosophie, 
pp.  157-159. 

Note  18,  page  153.  —  See  lecture  I,  note  18,  and  compare 
my  article,  "The  Ultimate  Test  of  Religious  Truth:  Is  It 
Historical  or  Philosophical?"  in  The  American  Journal  of 
Theology,  vol.  XIV,  p.  25. 

Note  19,  page  160.  —  Knox,  The  Direct  and  Fundamental 
Proofs  of  the  Christian  Religion,  pp.  191-196;  W.  A.  Brown, 
The  Essence  of  Christianity,  chap.  8. 

Note  20,  page  163.  —  Browning,  "Reverie." 

IV 

Note   i,  page  169.  —  The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol. 

Hi  P-  395- 

Note  2,  page  170.  —  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  359. 

Note  3,  page  171.  —  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  p.  468. 
Note  4,  page  172.  —  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  292. 
Note  5,  page  174.  —  Studies  in  Good  and  Evil,  p.  28  (Apple- 
tons). 

227 


NOTES 

Note  6,  page  175. — The  World  and  the  Individual,  vol.  II, 

PP-  399  ft- 
Note  7,  page  183. — James,  The  Meaning  oj  Truth,  pp. 

226-229. 

Note  8,  page  198. — The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Salvation, 
p.  442. 

Note  9,  page  200. — Porter,  "Inquiries  Concerning  the 
Divinity  of  Christ,"  American  Journal  of  Theology,  vol.  VIII, 

P-  13- 


228 


INDEX 


Absolute,  the,  11-15,  28- 
His  timelessness,  11-14, 

21,  40,  182  ff. 
His  relation   to  moral   evil, 

167-186. 
Absolute  idealism,  5,  9-24,  40, 

58. 

Its  deductive  method,  22-24. 

Its  treatment  of  moral  evil, 

167-186. 
Atonement, 

The  conception,  193. 

As  an  eternal  principle  in 
God,  194-198,  207,  214. 

And  Christ's  death,  194-196. 

A  work  in  which  the  Chris- 
tian should  share,  199-204, 
208,  213. 

And  social  injustice,  209-214. 
Axioms,  the  product  of  evolu- 
tion, 47,  51,  152-154. 

Buddhism,  103,  159. 

Christ,  94,  158-159. 

In  the  Ritschlian  theology, 
32-34,  84-88,  201-202. 

The  relation  of  his  conscious- 
ness to  mysticism,  86-87. 

His  ethical  consciousness, 
103-104,  114. 

His  religious  consciousness, 
104-105. 

His  fundamental  religious 
achievement,  106,  no-iii. 


And  the  principle  of  atone- 
ment, 194-219. 

His  sonship  and  ours,  199- 
201. 

Sonship  and  atoning  work, 

202-204. 
Christianity, 

An  historical  religion,  32-34, 
38,  40,  76-93. 

Its  vital  quality,  157-158. 

Centres    in    a    personality, 

158-159- 
Its    capacity    for    progress, 

159-160. 
Consciousness,    the    span    of, 

13-14- 
Continuity,     the     conception, 

125-130,    135,    137,    187, 

189-190. 
Critical  philosophy,  the,  9,  25- 

3i»  37-40. 

Dualism, 

In  Royce's  philosophy,  20, 
179. 

In  the  Kantian  theory  of 
knowledge,  37,  40,  51. 

Done  away  with  by  pragma- 
tism, 51-53,  57. 

Eternal,  the, 

The  object  of  man's  longing, 
61-63. 

As  experienced  by  the  mys- 
tic, 63-76. 


229 


INDEX 


Eternal,  the — Continued. 

As  revealed  in  history,  76-93. 

Experienced  in  the  develop- 
ment of  moral  personality, 
93-107,  142-145. 
Evil,  moral, 

The  problem,  164-167. 

Royce's  conception  criti- 
cised, 167-186. 

From  the  stand-point  of 
ethical  monotheism,  186- 
219. 

Its  origin,  188-192. 

Its  two  aspects,  204-215. 
Evolution, 

Its  relation  to  truth,  47,  150- 
160. 

Its  conception  of  law,  125- 

132. 
Experience, 

The  true  source  of  theology, 
1-7,  23-24,  108-113. 

The  final  test  of  truth,  48, 
142-145. 

Faith, 

A  cardinal  principle  of  Kant's 

philosophy,  26. 
A  source  of  truth,  23-24,  29- 

31,  35-36,  40,  49-53,  i  io- 

in,     142-145.     161-163, 

218. 
Its  nature,   26,   29,   34,   83, 

94-95- 
In  the   Ritschlian   theology, 

34,  82-84,  88-89. 
Freedom,  moral,  171-174,  183. 

God, 

His  immanence,   16-22,  40, 

53.  57.  105.  M9-I50.  157. 
179-180. 


EssentiaHy  active,  21,  136, 
148,  187,  194. 

Known  in  experience,  59- 
107,  142-145. 

As  conceived  by  mysticism, 
63-66,  148. 

His  infiniteness,  147-149. 

His  transcendence,  149-150. 

As  external  ruler  of  the  uni- 
verse, 175-178. 

The  atoning,  194-198. 

Hinduism,  102,  159. 
History, 

God's  immanence  in,  19-21, 

53.  57- 
As  a  test  of  truth,  54. 

Hoffding,  135. 

Hypothesis,     its     relation     to 
knowledge,  52. 

Idealism,  absolute,  5,  9-24,  40, 

58. 

Its  deductive  method,  22-24. 
Immanence  of  God,  16-22,  53, 

57,  106,  149,  157,  179-180. 
Individuality,  139-140. 
Intellectualism,  22-24,  36,  136. 

James,  W.,  20,  135. 

His  pluralism  criticised,  145- 

147. 
His   conception   of   God   as 

finite  criticised,  147-149. 
Jesus,  see  Christ. 
Judaism,  103,  159. 

Kantianism,   9,    25-31,   40-41, 

91. 

Its  value  for  theology,  29-30. 
Its  limitations,  37-38. 


230 


INDEX 


Knowledge, 

Through    faith,    23-24,    30, 

etc.  (see  Faith). 
Its  limits  according  to  Kant, 

26-28. 
Its  purposive  character,  43- 

45- 
Through    feeling,    according 

to  mysticism,  64. 

Law,  natural, 

Changes  in  the  conception, 

115-132. 
As  working  hypothesis,  121- 

125. 
The  evolutionary  conception, 

125-132. 
And  purpose,  128-130. 

Materialism,  15,  16. 
Metaphysics, 

Kant's    denial    that    knowl- 
edge in  this  realm  is  possi- 
ble, 26-28. 
The  Ritschlian  attitude  tow- 

ard it,  89-93. 
The  value  of  empirical  meta- 

physics, 49,  92. 
Mohammedanism,  103,  159. 
Monism,  102,  145-147. 
Monotheism,  ethical,  21,  103. 
Related   to  the   idea  of   the 
growing     universe,      135- 
150. 
As  a  metaphysical  point  of 

view,  135-150,  186-187. 
Contrasted     with     monism, 


Its  treatment  of  the  problem 

of  moral  evil,  186-219. 
Morality  and  religion,  93-107, 
140. 


Mysticism,  63-76,  77,  94,  168. 
Its  conception  of  God,  63-66. 
Its  ideal  of  life,  66-67. 
Its  conception  of  the  soul, 

67-68. 
The  influence  it  exerts,  69- 

?i- 
Its  value,  71-76. 

In  contrast  to  Christ's  re- 
ligious consciousness,  86- 
87. 

Nature,  irreversible,  129. 
Neo-Platonism,  102. 

Persian  religion,  102. 
Personality,  ethical, 

Its  significance  for  religion, 

93-107,  139-140. 
Its  atoning  power,  206-209. 
Phenomenalism,  118-120. 
Philosophy, 

The  critical,   9,    25-31,  37- 

40. 

Evolutionary,  150-160. 
Pluralism,  145-147. 
Postulates, 

In  Kant's  philosophy,  30. 
In  pragmatism,  51-52,  121- 

123. 

Pragmatism,   5,   9,   36,   40-58, 
91-93,   121  /.,   148,   150- 
160. 
The   will   in    its   relation    to 

knowledge,  41-45. 
Its  test  of  truth,  45~47»  54- 
Its    conception    of    time    as 

fully  real,  53. 
Historical    character    of    its 

method,  54. 
Its  proof  of  religion,  55-58, 

91-93- 


INDEX 


Reality, 

According  to  absolute  ideal- 
ism, 10-15. 

Not  fully  represented  by  nat- 
ural law,  123-124. 
Reason, 

Theoretical,    26-28,    32-33, 

37- 
Practical,   20-31,  32-34,  37, 

83- 

Religion, 

The  history  of,  39,  55-57,  58, 

92. 

Mystical,  63-76. 
And  the  moral  life,  93-107, 

140. 

Revelation,  historical,  76-93. 
The  older  view,  78-80. 
The  Ritschlian  view,  84-88. 
Ritschlianism,  5,  9,  25,  31-41, 

57,  81-93. 

Its  value,  31-36,  81-89. 
Its  limitations,  37-39,  89-93. 
Romanes,  98. 
Royce,  13,  20,  22. 

His  conception  of  evil  criti- 
cised, 167-186. 

Soul,  the,  as  conceived  by  the 

mystic,  68-69. 
Space,  its  ideality,  18-19. 
Span  of  consciousness,  the,  13- 

14. 
Spirit,   the,   in  the  thought  of 

Paul,  93-101. 
Spontaneity,    126  ff.,   138-141, 

189-190. 


Stevens,  G.  B.,  197. 
Supernaturalism,      the     older 

type,    5,    78-80,    117-118, 

175-178. 

Theologia  Germanica,  68,  77. 
Thomas  a  Kempis,  66. 
Time, 

Its  unreality  according  to  ab- 
solute idealism,  11-14. 
Fully  real  according  to  prag- 
matism, 53,  134. 
Truth, 

Its  practical  nature,  1-7,  23- 

24,   36>    45-47,    etc.    (see 
Faith). 
In  the  religious  realm,  5,  23- 

24,  31*  34- 
Its  relation  to  satisfactions, 

46-47. 

Its  relation  to  social  experi- 
ence, 46-47,  54. 

And  evolution,  47-48. 

Tested  by  history,  54-57. 

Its  standards,  150-160. 

Universe,  the  growing,  132-150. 
In  relation  to  ethical  mono- 
theism, 135-150. 

Value, 

Value-judgments,  34. 
Standards  of,  150-160. 

Will,  the,  its  relation  to  knowl- 
edge according  to  prag- 
matism, 41-45. 


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